De Cive
by Thomas Hobbes
1651

DOMINION

Chapter V

Of the causes, and first begining of civill Government

    I. It is of it selfe manifest, that the actions of men
proceed from the will, and the will from hope, and feare,
insomuch as when they shall see a greater good, or lesse evill,
likely to happen to them by the breach, then observation of the
Lawes, they'l wittingly violate them. The hope therefore which
each man hath of his security, and self-preservation, consists in
this, that by force or craft he may disappoint his neighbour,
either openly, or by stratagem. Whence we may understand, that
the naturall lawes, though well understood, doe not instantly
secure any man in their practise, and consequently, that as long
as there is no caution had from the invasion of others, there
remains to every man that same primitive Right of selfe-defence,
by such means as either he can or will make use of (that is) a
Right to all things, or the Right of warre; and it is sufficient
for the fulfiling of the naturall law, that a man be prepared in
mind to embrace Peace when it may be had.
    II. It is an old saying, That all lawes are silent in the
time of warre, and it is a true one, not onely if we speak of the
civill, but also of the naturall lawes, provided they be referr'd
not to the mind, but to the actions of men, by the third Chapter,
Art. 29. And we mean such a war as is of all men against all men;
such as is the meer state of nature; although in the warre of
nation against nation a certain mean was wont to be observed. And
therefore in old time there was a manner of living, and as it
were a certain oeconomy, which they called leotrikon, living by
Rapine, which was neither against the law of nature, (things then
so standing) nor voyd of glory to those who exercised it with
valour, not with cruelty. Their custome was, taking away the
rest, to spare life, and abstain from Oxen fit for plough, and
every instrument serviceable to husbandry, which yet is not so to
be taken, as if they were bound to doe thus by the law of nature,
but that they had regard to their own glory herein, lest by too
much cruelty, they might be suspected guilty of feare.
    III. Since therefore the exercise of the naturall law is
necessary for the preservation of Peace, and that for the
exercise of the naturall law security is no lesse necessary, it
is worth the considering what that is which affords such a
security: for this matter nothing else can be imagined, but that
each man provide himselfe of such meet helps, as the invasion of
one on the other may bee rendered so dangerous, as either of them
may think it better to refrain, then to meddle. But first it is
plain, that the consent of two or three cannot make good such a
security; because that the addition but of one, or some few on
the other side, is sufficient to make the victory undoubtedly
sure, and hartens the enemy to attacque us. It is therefore
necessary, to the end the security sought for may be obtained,
that the number of them who conspire in a mutuall assistance be
so great, that the accession of some few to the enemies party may
not prove to them a matter of moment sufficient to assure the
victory.
    IV. Farthermore, how great soever the number of them is who
meet on selfe-defence, if yet they agree not among themselves of
some excellent means whereby to compasse this, but every man
after his own manner shall make use of his endeavours, nothing
will be done; because that divided in their opinions they will be
an hinderance to each other, or if they agree well enough to some
one action through hope of victory, spoyle, or revenge, yet
afterward through diversity of wits, and Counsels, or emulation,
and envy, with which men naturally contend, they will be so torne
and rent, as they will neither give mutuall help, nor desire
peace, except they be constrained to it by some common feare.
Whence it followes, that the consent of many, (which consists in
this onely, as we have already defined in the foregoing section,
that they direct all their actions to the same end, and the
common good) that is to say, that the society proceeding from
mutuall help onely, yeelds not that security which they seek for,
who meet, and agree in the exercise of the above-named lawes of
nature; but that somewhat else must be done, that those who have
once consented for the common good, to peace and mutuall help,
may by fear be restrained, lest afterward they again dissent,
when their private Interest shall appear discrepant from the
common good.
    V. Aristotle reckons among those animals which he calls
Politique, not man only, but divers others; as the Ant, the Bee,
&c. which though they be destitute of reason, by which they may
contract, and submit to government, notwithstanding by
consenting, (that is to say) ensuing, or eschewing the same
things, they so direct their actions to a common end, that their
meetings are not obnoxious unto any seditions. Yet is not their
gathering together a civill government, and therefore those
animals not to be termed politicall, because their government is
onely a consent, or many wills concurring in one object, not (as
is necessary in civill government) one will. It is very true that
in those creatures, living only by sense and appetite, their
consent of minds is so durable, as there is no need of any thing
more to secure it, and (by consequence) to preserve peace among
them, then barely their naturall inclination. But among men the
case is otherwise. For first among them there is a contestation
of honour and preferment; among beasts there is none: whence
hatred and envy, out of which arise sedition and warre, is among
men, among beasts no such matter. Next, the naturall appetite of
Bees, and the like creatures, is conformable, and they desire the
common good which among them differs not from their private; but
man scarce esteems any thing good which hath not somewhat of
eminence in the enjoyment, more then that which others doe
possesse. Thirdly, those creatures which are voyd of reason, see
no defect, or think they see none, in the administration of their
Common-weales; but in a multitude of men there are many who
supposing themselves wiser then others, endeavour to innovate,
and divers Innovators innovate divers wayes, which is a meer
distraction, and civill warre. Fourthly, these brute creatures,
howsoever they may have the use of their voyce to signify their
affections to each other, yet want they that same art of words
which is necessarily required to those motions in the mind,
whereby good is represented to it as being better, and evill as
worse then in truth it is; But the tongue of man is a trumpet of
warre, and sedition; and it is reported of Pericles, that he
sometimes by his elegant speeches thundered, and lightened, and
confounded whole Greece it selfe. Fiftly, they cannot distinguish
between injury and harme; Thence it happens that as long as it is
well with them, they blame not their fellowes: But those men are
of most trouble to the Republique, who have most leasure to be
idle; for they use not to contend for publique places before they
have gotten the victory over hunger, and cold. Last of all, the
consent of those brutall creatures is naturall, that of men by
compact onely, (that is to say) artificiall; it is therefore no
matter of wonder if somewhat more be needfull for men to the end
they may live in peace. Wherefore consent, or contracted society,
without some common power whereby particular men may be ruled
through feare of punishment, doth not suffice to make up that
security which is requisite to the exercise of naturall justice.
    VI. Since therefore the conspiring of many wills to the same
end doth not suffice to preserve peace, and to make a lasting
defence, it is requisite that in those necessary matters which
concern Peace and selfe-defence, there be but one will of all
men. But this cannot.be done, unlesse every man will so subject
his will to some other one, to wit, either Man or Counsell, that
whatsoever his will is in those things which are necessary to the
common peace, it be received for the wills of all men in
generall, and of every one in particular. Now the gathering
together of many men who deliberate of what is to be done, or not
to be done, for the common good of all men, is that which I call
a COUNSELL.
    VII. This submission of the wils of all those men to the will
of one man, or one Counsell, is then made, when each one of them
obligeth himself by contract to every one of the rest, not to
resist the will of that one man, or counsell, to which he hath
submitted himselfe; that is, that he refuse him not the use of
his wealth, and strength, against any others whatsoever (for he
is supposed still to retain a Right of defending himselfe against
violence) and this is called UNION. But we understand that to be
the will of the counsell, which is the will of the major part of
those men of whom the Counsell consists.
    VIII. But though the will it self be not voluntary, but only
the beginning of voluntary actions (for we will not to will, but
to act ) and therefore falls least of all under deliberation, and
compact; yet he who submits his will to the will of an other,
conveighs to that other the Right of his strength, and faculties;
insomuch as when the rest have done the same, he to whom they
have submitted hath so much power, as by the terrour of it hee
can conforme the wills of particular men unto unity, and concord.
    IX. Now union thus made is called a City, or civill society,
and also a civill Person; for when there is one will of all men,
it is to be esteemed for one Person, and by the word (one) it is
to be knowne, and distinguished from all particular men, as
having its own Rights and properties; insomuch as neither any one
Citizen, nor all of them together (if we except him whose will
stands for the will of all) is to be accounted the City. A CITY
therefore (that we may define it) is one Person, whose will, by
the compact of many men, is to be received for the will of them
all; so as he may use all the power and faculties of each
particular person, to the maintenance of peace, and for common
defence.
    X. But although every City be a civill Person, yet every
civill Person is not a City; for it may happen that many
Citizens, by the permission of the City, may joyne together in
one Person, for the doing of certain things. These now will be
civill Persons, as the companies of Merchants, and many other
Convents; but Cities they are not, because they have not
submitted themselves to the will of the company simply, and in
all things, but in certain things onely determined by the City;
and on such termes as it is lawfull for any one of them to
contend in judgement against the body it selfe of the sodality;
which is by no means allowable to a Citizen against the City;
such like societies therefore are civill Persons subordinate to
the City.
    XI. In every city, That Man, or Counsell, to whose will each
particular man hath subjected his will (so as hath been declared)
is said to have the SUPREME POWER, or CHIEFE COMMAND, or
DOMINION; which Power, and Right of commanding, consists in this,
that each Citizen hath conveighed all his strength and power to
that man, or Counsell; which to have done (because no man can
transferre his power in a naturall manner) is nothing else then
to have parted with his Right of resisting. Each Citizen, as also
every subordinate civill Person, is called the SUBJECT of him who
hath the chiefe command.
    XII. By what hath been sayed, it is sufficiently shewed, in
what manner, and by what degrees many naturall Persons, through
desire of preserving themselves, and by mutuall feare, have
growne together into a civill Person, whom we have called a City.
But they who submit themselves to another for feare, either
submit to him whom they feare, or some other whom they confide in
for protection; They act according to the first manner who are
vanquished in warre, that they may not be slain; they according
to the second, who are not yet overcome, that they may not be
overcome. The first manner receives its beginning from naturall
Power, and may be called the naturall beginning of a City; the
latter from the Counsell, and constitution of those who meet
together, which is a beginning by institution. Hence it is, that
there are two kinds of Cities, the one naturall, such as is the
paternall, and despoticall; the other institutive, which may be
also called politicall. In the first the Lord acquires to
himselfe such Citizens as he will; in the other the Citizens by
their own wills appoint a Lord over themselves, whether he be one
man, or one company of men endued with the command in chiefe. But
we will speak in the first place of a City politicall or by
institution, and next of a City naturall.

Chap. VI

Of the right of him, whether Counsell, or one Man onely, who hath
the supreme power in the City

    I. We must consider first of all what a multitude of men
(gathering themselves of their owne free wills into society) is,
namely, that it is not any one body, but many men, whereof each
one hath his owne will, and his peculiar judgment concerning all
things that may be propos'd. And though by particular Contracts
each single man may have his own Right, and Propriety, so as one
may say This is mine, the other, That is his; yet will there not
be any thing of which the whole multitude, as a Person distinct
from a single man, can rightly say, This is mine, more then
anothers. Neither must we ascribe any action to the multitude, as
it's one, but (if all, or more of them doe agree) it will not be
an Action, but as many actions, as Men. For although in some
great Sedition, it's commonly said, That the People of that City
have taken up Armes; yet is it true of those onely who are in
Armes, or who consent to them. For the City, which is one Person,
cannot take up Armes against it selfe. Whatsoever therefore is
done by the multitude, must be understood to be done by every one
of those by whom it is made up; and that he, who being in the
Multitude, and yet consented not, nor gave any helps to the
things that were done by it, must be judg'd to have done nothing.
Besides, in a multitude not yet reduc'd into one Person, in that
manner as hath been said, there remaines that same state of
nature in which all things belong to all men and there is no
place for Meum & Tuum, which is call'd Dominion, and Propriety,
by reason that that security is not yet extant which we have
declar'd above to be necessarily requisite for the practise of
the Naturall Laws.
    Multitude, &c.] The Doctrine of the Power of a City over it's
Citizens, almost wholly depends on the understanding of the
difference which is between a multitude of men ruling, and a
multitude ruled: For such is the nature of a City, That a
multitude, or company of Citizens, not onely may have command,
but may also be subject to command, but in diverse senses; which
difference I did beleeve was clearly enough explained in this
first Article,, but by the objections of many against those
things which follow, I discern otherwise; wherefore it seemed
good to me, to the end I might make a fuller explication, to adde
these few things. By Multitude, because it is a collective word,
we understand more then one, so as a multitude of men is the same
with many men; The same word, because it is of the singular
number, signifies one thing, namely, one multitude; but in
neither sense can a multitude be understood to have one will
given to it by nature, but to either a severall; and therefore
neither is any one action whatsoever to be attributed to it:
therefore a Multitude cannot promise, contract, acquire Right,
conveigh Right, act, have, Possesse, and the like, unlesse it be
every one apart, and Man by Man; so as there must be as many
promises, compacts, rights, and actions, as Men. therefore a
Multitude is no naturall Person; but if the same Multitude doe
Contract one with another, that the will of one man, or the
agreeing wills of the major part of them, shall be received for
the will of all, then it becomes one Person; for it is endu'd
with a will, and therefore can doe voluntary actions, such as are
Commanding, making Lawes, acquiring and transferring of Right,
and so forth; and it is oftner call'd the People, then the
Multitude. We must therefore distinguish thus. then we say the
People, or Multitude, wills, commands, or doth any thing, it is
understood that the City which Commands, tills and Acts by the
will of one, or the concurring wills of more, which cannot be
done, but in an Assembly; But as oft as any thing is said to be
done by a Multitude of Men, whether great, or small, without the
will of that man, or assembly of men, that's understood to be
done by a subjected People, that is, by many single Citizens
together, and not proceeding from one till, but from diverse
wills of diverse men, who are Citizens, and Subjects, but not a
City.
    II. Next, we must consider that every one of the Multitude
(by whose meanes there may be a beginning to make up the City)
must agree with the rest, that in those matters which shall be
propounded by any one in the Assembly, that be received for the
will of all which the major part shall approve of; for otherwise
there will be no will at all of a Multitude of Men, whose Wills
and Votes differ so variously. Now if any one will not consent,
the rest notwithstanding shall among themselves constitute the
City without him: Whence it will come to passe, that the City
retaines its primitive Right against the Dissentour, that is, the
Right of tar, as against an Enemy.
    III. But because we said in the foregoing Chapter, the sixth
Article, That there was requir'd to the security of men, not
onely their Consent, but also the Subjection of their wills in
such things as were necessary to Peace and Defence; and that in
that Union, and Subjection, the nature of a City consisted; We
must discerne now in this place, out of those things which may be
propounded, discuss'd, and stated in an Assembly of men, (all
whose wills are contain'd in the will of the major part) what
things are necessary to Peace, and common defence: But first of
all, it is necessary to Peace, that a man be so farre forth
protected against the violence of others, that he may live
securely, that is, that he may have no just cause to fear others,
so long as he doth them no injury. Indeed, to make men altogether
safe from mutuall harmes, so as they cannot be hurt, or
injuriously kill'd, is impossible, and therefore comes not within
deliberation. But care may be had there be no just cause of fear;
for security is the end wherefore men submit themselves to
others, which if it be not had, no man is suppos'd to have
submitted himselfe to ought, or to have quitted his Right to all
things, before that there was a care had of his security.
    IV. It is not enough to obtain this security, that every one
of those who are now growing up into a City, doe covenant with
the rest, either by words, or writing, Not to steal, not to kill,
and to observe the like Lawes; for the pravity of humane
disposition is manifest to all, and by experience too well known
how little (removing the punishment) men are kept to their
duties, through conscience of their promises. We must therefore
provide for our security, not by Compacts, but by Punishments;
and there is then sufficient provision made, when there are so
great punishments appointed for every injury, as apparently it
prove a greater evill to have done it, then not to have done it:
for all men, by a necessity of nature, chuse that which to them
appears to be the lesse evill.
    V. Now the right of punishing is then understood to be given
to any one, when every man Contracts not to assist him who is to
be punished. But I will call this Right, The Sword of Justice.
But these kind of contracts men observe well enough, for the most
part, till either themselves, or their near friends are to
suffer.
    VI. Because therefore for the security of particular men,
and, by consequence for the common peace, it is necessary that
the right of using the Sword for punishment, be transferred to
some Man or Counsell, that Man or Counsell is necessarily
understood by Right to have the supreme Power in the City. For he
that by Right punisheth at his own discretion, by Right compells
all men to all things which he himselfe wills; then which a
greater command cannot be imagined.
    VII. But in vain doe they worship peace at home, who cannot
defend themselves against forrainers; neither is it possible for
them to protect themselves against forrainers, whose forces are
not united; and therefore it is necessary for the preservation of
particulars, that there be some one Counsell, or one man, who
hath the Right to arm, to gather together, to unite so many
Citizens in all dangers, and on all occasions, as shall be
needfull for common defence against the certain number, and
strength of the enemy; and again, (as often as he shall finde it
expedient) to make peace with them. We must understand therefore,
that particular Citizens have conveighed their whole Right of
Warre, and Peace, unto some one Man or Counsell; And that this
right (which we may call the Sword of Warre) belongs to the same
Man, or Counsell, to whom the Sword of Justice belongs; for no
Man can by Right compell Citizens to take up armes, and be at the
expences of Warre, but he who by Right can punish him who doth
not obey. Both Swords therefore, as well this of War, as that of
Justice, even by the constitution it selfe of a City, and
essentially, doe belong to the chiefe command.
    VIII. But because the right of the Sword is nothing else but
to have power by right to use the sword at his own will, it
followes, that the judgement of its right use pertaines to the
same party: for if the Power of judging were in one, and the
power of executing in another, nothing would be done. For in vain
would he give judgement, who could not execute his commands; or
if he executed them by the power of another, he himselfe is not
said to have the Power of the Sword, but that other, to whom he
is onely an Officer. All judgement therefore in a City belongs to
him who hath the swords, (i.e.) to him, who hath the supreme
authority.
    IX. Furthermore, since it no lesse, nay it much more
conduceth to Peace to prevent brawles from arising, then to
appease them being risen; and that all controversies are bred
from hence, that the opinions of men differ concerning Meum &
Tuum, just and unjust, profitable and unprofitable, good and
evill, honest and dishonest, and the like, which every man
esteems according to his own judgement; it belongs to the same
chiefe power to make some common Rules for all men, and to
declare them publiquely, by which every man may know what may be
called his, what anothers, what just, what unjust, what honest,
what dishonest, what good, what evill, that is summarily, what is
to be done, what to be avoyded in our common course of life. But
those Rules and measures are usually called the civill Lawes, or
the Lawes of the City, as being the Commands of him who hath the
supreme power in the City. And the CIVILL LAWES (that we may
define them) are nothing else but the commands of him who hath
the chiefe authority in the City, for direction of the future
actions of his Citizens.
    X. Furthermore, since the affaires of the City, both those of
Warre, and Peace, cannot possibly be all administred by one man,
or one Counsell, without Officers and subordinate Magistrates,
and that it appertains to Peace, and common defence, that they to
whom it belongs justly to judge of controversies, to search into
neighbouring counsels, prudently to wage war, and on all hands
warily to attend the benefit of the City, should also rightly
exercise their offices; it is consonant to reason, that they
depend on, and be chosen by him who hath the chiefe command both
in War, and in Peace.
    XI. It is also manifest, that all voluntary actions have
their beginning from, and necessarily depend on the will, and
that the will of doing, or omitting ought, depends on the opinion
of the good and evill of the reward, or punishment, which a man
conceives he shall receive by the act, or omission; so as the
actions of all men are ruled by the opinions of each; wherefore
by evident and necessary inference, we may understand that it
very much concerns the interest of Peace, that no opinions or
doctrines be delivered to Citizens, by which they may imagine,
that either by Right they may not obey the Lawes of the City,
that is, the commands of that man, or Counsell, to whom the
supreme power is committed, or that it is lawfull for to resist
him, or that a lesse punishment remaines for him that denies,
then him that yeelds obedience. For if one command somewhat to be
done under penalty of naturall death, another forbids it under
pain of eternall death, and both by their own Right, it will
follow that the Citizens, although innocent, are not onely by
Right punishable, but that the City it selfe is altogether
dissolved; for no man can serve two Masters: nor is he lesse, but
rather more, a Master, whom we believe we are to obey for feare
of damnation, then he whom we obey for feare of temporall death.
It followes therefore, that this one, whether Man, or Court, to
whom the City hath committed the supreme Power, have also this
Right, That he both judge what opinions and doctrines are enemies
unto peace, and also that he forbid them to be taught.
    Judge what opinions, & c.] There is scarce any Principle,
neither in the worship of God, nor humane sciences, from whence
there may not spring dissentions, discords, reproaches, and by
degrees war it selfe; neither doth this happen by reason of the
falshood of the Principle, but of the disposition of men, who
seeming wise to themselves, will needs appear such to all others:
But though such dissentions cannot be hindered from arising, yet
may they be restrained by the exercise of the supreme Power, that
they Prove no hinderance to the publique peace. of these kind of
opinions therefore I have not spoken of in this place. There are
certain doctrines wherewith Subjects being tainted, they verily
believe that obedience may be refused to the City, and that by
Right they may, nay ought, to oppose, and fight against chiefe
Princes, and dignities. Such are those, which whether directly,
and openly, or more obscurely, and by consequence require
obedience to be given to others beside them to whom the supreme
authority is committed. I deny not, but this reflects on that
Power which many living under other government, ascribe to the
chiefe head of the Church of Rome, and also on that, which
elsewhere out of that Church, Bishops require in theirs, to be
given to them; and last of all, on that liberty which the lower
sort of Citizens under pretence of Religion doe challenge to
themselves; for what civill war was there ever in the Christian
world, which did not either grow from, or was nourisht by this
Root? The judgement therefore of doctrines, whether they be
repugnant to civill obedience or not, and if they be repugnant,
the Power of prohibiting them to be taught, I doe here attribute
to the civill authority; for since there is no man who grants not
to the City the judgement of those things which belong to its
Peace, and defence, and it is manifest, that the opinions which I
have already recited do relate to its Peace, it followes
necessarily, that the examination of those opinions, whether they
be such, or not, must be referred to the City, that is, to him
who hath the supreme authority.
    XII. Last of all, from this consideration, that each Citizen
hath submitted his Will to his who hath the Supreme Command in
the City, so as he may not employ his strength against him; it
followes manifestly, that whatsoever shall be done by him who
commands, must not be punisht; for as he who hath not power
enough, cannot punish him naturally; so neither can he punish him
by Right, who by Right hath not sufficient power.
    XIII. It is most manifest by what hath been said, That in
every perfect City (that is, where no Citizen hath Right to use
his faculties, at his owne discretion, for the preservation of
himselfe, or where the Right of the private Sword is excluded)
there is a Supreme Power in some one, greater then which cannot
by Right be conferr'd by men, or greater then which no mortall
man can have over himself. But that power, greater then which
cannot by men, be conveigh'd on a man, we call ABSOLUTE: for
whosoever hath so submitted his will to the will of the City,
That he can, unpunisht, doe any thing, make Lawes, judge
Controversies, set Penalties, make use, at his own pleasure, of
the strength, and wealth of men, and all this by Right, truly he
hath given him the greatest dominion that can be granted. This
same may be confirm'd by experience in all the Cities which are,
or ever have beene; for though it be sometimes in doubt, what
Man, or Counsell, hath the Chief Command, yet ever there is such
a Command, and alwayes exercis'd, except in the time of Sedition,
and Civill War, and then there are two Chiefe Commands made out
of one: Now those seditious persons who dispute against absolute
Authority, doe not so much care to destroy it, as to conveigh it
on others; for removing this power, they together take away
Civill Society, and a confusion of all things returnes. There is
so much obedience joyn'd to this absolute Right of the Chief
Ruler, as is necessarily requir'd for the Government of the City,
that is to say, so much as that Right of his may not be granted
in vaine. Now this kind of obedience, although for some reasons
it may sometimes, by Right, be deny'd, yet because a greater
cannot be perform'd, we will call it SIMPLE. But the obligation
to performe this growes not immediately from that Contract by
which we have conveigh'd all our Right on the City, but mediately
from hence, That, without obedience, the Cities Right would be
frustrate, and by consequence there would be no City constituted.
For it is one thing if I say, I give you Right to Command what
you will; another, if I say, I will doe whatsoever you Command;
and the Command may be such, as I would rather die then doe it;
forasmuch therefore as no man can be bound to will being kill'd,
much lesse is he tyed to that, which to him is worse then death:
if therefore I be commanded to kill my self, I am not bound to
doe it; for though I deny to doe it, yet the Right of dominion is
not frustrated, since others may be found, who being commanded,
will not refuse to doe it; neither doe I refuse to doe that which
I have contracted to doe. In like manner, if the Chief Ruler
command any man to kill him, he is not tyed to doe it, because it
cannot be conceiv'd that he made any such Covenant; nor if he
command to execute a Parent, whether he be innocent, or guilty,
and condemned by the Law, since there are others, who, being
commanded, will doe that, and a Son will rather die, then live
infamous, and hated of all the world. There are many other cases,
in which, since the Commands are shamefull to be done by some,
and not by others, Obedience may, by Right, be perform'd by
these, and refus'd by those; and this, without breach of that
absolute Right which was given to the Chief Ruler. For in no case
is the Right taken away from him, of slaying those who shall
refuse to obey him. But they who thus kill men, although by Right
given them from him that hath it, yet if they use that Right
otherwise then right Reason requires, they sin against the Lawes
of Nature, (that is) against God.
    Absolute] A popular state openly challengeth absolute
dominion, and the Citizens oppose it not, for in the gathering
together of many men, they acknowledge the face of a City; and
even the unskilfull understand, that matters there are rul'd by
Counsell. Yet monarchy is no lesse a City, then Democraty, and
absolute Kings have their Counsellours, from whom they will take
advice, and suffer their Power, in matters of greater
consequence, to be guided, but not recall'd. But it appears not
to most men how a City is contain'd in the person of a King; and
therefore they object against Absolute Command: First, that if
any man had such a Right, the condition of the Citizens would be
miserable: For thus they think, he will take all, spoil all, kill
all; and every man counts it his onely happinesse that he is not
already spoil'd and kill'd. But why should he doe thus? not
because he can; for unlesse he have a mind to it, he will not doe
it. till he, to please one, or some few, spoil all the rest?
First, though by Right, that is, without injury to them, he may
doe it, yet can he not doe it justly, that is, without breach of
the Naturall Lawes, and injury against God. And therefore there
is some security for Subjects in the Oaths which princes take.
Next, if he could justly doe it, or that he made no account of
his Oath, yet appeares there no reason why he should desire it,
since he findes no good in it. But it cannot be deny'd but a
prince may sometimes have an inclination to doe wickedly; but
grant then that thou hadst given him a power which were not
absolute, but so much onely as suffic'd to defend thee from the
injuries of others, which, if thou wilt be safe, is necessary for
thee to give; are not all the same things to be feared? for he
that hath strength enough to protect all, wants not sufficiency
to oppresse all. Here is no other difficulty then, but that
humane affaires cannot be without some inconvenience. And this
inconvenience it self is in the Citizens, not in the Government;
for if men could rule themselves, every man by his own command,
that's to say, could they live according to the Lawes of Nature,
there would be no need at all of a City, nor of a common coercive
power. Secondly, they object, That there is no Dominion in the
Christian world Absolute; which indeed is not true, for all
Monarchies, and all other States, are so; for although they, who
have the chief Command, doe not all those things they would, and
what they know profitable to the City, the reason of that is not
the defect of Right in them, but the consideration of their
Citizens, who busied about their private interest, and carelesse
of what tends to the publique, cannot sometimes be drawn to
performe their duties without the hazard of the City. therefore
princes sometimes forbear the exercise of their Right, and
prudently remit somewhat of the act, but nothing of their Right.
    XIV. Neither can any man give somewhat to himselfe; for he is
already suppos'd to have what he can give himself; nor can he be
oblig'd to himselfe, for the same party being both the obliged,
and the Obliger, and the Obliger having power to release the
obliged, it were meerly in vain for a man to be obliged to
himselfe, because he can release himself at his own pleasure; and
he that can doe this, is already actually free. Whence its
plaine, that the City is not tyed to the Civill Lawes; for the
Civill Lawes are the Lawes of the City, by which, if she were
engag'd, she should be engag'd to her selfe. Neither can the City
be oblig'd to her Citizen, because, if he will, he can free her
from her obligation; and he will, as oft as she wills, (for the
will of every Citizen is in all things comprehended in the will
of the City); the City therefore is free when she pleaseth, that
is, she is now actually free; but the will of a Councell, or one
who hath the Supreme Authority given him, is the will of the
City; he therefore containes the wills of all particular
Citizens: Therefore neither is he bound to the Civill Lawes (for
this is to be bound to himself) nor to any of his Citizens.
    XV. Now because (as hath been shewn above) before the
constitution of a City all things belong'd to all men, nor is
there that thing which any man can so call his, as any other may
not, by the same Right, claime as his own, (for where all things
are common, there can be nothing proper to any man) it followes,
that propriety receiv'd its beginning when Cities receiv'd
theirs, and that that onely is proper to each man which he can
keep by the Lawes, and the power of the whole City, (that is) of
him on whom its chief command is conferr'd. Whence we understand,
that each particular Citizen hath a propriety, to which none of
his fellow-Citizens hath Right, because they are tyed to the same
Lawes; but he hath no propriety in which the Chief Ruler (whose
Commands are the Lawes, whose will contains the will of each man,
and who, by every single person, is constituted the Supreme
Judge) hath not a Right. But although there be many things which
the City permits to its Citizens, and therefore they may
sometimes goe to Law against their Chief; yet is not that action
belonging to Civill Right, but to Naturall Equity; neither is it
concerning what by Right he may doe who hath the Supreme power,
but what he hath been willing shouLd be done, and therefore he
shall be judge himself, as though (the equity of the cause being
well understood) he could not give wrong judgment.
    Propriety receiv'd its beginning, &c.] What's objected by
some, That the propriety of goods, even before the constitution
of Cities, was found in Fathers of Families, that objection is
vaine, because I have already declar'd, That a Family is a little
City. For the Sonnes of a Family have a propriety of their goods
granted them by their Father, distinguisht indeed from the rest
of the Sons of the same Family, but not from the propriety of the
Father himself; but the Fathers of diverse Families, who are
subject neither to any common Father, nor Lord, have a common
Right in all things.
    What by Right he may doe, &c.] As often as a Citizen is
granted to have an action of Law against the Supreme, i.e.
against the City, the question is not in that action, whether the
City may, by Right, keep possession of the thing in controversie,
but whether by the Lawes formerly made she would keep it; for the
Law is the declared will of the Supreme: since then the City may
raise money from the Citizens under two Titles, either as
Tribute, or as Debt, in the former case there is no action of Law
allowed; for there can be no question whether the City have Right
to require Tribute: in the latter it is allowed, because the City
will take nothing from its Citizens by fraud, or cunning, and yet
if need require, all they have, openly; and therefore he that
condemnes this place, saying, That by this doctrine it is easie
for princes to free themselves from their Debts, he does it
impertinently.
    XVI. Theft, further, AduLtery, and all injuries are forbid by
the Lawes of nature; but what is to be called Theft, what
further, what Adultery, what injury in a Citizen, this is not to
be determined by the naturall, but by the civill Law: for not
every taking away of the thing which another possesseth, but
onely another mans goods is theft; but what is ours, and what
anothers, is a question belonging to the civill Law. In like
manner, not every killing of a man is further, but onely that
which the civill Law forbids; neither is all encounter with women
Adultery, but onely that which the civill Law prohibits. Lastly,
all breach of promise is an injury, where the promise it selfe is
lawfull, but where there is no Right to make any compact, there
can be no conveighance of it, and therefore there can no injury
follow, as hath been said in the second Chapter, Artic. 17. Now
what we may contract for, and what not, depends wholly upon the
civill Lawes. The City of Lacedoemon therefore rightly ordered
that those young men who could so take away certain goods from
others as not to be caught, should goe unpunisht; for it was
nothing else, but to make a Law that what was so acquired should
be their own, and not anothers. Rightly also is that man every
where slain, whom we kill in warre, or by the necessity of
selfe-defence. So also that copulation which in one City is
Matrimony, in another will be judged Adultery. Also those
contracts which make up Marriage in one Citizen, doe not so in
another, although of the same City. because that he who is
forbidden by the City (that is by that one man, or Councell,
whose the supreme power is) to contract ought, hath no Right to
make any contract, and therefore having made any, it is not
valid, and by consequence, no Marriage. But his contract which
received no prohibition, was therefore of force, and so was
Matrimony: neither addes it any force to any unlawfull contracts,
that they were made by an Oath, or Sacrament, for those adde
nothing to the strengthning of the contract, as hath been said
above Chap. 2. Artic. 22. What therefore Theft, what Murther,
what Adultery, and in generall what injury is, must be known by
the civill Lawes, that is, the commands of him who hath the
supreme authority.
    That they were made by an Oath or Sacrament, &c.] Whether
Matrimony bee a Sacrament (in which sense that word is used by
some Divines) or not, it is not my purpose to dispute: Onely I
say, that the legitimate contract of a man and woman to live
together, i.e. granted by the civill Law, whether it be a
Sacrament, or not, is surely a legitimate Marriage; but that
copulation which the City hath prohibited is no marriage, since
it is of t he essence of Marriage to be a legitimate contract.
There were legitimate marriages in many places, as among the
Jewes, the Grecians, the Romans, which yet might be dissolved.
But with those who permit no such contracts, but by a Law that
they shall never be broke, Wedlock cannot be dissolved; and the
reason is, because the City hath commanded it to be indissoluble,
not because Matrimony is a Sacrament. Wherefore the ceremonies
which at weddings are to be performed in the Temple, to blesse,
or (if I may say so) to consecrate the husband and wife, will
perhaps belong only to the office of Clergy-men; all the rest,
namely who, when, and by what contracts Marriages may be made,
pertains to the Lawes of the City.
    XVII. This same supreme command, and absolute power, seems so
harsh to the greatest part of men, as they hate the very naming
of them; which happens chiefly through want of knowledge, what
humane nature, and the civill Lawes are, and partly also through
their default, who when they are invested with so great
authority, abuse their power to their own lust. That they may
therefore avoyd this kind of supreme authority, some of them will
have a City well enough constituted, if they who shall be the
Citizens convening, doe agree concerning certaine Articles
propounded, and in that convent agitated and approved; and doe
command them to be observed, and punishments prescribed to be
inflicted on them who shall break them: to which purpose, and
also to the repelling of a forraign enemy, they appoint a certain
and limited return, with this condition, that if that suffice
not, they may call a new convention of estates. Who sees not in a
City thus constituted, that the Assembly who prescribed those
things had an absolute power? If therefore the assembly continue,
or from time to time have a certain day, and place of meeting,
that power will be perpetuall. But if they wholly dissolve,
either the City dissolves with them, and so all is returned to
the state of War, or else there is somewhere a power left to
punish those who shall transgresse the Lawes, whosoever, or how
many soever they be that have it, which cannot possibly be
without an absolute power: for he that by right hath this might
given, by punishments to restrain what Citizens he pleaseth, hath
such a power, as a greater cannot possibly be given by any
Citizens.
    XVIII. It is therefore manifest, that in every City there is
some one man, or Councell, or Court, who by Right hath as great a
power over each single Citizen, as each man hath over himselfe
considered out of that civill state, that is, supreme and
absolute, to be limited onely by the strength and forces of the
City it selfe, and by nothing else in the world: for if his power
were limited, that limitation must necessarily proceed from some
greater power; For he that prescribes limits, must have a greater
power then he who is confin'd by them; now that confining power
is either without limit, or is again restrained by some other
greater then it selfe, and so we shall at length arrive to a
power which hath no other limit, but that which is the terminus
ultimus of the forces of all the Citizens together. That same is
called the supreme command, and if it bee committed to a
councell, a supreme councell, but if to one man, the supreme Lord
of the City. Now the notes of supreme command are these, To make
and abrogate Lawes. To determine War and peace, to know, and
judge of all controversies, either by himselfe, or by Judges
appointed by him; to elect all Magistrates; Ministers, and
Counsellors. Lastly, if there be any man who by Right can doe
some one action which is not lawfull for any Citizen or Citizens
to doe beside himselfe, that man hath obtained the supreme power:
For those things which by Right may not be done by any one or
many Citizens, the City it selfe can onely doe: He therefore that
doth those things useth the Cities Right, which is the supreme
power.
    XIX. They who compare a City and its Citizens, with a man and
his members, almost all say, that he who hath the supreme power
in the City, is in relation to the whole City, such as the head
is to the whole man; But it appeares by what hath been already
said, that he who is endued with such a power, (whether it be a
man, or a Court) hath a relation to the City, not as that of the
head, but of the soule to the body. For it is the soule by which
a man hath a will, that is, can either will, or nill; so by him
who hath the supreme power, and no otherwise, the City hath a
will, and can either will or nill. A Court of Counsellors is
rather to be compared with the head, or one Counsellor, whose
only Counsell (if of any one alone) the chief Ruler makes use of
in matters of greatest moment: for the office of the head is to
counsell, as the soules is to command.
    XX. Forasmuch as the supreme command is constituted by vertue
of the compacts which each single Citizen, or subject, mutually
makes with the other. but all contracts, as they receive their
force from the contractors, so by their consent they lose it
again, and are broken; perhaps some may inferre hence, that by
the consent of all the subjects together, the supreme authority
may be wholly taken away. Which inference if it were true, I
cannot discerne what danger would thence by Right arise to the
supreme Commanders. For since it is supposed, that each one hath
obliged himselfe to each other, if any one of them shall refuse,
whatsoever the rest shall agree to doe, he is bound
notwithstanding; neither can any man without injury to me, doe
that which by contract made with me, he hath obliged himselfe not
to doe. But it is not to be imagined that ever it will happen,
that all the subjects together, not so much as one excepted, will
combine against the supreme power; wherefore there is no feare
for Rulers in chiefe, that by any Right they can be despoyled of
their authority. If notwithstanding it were granted, that their
Right depended onely on that contract which each man makes with
his fellow-citizen, it might very easily happen, that they might
be robbed of that Dominion under pretence of Right; for subjects
being called either by the command of the City, or seditiously
flocking together, most men think that the consents of all are
contained in the votes of the greater part. Which in truth is
false; for it is not from nature that the consent of the major
part should be received for the consent of all, neither is it
true in tumults, but it proceeds from civill institution, and is
then onely true, when that Man or Court which hath the supreme
power, assembling his subjects, by reason of the greatnesse of
their number, allowes those that are elected a power of speaking
for those who elected them, and will have the major part of
voyces, in such matters as are by him propounded to be discust,
to be as effectuall as the whole. But we cannot imagine that he
who is chiefe, ever convened his subjects with intention that
they should dispute his Right, unlesse, weary of the burthen of
his charge, he declared in plain termes, that he renounces and
abandons his government. Now because most men through ignorance
esteem not the consent of the major part of Citizens only, but
even of a very few, provided they be of their opinion, for the
consent of the whole City, it may very well seem to them, that
the supreme authority may by right be abrogated, so it be done in
some great Assembly of Citizens by the votes of the greater
number; But though a government be constituted by the contracts
of particular men with particulars, yet its Right depends not on
that obligation onely; there is another tye also toward him who
commands; for each Citizen compacting with his fellow, sayes
thus, I conveigh my Right on this party, upon condition, that you
passe yours to the same; by which means, that Right which every
man had before to use his faculties to his own advantage, is now
wholly translated on some certain man, or Councell, for the
common benefit; wherefore what by the mutuall contracts each one
hath made with the other, what by the donation of Right which
every man is bound to ratifie to him that commands, the
government is upheld by a double obligation from the Citizens,
first that which is due to their fellow citizens, next that which
they owe to their prince. Wherefore no subjects how many soever
they be, can with any Right despoyle him who bears the chiefe
Rule, of his authority, even without his own consent.

Chap. VII

Of the three kindes of Government, Democracy, Aristocracy,
Monarchie.

    I. We have already spoken of a City by institution in its
Genus; we will now say somewhat of its species. As for the
difference of Cities, it is taken from the difference of the
Persons, to whom the Supreme Power is committed; this Power is
committed either to one Man, or Councell, or some one Court
consisting of many men. Furthermore, a Councell of many men,
consists either of all the Citizens, (insomuch as every man of
them hath a Right to Vote, and an interest in the ordering of the
greatest affaires, if he will himselfe) or of a part onely; from
whence there arise three sorts of Government: The one, when the
Power is in a Councell, where every Citizen hath a right to Vote,
and it is call'd a DEMOCRATY. The other, when it is in a
Councell, where not all, but some part onely have their
suffrages, and we call it an ARISTOCRATY. The third is that, when
the Supreme Authority rests onely in one, and it is stiled a
MONARCHY. In the first, he that governes is called demos, The
PEOPLE. In the second, the NOBLES. In the third, the MONARCH.
    II. Now, although Ancient Writers of Politiques have
introduc'd three other kindes of Government opposite to these, to
wit, Anarchy or confusion to Democraty, Oligarchy, that is, the
command of some few, to Aristocraty, and Tyranny to Monarchy, yet
are not these three distinct formes of Government, but three
diverse Titles given by those who were either displeas'd with
that present Government, or those that bare Rule. For men, by
giving names, doe usually, not onely signifie the things
themselves, but also their own affections, as love, hatred,
anger, and the like, whence it happens that what one man calls a
Democraty, another calls an Anarchy; what one counts an
Aristocraty, another esteemes an Oligarchie. and whom one titles
a King, another stiles him a Tyrant; so as we see these names
betoken not a diverse kinde of Government, but the diverse
opinions of the Subjects concerning him who hath the Supreme
Power. For first, who sees not that Anarchy is equally opposite
to all the forenam'd Formes? For that word signifies that there
is no Government at all, that is, not any City. But how is it
possible that no City should be the species of a City?
Farthermore, what difference is there between an Oligarchie,
which signifies the Command of a few, or Grandees, or an
Aristocraty, which is that of the Prime, or Chief Heads, more
then that men differ so among themselves, that the same things
seeme not good to all men? Whence it happens, that those persons,
who by some are look'd on as the best, are by others esteem'd to
be the worst of all men.
    III. But men, by reason of their passions, will very hardly
be perswaded that a Kingdome, and Tyranny, are not diverse kindes
of Cities, who though they would rather have the City subject to
one, then many, yet doe they not beleeve it to be well govern'd
unlesse it accord with their judgements: But we must discover by
Reason, and not by Passion, what the difference is between a
King, and a Tyrant: but first, they differ not in this, That a
Tyrant hath the greater Power, for greater then the Supreme
cannot be granted; nor in this, That one hath a limited power,
the other not; for he, whose authority is limited, is no King,
but his Subject that limits him. Lastly, neither differ they in
their manner of acquisition; for if in a Democraticall, or
Aristocraticall Government some one Citizen should, by force,
possesse himself of the Supreme Power, if he gain the consent of
all the Citizens, he becomes a legitimate Monarch; if not, he is
an Enemy, not a Tyrant. They differ therefore in the sole
exercise of their command, insomuch as he is said to be a King,
who governs wel, and he a Tyrant that doth otherwise. The case
therefore is brought to this passe, That a King legitimately
constituted in his Government, if he seeme to his Subjects to
Rule well, and to their liking, they afford him the appellation
of a King, if not, they count him a Tyrant. Wherefore we see a
Kingdome, and Tyranny, are not diverse Formes of Government, but
one and the self-same Monarch hath the name of a King given him
in point of Honour, and Reverence to him, and of a Tyrant in way
of contumely, and reproach. But what we frequently finde in
bookes said against Tyrants, took its originall from Greek, and
Roman Writers, whose Government was partly Democraticall, and
partly Aristocraticall, and therefore not Tyrants onely, but even
Kings were odious to them.
    IV. There are, who indeed doe think it necessary, That a
Supreme Command should be somewhere extant in a, City. but if it
should be in any one, either Man, or Councell, it would follow
(they say) that all the Citizens must be slaves. Avoiding this
condition, they imagine that there may be a certaine Form of
Government compounded of those three kinds we have spoken of, yet
different from each particular, which they call a mixt Monarchie,
or mixt Aristocraty, or mixt Democraty, according as any one of
these three sorts shall be more eminent then the rest: For
example, if the naming of Magistrates, and the arbitration of
War, and Peace, should belong to the King, Judicature to the
Lords, and contribution of Monies to the People, and the power of
making Lawes too altogether, this kind of State would they call a
mixt Monarchie forsooth. But if it were possible that there could
be such a State, it would no whit advantage the liberty of the
subject; for as long as they all agree, each single Citizen is as
much subject as possibly he can be; but if they disagree, the
State returns to a Civill War, and the Right of the private
Sword, which certainly is much worse then any subjection
whatsoever: But that there can be no such kind of Government hath
been sufficiently demonstrated in the foregoing Chapter, Artic:
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.
    But that there can be no such kinde of Government] Most men
grant, That a Government ought not to be divided, but they would
have it moderated, and bounded by some limits. Truly it is very
reasonable it should be so; but if these men, when they speak of
moderating, and limiting, do understand dividing it, they make a
very fond distinction. Truly, for my part, I wish that not onely
Kings, but all other Persons endued with Supreme Authority would
so temper themselves as to commit no wrong, and onely minding
their charges contain themselves within the limits of the
naturall, and divine Lawes: But they who distinguish thus, they
would have the chief Power bounded, and restrain'd by others;
which, because it cannot be done, but that they who doe set the
limits, must needs have some part of the Power, whereby they may
be enabled to doe it, the Government is properly divided, not
moderated.
    V. Let us see a little now in the constituting of each Form
of Government, what the constitutours doe. Those who met together
with intention to erect a City, were almost in the very act of
meeting a Democraty; for in that they willingly met, they are
suppos'd oblig'd to the observation of what shall be determin'd
by the major part: which, while that convent lasts, or is
adjourn'd to some certain dayes, and places, is a clear
Democraty; for that convent, whose will is the will of all the
Citizens, hath the Supreme Authority; and because in this Convent
every man is suppos'd to have a Right to give his voice, it
followes, that it is a Democraty by the definition given in the
first Article of this Chap. But if they depart, and break up the
Convent, and appoint no time, or place, where, and when they
shall meet again, the publick weal returns to Anarchy, and the
same state it stood in before their meeting, that is, to the
state of all men warring against all. The People therefore
retains the supreme power no longer then there is a certain day
and place publiquely appointed, and known, to which whosoever
will, may resort. For except that be known and determined, they
may either meet at divers times, and places, that is in factions,
or not at all; and then it is no longer demos, the People, but a
dissolute multitude, to whom we can neither attributes any
Action, or Right: Two things therefore frame a Democratie,
whereof one (to wit the perpetuall prescription of Convents)
makes demos, the People, the other (which is a plurality of
voyces) to kratos or the power.
    VI. Furthermore, it will not be sufficient for the People, so
as to maintain its supremacy, to have some certain known times,
and places of meeting, unlesse that either the intervals of the
times be of lesse distance, then that any thing may in the mean
time happen whereby (by reason of the defect of power) the City
may be brought into some danger, or at least that the exercise of
the supreme authority be, during the intervall, granted to some
one man, or Councell. For unlesse this be done, there is not that
wary care, and heed taken for the defence and Peace of single men
which ought to be, and therefore will not deserve the name of a
City, because that in it for want of security, every mans Right
of defending himselfe at his own pleasure, returns to him again.
    VII. Democraty is not framed by contract of particular
persons with the People, but by mutuall compacts of single men
each with other. But hence it appears in the first place, that
the Persons contracting, must be in being before the contract it
selfe. But the People is not in being before the constitution of
government, as not being any Person, but a multitude of single
Persons; wherefore there could then no contract passe between the
People and the Subject. Now, if after that government is framed,
the subject make any contract with the People, it is in vain,
because the People contains within its will, the will of that
subject to whom it is supposed to be obliged; and therefore may
at its own will and pleasure disengage it selfe, and by
consequence is now actually free. But in the second place, that
single Persons doe contract each with other may be inferred from
hence, that in vain sure would the City have been constituted, if
the Citizens had been engaged by no contracts to doe, or omit
what the City should command to be done or omitted. Because
therefore such kind of compacts must be understood to passe as
necessary to the making up of a City, but none can be made (as is
already shewed) between the Subject and the People; it followes,
that they must be made between single Citizens, namely that each
man contract to submit his will to the will of the major part, on
condition that the rest also doe the like, as if every one should
say thus, I give up my Right unto the People for your sake, on
condition, that you also deliver up yours, for mine.
    VIII. An Aristocraty, or Councell of Nobles endued with
supreme authoritie, receives its originall from a Democraty,
which gives up its Right unto it; where we must understand that
certain men distinguisht from others, either by eminence of
title, blood, or some other Character, are propounded to the
People, and by plurality of voyces are elected; and being
elected, the whole Right of the People, or City, is conveighed on
them, insomuch as whatsoever the People might doe before, the
same by Right may this Court of elected Nobles now doe. Which
being done, it is clear that the People, considered as one
Person, (its supreme authority being already transferred on
these) is no longer now in being.
    IX. As in Democraty the People, so in an Aristocraty the
Court of Nobles is free from all manner of obligation; for seeing
subjects not contracting with the People, but by mutuall compacts
among themselves, were tyed to all that the People did, hence
also they were tyed to that act of the People in resigning up its
Right of government into the hands of Nobles. Neither could this
Court, although elected by the People, be by it obliged to any
thing; for being erected, the People is at once dissolved, as was
declared above, and the authority it had as being a Person
utterly vanisheth. Wherefore the obligation which was due to the
Person must also vanish, and perish together with it.
    X. Aristocraty hath these considerations, together with
Democraty; First, that without an appointment of some certain
times, and places, at which the Court of Nobles may meet, it is
no longer a Court, or one Person, but a dissolute multitude
without any supreme power; Secondly, that the times of their
assembling cannot be disjoyned by long intervalls, without
prejudice to the supreme power, unlesse its administration be
transferred to some one man: Now the reasons why this happens,
are the same which we set down in the fifth Article.
    XI. As an Aristocratie, so also a monarchy is derived from
the Power of the People, transferring its Right, (that is) its
Authoritie on one man: Here also we must understand, that some
one man, either by name, or some other token, is propounded to be
taken notice of above all the rest, and that by a plurality of
voyces the whole Right of the People is conveighed on him,
insomuch as whatsoever the People could doe before he were
elected, the same in every Respect may he by Right now doe, being
elected; which being done, the People is no longer one Person,
but a rude multitude, as being only one before by vertue of the
supreme command, whereof they now have made a conveyance from
themselves on this one Man.
    XII. And therefore neither doth the Monarch oblige himselfe
to any for the command he receives, for he receives it from the
People; but as hath been shewed above, the People, as soon as
that act is done, ceaseth to be a Person; but the Person
vanishing, all obligation to the Person vanisheth. The subjects
therefore are tyed to perform obedience to the Monarch, by those
compacts only by which they mutually obliged themselves to the
observation of all that the People should command them, (that is)
to obey that Monarch, if he were made by the People.
    XIII. But a Monarchy differs as well from an Aristocraty, as
a Democratie, in this chiefly, that in those there must be
certain set times and places for deliberation, and consultation
of affaires, that is, for the actuall exercise of it in all
times, and places; For the People, or the Nobles not being one
naturall Person must necessarily have their meetings. The Monarch
who is one by nature, is alwayes in a present capacity to execute
his authority.
    XIV. Because we have declared above in the 7. 9. and 12.
Articles, that they who have gotten the supreme command are by no
compacts obliged to any man, it necessarily followes, that they
can doe no injury to the subjects; for injury according to the
definition made in the third Article of the third Chapter, is
nothing else but a breach of contract: and therefore where no
contracts have part, there can be no injury. Yet the People, the
Nobles, and the Monarch may diverse wayes transgresse against the
other Lawes of nature, as by cruelty, iniquity, contumely, and
other like vices, which come not under this strict, and exact
notion of injury. But if the subject yeeld not obedience to the
supreme, he will in propriety of speech be said to be injurious
as well to his fellow subjects, because each man hath compacted
with the other to obey, as to his chief Ruler, in resuming that
Right, which he hath given him, without his consent. And in a
Democraty, or Aristocraty, if any thing be decreed against any
Law of nature, the City it selfe (i.e.) the civill Person sinnes
not, but those subjects only by whose votes it was decreed; for
sinne is a consequence of the naturall expresse will, not of the
politicall, which is artificiall; for if it were otherwise, they
would be guilty, by whom the decree was absolutely disliked: But
in a Monarchie, if the Monarch make any decree against the Lawes
of nature, he sins himselfe, because in him the civill will and
the naturall are all one.
    XV. The people who are about to make a Monarch, may give him
the supremacy either simply without limitation of time, or for a
certaine season; and time determined; if simply, we must
understand that he who receives it, hath the selfe-same power
which they had, who gave it, on the same grounds: therefore that
the People by Right could make him a Monarch, may he make another
Monarch: insomuch as the Monarch to whom the command is simply
given, receives a Right not of possession onely, but of
succession also, so as he may declare whom hee pleaseth for his
successor.
    XVI. But if the power be given for a time limited, we must
have regard to somewhat more then the bare gift onely: First,
whether the People conveighing its authority, left it selfe any
Right to meet at certain times, and places, or not. Next, if it
have reserved this power, whether it were done, so as they might
meet before that time were expired, which they prescribed to the
Monarch. Thirdly, whether they were contented to meet onely at
the will of that temporary Monarch and not otherwise. Suppose now
the People had delivered up its Power to some one man for term of
life onely; which being done, let us suppose in the first place,
that every man departed from the Counsell without making any
order at all concerning the place where (after his death) they
should meet again to make a new election. In this case it is
manifest by the fifth Article of this Chapter, that the People
ceaseth to be a Person, and is become a dissolute multitude,
every one whereof hath an equall, to wit, a naturall Right to
meet with whom he lists at divers times, and in what places shall
best please him; nay, and if he can, engrosse the supreme power
to himselfe, and settle it on his own head. What Monarch soever
therefore hath a command in such a condition, he is bound by the
Law of nature (set down in the Article of the third Chapter of
not returning evill for good) prudently to provide, that by his
death the City suffer not a dissolution, either by appointing a
certain day, & place, in which those subjects of his who have a
mind to it may assemble themselves, or else by nominating a
successor: whether of these shall to him seem most conducible to
their common benefit. He therefore who on this foresaid manner
hath received his command during life, hath an absolute Power,
and may at his discretion dispose of the succession. In the next
place, if we grant that the people departed not from the election
of the temporary Monarch, before they decreed a certain time and
place of meeting after his death, then the Monarch being dead,
the authority is confirmed in the people, not by any new acts of
the subjects, but by vertue of the former Right; for all the
supreme command (as Dominion) was in the People, but the use, and
exercise of it was only in the temporary Monarch, as in one that
takes the benefit, but hath not the Right. But if the People
after the election of a temporarie Monarch, depart not from the
Court before they have appointed certain times, and places to
convene, during the time prescribed him (as the Dictators in
ancient times were made by the People of Rome) such an one is not
to be accounted a Monarch, but the Prime Officer of the People;
and if it shall seem good, the People may deprive him of his
office even before that time, as the People of Rome did, when
they conferred an equall power on Minutius Master of the horse,
with Quintus Fabius Maximus, whom before they had made Dictator.
The reason whereof is, hat it is not to be imagined, that,
whether Man or Counsell who hath the readiest, and most immediate
power to act, should hold his command on such termes as not to be
able actually to execute it; for command is nothing else but a
Right of commanding, as oft as nature allowes it possible.
Lastly, if the People having declared a temporary Monarch, depart
from the Court on such termes, as it shall not be lawfull for
them to meet without the command of the Monarch, we must
understand the People to be immediately dissolved, and that his
authority who is thus declared, is absolute; forasmuch as it is
not in the power of all the subjects to frame the City anew,
unlesse he give consent who hath now alone the authority. Nor
matters it, that he hath perhaps made any promise to assemble his
Subjects on some certain times, since there remains no Person now
in being, but at his discretion, to whom the promise was made.
What we have spoken of these four cases of a People electing a
Temporary Monarch will be more clearly explain'd by comparing
them with an absolute Monarch, who hath no heir apparent; for the
People is Lord of the subject in such a manner as there can be no
Heir but whom it self doth appoint. Besides, the spaces between
the times of the subjects meeting may be fitly compar'd to those
times wherein the Monarch sleepes, for in either the Acts of
commanding ceases, the Power remaines: Farthermore, to dissolve
the convent, so as it cannot meet againe, is the death of the
People; just as sleeping, so as he can never wake more, is the
death of a man: As therefore a King, who hath no Heir, going to
his rest, so as never to rise again, (i.e.) dying, if he commit
the exercise of his Regall Authority to any one till he awake,
does by consequence give him the Succession; the People also
electing a Temporary Monarch, and not reserving a power to
convene, delivers up to him the whole Dominion of the Country:
Furthermore, as a King going to sleep for some season, entrusts
the administration of his Kingdome to some other, and waking
takes it again; so the people having elected a Temporary Monarch,
and withall retaining a right to meet at a certain day, and
place, at that day receives its supremacy again. And as a King
who hath committed the execution of his Authority to another,
himself in the mean while waking, can recall this commission
againe when he pleaseth; so the People, who during the time
prescribed to the Temporary Monarch, doth by Right convene, may
if they please, deprive the Monarch of his Authority. Lastly, the
King, who commits his Authority to another while himself sleeps,
not being able to wake againe till he whom he entrusted, give
consent, loses at once both his power, and his life; so the
people, who hath given the Supreme Power to a temporary Monarch
in such sort as they cannot assemble without his command is
absolutely dissolv'd, and the power remaines with him whom they
have chosen.
    XVII. If the Monarch promise ought to any one, or many
subjects together, by consequence whereof the exercise of his
power may suffer prejudice, that Promise or Compact whether made
by Oath, or without it, is null: for all Compact is a conveyance
of Right, which by what hath been said in the fourth Article of
the second Chapter, requires meet, and proper signes of the Will
in the conveyer. But he who sufficiently signifies his will of
retaining the end, doth also sufficiently declare that he quits
not his Right to the means necessary to that end. Now he who hath
promis'd to part with somewhat necessary to the Supreme Power,
and yet retaines the Power it selfe, gives sufficient tokens,
That he no otherwise promis'd it then so farre forth as the power
might be retain'd without it. Whensoever therefore it shall
appear that what is promis'd cannot be perform'd without
prejudice to the Power, the promise must be valued as not made,
(i.e.) of no effect.
    XVIII. We have seen how Subjects, nature dictating, have
oblig'd themselves by mutuall Compacts to obey the SuPreme Power.
We will see now by what meanes it comes to passe that they are
releas'd from these bonds of obedience. And first of all this
happens by rejection, namely, if a man cast off, or forsake, but
conveigh not the Right of his Command on some other; for what is
thus rejected, is openly expos'd to all alike, catch who catch
can; whence again, by the Right of nature, every subject may heed
the preservation of himselfe according to his own judgement. In
the second place, If the Kingdome fall into the power of the
enemy, so as there can no more opposition be made against them,
we must understand that he, who before had the Supreme Authority,
hath now lost it: For when the Subjects have done their full
indeavour to prevent their falling into the enemies hands, they
have fulfill'd those Contracts of obedience which they made each
with other, and what, being conquer'd, they promise afterwards,
to avoid death, they must, with no lesse endeavour, labour to
performe. Thirdly, in a Monarchy, (for a Democraty, and
Aristocraty cannot fail) if there be no successour, all the
subjects are discharg'd from their obligations; for no man is
suppos'd to be tyed he knows not to whom, for in such a case it
were impossible to perform ought. And by these three wayes all
subjects are restor'd from their civill subjection to that
liberty, which all men have to all things, to wit, naturall, and
salvage, (for the naturall state hath the same proportion to the
Civill, I mean liberty to subjection, which Passion hath to
Reason, or a Beast to a Man:) Furthermore, each subject may
lawfully be freed from his subjection by the will of him who hath
the Supreme Power, namely, if he change his soile, which may be
done two wayes, either by permission, as he, who gets license to
dwell in another Country; or Command, as he, who is Banisht: In
both cases he is free from the Lawes of his former Country,
because he is tyed to observe those of the latter.

Chap. VIII

Of the Rights of Lords over their Servant


    I. In the two fore-going Chapters we have treated of an
institutive, or fram'd Government, as being that which receives
its originall from the consent of many, who by Contract and Faith
mutually given, have oblig'd each other. Now followes, what may
be said, concerning a naturall Government, which may also be
call'd, Acquired, because it is that which is gotten by power,
and naturall force. But we must know in the first place by what
means the Right of Dominion may be gotten over the Persons of
men. Where such a Right is gotten, there is a kind of a little
Kingdome; for to be a King, is nothing else but to have Dominion
over many Persons; and thus a Great Family is a Kingdom, & a
Little Kingdome a Family. Let us return again to the state of
nature, and consider men as if but even now sprung out of the
earth, and suddainly (like Mushromes) come to full maturity
without all kind of engagement to each other: There are but three
wayes only whereby one can have the Dominion over the Person of
another; whereof the first is, if by mutuall Contract made
between themselves (for Peace, & self-defences sake) they have
willingly given up themselves to the Power and Authority of some
man, or Councel of Men, & of this we have already spoken. The 2d
is, If a man taken Prisoner in the Wars, or overcome; or else
distrusting his own forces, (to avoid Death) promises the
Conquerour, or the stronger Party, his Service, i.e. to do all
whatsoever he shall command him; in which Contract the good which
the vanquisht, or inferiour, in strength doth receive, is the
grant of his life, which by the Right of War in the naturall
state of men he might have depriv'd him of, but the good which he
promises, is his service and obedience. By vertue therefore of
this promise, there is as absolute service and obedience due from
the vanquisht, to the vanquisher, as possibly can be, excepting
what repugns the Divine Lawes; for he who is oblig'd to obey the
Commands of any man before he knowes what he will command him, is
simply, and without any restriction tyed to the performance of
all Commands whatsoever. Now he that is thus tyed, is call'd a
SERVANT, he to whom he is tyed, a LORD. Thirdly, there is a Right
acquir'd over the Person of a Man, by Generation; of which kind
of acquisition somewhat shall be spoken in the following Chapter.
    II. Every one that is taken in the War, and hath his life
spar'd him, is not suppos'd to have Contracted with his Lord; for
every one is not trusted with so much of his naturall liberty, as
to be able, if he desir'd it, either to flie away, or quit his
service, or contrive any mischief to his Lord. And these serve
indeed but within Prisons, or bound within Irons, and therefore
they were call'd not by the common name of Servant onely, but by
the peculiar name of Slave, even as now at this day un serviteur,
and un serf or un esclave have diverse significations.
    III. The obligation therefore of a Servant to his Lord
ariseth not from a simple grant of his life, but from hence
rather, That he keeps him not bound, or imprison'd, for all
obligation derives from Contract; but where's no trust, there can
be no Contract, as appears by the 2. Chap. Artic. 9. where a
Compact is defin'd to be the promise of him who is trusted. There
is therefore a confidence and trust which accompanies the benefit
of pardon'd life, whereby the Lord affords him his corporall
liberty. so that if no obligation, nor bonds of Contract had
happen'd, he might not onely have made his escape, but also have
kill'd his Lord, who was the preserver of his life.
    IV. Wherefore such kind of Servants as are restrain'd by
imprisonment, or bonds, are not comprehended in that definition
of Servants given above, because those serve not for the
Contracts sake, but to the end they may not suffer; and therefore
if they flie, or kill their Lord, they offend not against the
Lawes of Nature, for to bind any man is a plain signe, that the
binder supposes him that is bound not to be sufficiently tyed by
any other obligation.
    V. The Lord therefore hath no less Dominion over a Servant
that is not, then over one that is bound, for he hath a Supreme
Power over both, and may say of his Servant no lesse then of
another thing, whether animate, or inanimate, This is mine;
whence it followes, that whatsoever the Servant had before his
servitude, that afterwards becomes the Lords; and whatsoever he
hath gotten, it was gotten for his Lord: for he that can by Right
dispose of the Person of a man, may surely dispose of all those
things which that Person could dispose of. There is therefore
nothing which the Servant may retaine as his own against the will
of his Lord; yet hath he, by his Lords distribution, a propriety,
and Dominion over his own goods, insomuch as one Servant may
keep, and defend them against the invasion of his fellow Servant,
in the same manner as hath been shewed before, that a subject
hath nothing properly his owne against the will of the Supreme
Authority, but every subject hath a propriety against his fellow
subject.
    VI. Since therefore both the Servant himself, and all that
belongs to him are his Lords, and by the Right of Nature every
man may dispose of his owne in what manner he pleases; the Lord
may either sell, lay to pledge, or by Testament conveigh the
Dominion he hath over his Servant, according to his own will and
pleasure.
    VII. Farthermore, what hath before been demonstrated
concerning subjects in an institutive Government, namely, that he
who hath the Supreme Power can doe his subject no injury; is true
also concerning Servants, because they have subjected their will
to the will of the Lord; wherefore, whatsoever he doth, it is
done with their wills, but no injury can be done to him that
willeth it.
    VIII. But if it happen that the Lord, either by captivity or
voluntary subjection, doth become a Servant or Subject to
another, that other shall not onely be Lord of him, but also of
his Servants; Supreme Lord over these, immediate Lord over him.
Now because not the Servant only, but also all he hath are his
Lords; therefore his Servants now belong to this man, neither can
the mediate Lord dispose otherwise of them then shall seeme good
to the Supreme. And therefore, if sometime in civill Governments,
the Lord have an absolute power over his Servants, that's
suppos'd to be deriv'd from the Right of Nature, and not
constituted, but slightly pass'd over by the Civill Law.
    IX. A servant is by the same manner freed from his servitude,
that a Subject in an institutive government, is freed from his
subjection; First, if his Lord enfranchize him, for the Right
which the servant transferred to his Lord over himselfe, the same
may the Lord restore to the servant again. And this manner of
bestowing of liberty is called MANUMISSION; which is just as if a
City should permit a Citizen to conveigh himselfe under the
jurisdiction of some other City. Secondly, if the Lord cast off
his servant from him, which in a City is banishment; neither
differs it from Manumission in effect, but in manner onely: for
there, liberty is granted as a favour, here, as a punishment: In
both, the Dominion is renounced. Thirdly, if the servant be taken
prisoner, the old servitude is abolished by the new; for as all
other things, so servants also are acquired by warre, whom in
equity the Lord must protect, if he will have them to be his.
Fourthly, the servant is freed for want of knowledge of a
successour, the Lord dying (suppose) without any Testament, or
Heire, for no man is understood to be obliged, unlesse he know to
whom he is to perform the obligation. Lastly, the servant that is
put in bonds, or by any other means deprived of his corporall
liberty, is freed from that other obligation of contract, for
there can be no contract where there is no trust, nor can that
faith be broken which is not given. But the Lord who himselfe
serves another, cannot so free his servants, but that they must
still continue under the power of the supreme, for, as hath been
shewed before, such servants are not his, but the supreme Lords.
    X. We get a right over irrationall Creatures in the same
manner, that we doe over the Persons of men, to wit, by force and
naturall strength; for if in the state of nature it is lawfull
for every one, by reason of that warre which is of all against
all, to subdue, and also to kill men as oft as it shall seem to
conduce unto their good, much more will the same be lawfull
against Brutes; namely at their own discretion, to reduce those
to servitude which by art may be tamed, and fitted for use, and
to persecute and destroy the rest by a perpetuall warre, as
dangerous and noxious. Our Dominion therefore over beasts, hath
its originall from the right of nature, not from divine positive
Right: for if such a Right had not been before the publishing of
the sacred Scriptures, no man by right might have killed a beast
for his food, but he to whom the divine pleasure was made
manifest by holy Writ; a most hard condition for men indeed whom
the beasts might devoure without injury, and yet they might not
destroy them: Forasmuch therefore as it proceeds from the right
of nature, that a beast may kill a man; it is also by the same
Right, that a man may slay a beast.

Chap. IX

Of the right of Parents over their children and of hereditary
Government


    I. Socrates is a man, and therefore a living creature, is a
right reasoning, and that most evident, because there is nothing
needfull to the acknowledging of the truth of the consequence,
but that the word Man be understood, because a living creature is
in the definition it selfe of a Man, and every one makes up the
proposition which was desired, namely this, Man is a living
Creature; And this, Sophroniscus is Socrates his Father, and
therefore his Lord, is perhaps a true inference, but not evident,
because the word Lord is not in the definition of a Father:
wherefore it is necessary to make it more evident, that the
connexion of Father and Lord be somewhat unfolded. Those that
have hitherto endeavoured to prove the Dominion of a Parent over
his children, have brought no other argument then that of
generation, as if it were of it selfe evident, that what is
begotten by me, is mine; just as if a man should think, that
because there is a triangle, it appeares presently without any
farther discourse, that its angles are equall to two Rights.
Besides, since Dominion (that is) supreme Power is indivisible,
insomuch as no man can serve two Masters, but two Persons male
and female, must concurre in the act of generation, its
impossible that Dominion should at all be acquired by generation
onely. Wherefore we will with the more diligence in this place,
enquire into the original of paternal Government.
    II. Wee must therefore returne to the state of nature, in
which, by reason of the equality of nature all men of riper
yeares are to be accounted equall; There by right of nature the
Conqueror is Lord of the conquered: by the Right therefore of
nature, the Dominion over the Infant first belongs to him who
first hath him in his power'd but it's manifest that he who is
newly born is in the Mothers power before any others, insomuch as
she may rightly, and at her own wil, either breed him up, or
adventure him to fortune.
    III. If therefore she breed him (because the state of nature
is the state of warre) she is supposed to bring him up on this
condition, that being grown to full age he become not her enemy;
(which is) that he obey her. For since by naturall necessity we
all desire that which appears good unto us, it cannot be
understood that any man hath on such termes afforded life to
another, that he might both get strength by his years, and at
once become an enemy; but each man is an enemy to that other whom
he neither obeys nor commands. And thus in the state of nature,
every woman that bears children, becomes both a Mother, and a
Lord. But what some say, that in this case, the Father by reason
of the preeminence of sexe, and not the Mother, becomes Lord,
signifies nothing. For both reason shewes the contrary, because
the inequality of their naturall forces is not so great, that the
man could get the Dominion over the woman without warre. And
custome also contradicts not; for women, namely Amazons, have in
former times waged war against their adversaries, and disposed of
their children at their own wils, and at this day in divers
places, women are invested with the principall authority. Neither
doe their husbands dispose of their children, but themselves;
which in truth they do by the right of nature; forasmuch as they
who have the supreme power, are not tyed at all (as hath bin
shewed) to the civill lawes. Adde also that in the state of
nature it cannot be known who is the Father but by the testimony
of the Mother; the child therefore is his whose the Mother will
have it, and therefore hers; Wherefore originall Dominion over
children belongs to the Mother, and among men no lesse then other
creatures: The birth followes the belly.
    IV. The Dominion passes from the Mother to others, divers
wayes; first, if she quit and forsake her Right by exposing the
child. He therefore that shall bring up the childe thus exposed,
shall have the same Dominion over it, which the Mother had. For
that life which the Mother had given it (not by getting, but
nourishing it) she now by exposing, takes from it; Wherefore the
obligation also which arose from the benefit of life, is by this
exposition made voyd. Now the preserved, oweth all to the
preserver, whether in regard of his education as to a Mother, or
of his service, as to a Lord; for although the Mother in the
state of nature, where all men have a right to all things, may
recover her sonne again (namely by the same Right that any body
else might doe it) yet may not the Sonne rightly transferre
himselfe again unto his Mother.
    V. Secondly, if the Mother be taken prisoner, her Sonne is
his that took her, because that he who hath Dominion over the
Person, hath also Dominion over all belonging to the Person;
Wherefore over the Sonne also, as hath been shewed in the
foregoing Chapter, in the fifth Article. Thirdly, if the Mother
be a subject under what government soever, he that hath the
supreme authority in that government, will also have the Dominion
over him that is born of her. for he is Lord also of the Mother,
who is bound to obey him, in all things. Fourthly, if a woman for
societie sake give her selfe to a man on this condition; that he
shall bear the sway; he that receives his being from the
contribution of both Parties, is the Fathers, in regard of the
command he hath over the Mother; but if a woman bearing rule
shall have children by a Subject, the children are the Mothers:
for otherwise the woman can have no children without prejudice to
her authority. And universally, if the society of the male and
female be such an union, as the one have subjected himselfe to
the other, the children belong to him or her that commands.
    VI. But in the state of nature, if a man, and woman contract
so, as neither is subject to the command of the other, the
children are the Mothers for the reasons above given in the third
Article, unlesse by pacts it be otherwise provided. For the
Mother may by pact dispose of her Right as she lists, as
heretofore hath been done by the Amazons, who of those children
which have been begotten by their neighbours, have by pact
allowed them the males, and retained the females to themselves;
but in a civill government, if there be a contract of marriage
between a man and woman, the children are the Fathers; because in
all Cities, viz. constituted of Fathers, not Mothers governing
their families, the domesticall command belongs to the man, and
such a contract, if it be made according to the civill Laws, is
called MATRIMONY; but if they agree only to lye together, the
children are the Fathers, or the Mothers variously, according to
the differing civill Lawes of divers Cities.
    VII. Now because by the third Article the Mother is
originally Lord of her Children, and from her the Father, or some
body else by derived Right, it is manifest that the Children are
no lesse subject to those by whom they are nourisht, and brought
up, then Servants to their Lords, and Subjects to him who beares
the Supreme Rule; and that a Parent cannot be injurious to his
Sonne as long as he is under his power. A Son also is freed from
subjection on the same manner as a subject and servant are. For
emancipation is the same thing with manumission, and abdication
with banishment.
    VIII. The enfranchised son, or released servant, doe now
stand in lesse fear of their Lord and Father, being deprived of
his naturall and lordly power over them, and (if regard be had to
true and inward Honour) doe Honour him lesse, then before. For
Honour (as hath been said in the section above) is nothing else
but the estimation of anothers power; and therefore he that hath
least power, hath alwayes least Honour. But it is not to be
imagin'd that the enfranchiser ever intended so to match the
enfranchised with himself, as that he should not so much as
acknowledge a benefit, but should so carry himself in all things,
as if he were become wholly his equall; It must therefore be ever
understood, That he who is freed from subjection, whether he be a
servant, sonne, or some colony, doth promise all those externall
signes, at least whereby Superiours used to be Honour'd by their
inferiours. From whence it followes, That the precept of
honouring our Parents, belongs to the law of nature, not onely
under the title of Gratitude, but also of Agreement.
    IX. What then, will some one demand, is the difference
between a sonne, or between a subject, and a servant? Neither doe
I know that any Writer hath fully declared what liberty, and what
slavery is. Commonly to doe all things according to our own
phancies, and that without punishment, is esteem'd to be liberty;
not to be able to doe this, is judg'd bondage; which in a Civill
Government, and with the peace of mankind cannot possibly be
done, because there is no City without a Command, and a
restraining Right. LIBERTY, that we may define it, is nothing
else but an absence of the lets, and hinderances of motion, as
water shut up in a vessell is therefore not at liberty, because
the vessell hinders it from running out, which the vessell being
broken, is made free. And every man hath more or lesse liberty,
as he hath more or lesse space in which he employes himself: as
he hath more liberty, who is in a large, then he that is kept in
a close prison. And a man may be free toward one part, and yet
not toward another; as the traveller is bounded on this, and that
side with hedges, or stone walls, lest he spoyle the vines, or
corne, neighbouring on the high way. And these kinde of lets are
externall, and absolute; in which sense all Servants, and
Subjects are free, who are not fetter'd and imprisoned. There are
others which are arbitrary, which doe not absolutely hinder
motion, but by accident; to wit, by our own choyce, as he that is
in a ship is not so hindered, but he may cast himselfe into the
Sea, if he will: and here also the more wayes a man may move
himselfe, the more liberty he hath, and herein consists civill
liberty; for no man, whether subject, sonne, or servant, is so
hindred by the punishments appointed by the City, the Father, or
the Lord, how cruell soever, but that he may doe all things, and
make use of all meanes necessary to the preservation of his life
and health. For my part therefore I cannot finde what reason a
meer servant hath to make complaints, if they relate onely to
want of liberty, unlesse he count it a misery to be restrained
from hurting himselfe, and to receive that life, (which by warre,
or misfortune, or through his own idlenesse was forfeited)
together with all manner of sustenance, and all things necessary
to the conservation of health, on this condition only, that he
will be rul'd: for he that is kept in by punishments layd before
him, so as he dares not let loose the reines to his will in all
things; is not opprest by servitude, but is governed and
sustained. But this priviledge free subjects and sonnes of a
family, have above servants, (in every government, and family,
where servants are) that they may both undergoe the more
honourable offices of the City or family, and also enjoy a larger
possession of things superfluous. And herein layes the difference
between a free subject, and a servant, that he is FREE, but a
SERVANT is he who also indeed, who serves his City onely; serves
his fellow subject: all other liberty is an exemption from the
Lawes of the City, and proper only to those that bear Rule.
    X. A Father, with his sonnes and servants growne into a
civill Person by vertue of his paternall jurisdiction, is called
a FAMILY. This family, if through multiplying of children, and
acquisition of servants, it becomes numerous, insomuch as without
casting the uncertain dye of warre, it cannot be subdued, will be
termed an Hereditary Kingdome; which though it differ from an
institutive Monarchy, being acquired by force in the original, &
manner of its constitution; yet being constituted, it hath al the
same properties, and the Right of authority is every where the
same, insomuch as it is not needfull to speak any thing of them
apart.
    XI. It hath been spoken, by what Right supreme authorities
are constituted. Wee must now briefly tell you by what right they
may be continued. Now the Right by which they are continued, is
that which is called the right of SUCCESSION. Now because in a
Democratie, the supreme authority is with the People, as long as
there be any subjects in being, so long it rests with the same
Person; for the People hath no Successour. In like manner in an
Aristocraty, one of the Nobles dying, some other by the rest is
substituted in his place; and therefore except they all dye
together, which I suppose will never happen, there is no
succession. The Querie therefore of the Right of Succession takes
place onely in an absolute Monarchy. For they who exercise the
supreme power for a time onely, are themselves no Monarchs, but
Ministers of state.
    XII. But first, if a Monarch shall by Testament appoint one
to succeed him, the Person appointed shall succeed; for if he be
appointed by the People, he shall have all the Right over the
City which the People had, as hath been shewed in the 7. Chap.
Art. 11. But the People might choose him; by the same Right
therefore may he choose another; But in an hereditary Kingdome
there are the same Rights as in an institutive; Wherefore, every
Monarch may by his will make a successour.
    XIII. But what a man may transferre on another by Testament,
that by the same Right may he yet living, give, or sell away; To
whomsoever therefore he shall make over the supreme power,
whether by gift, or sale, it is rightly made.
    XIV. But if living, he have not declared his will concerning
his successour by Testament, nor otherwise, it is supposed,
First, that he would not have his Government reduced to an
Anarchy, or the state of warre, (that is) to the destruction of
his subjects; as well because he could not doe that without
breach of the Lawes of nature, whereby he was obliged to the
performance of all things necessarily conducing to the
preservation of Peace, as also because if that had been his will,
it had not been hard for him to have declared that openly. Next,
because the Right passeth according to the will of the Father, we
must judge of the successour according to the signes of his will.
It is understood therefore, that he would have his subjects to be
under a Monarchicall Government rather then any other, because he
himselfe in ruling, hath before approved of that state by his
example, and hath not afterward either by any word or deed
condemned it.
    XV. Furthermore, because by naturall necessity all men wish
them better from whom they receive glory, and honour, then
others; but every man after death receives honour and glory from
his children, sooner then from the power of any other men: hence
we gather, that a father intends better for his children, then
any other persons. It is to be understood therefore, that the
will of the father, dying without Testament, was, that some of
his children should succeed him; yet this is to be understood
with this proviso, that there be no more apparent tokens to the
contrary: of which kind, after many successions, custome may be
one, for he that makes no mention of his succession, is supposed
to consent to the customes of his Realme.
    XVI. Among children the Males carry the preheminence, in the
beginning perhaps, because for the most part (although not
alwayes) they are fitter for the administration of greater
matters, but specially of wars; but afterwards, when it was grown
a custome, because that custome was not contradicted; and
therefore the will of the Father, unlesse some other custome or
signe doe clearly repugne it, is to be interpreted in favour of
them.
    XVII. Now because the Sonnes are equall, and the power cannot
be divided, the eldest shall succeed; for if there be any
difference by reason of age, the eldest is supposed more worthy,
for nature being judge, the most in years (because usually it is
so) is the wisest. But other judge there cannot be had. But if
the Brothers must be equally valued, the succession shall be by
lot. But primogeniture is a naturall lot, and by this the eldest
is already prefer'd; nor is there any that hath power to judge,
whether by this, or any other kind of lots the matter is to be
decided. Now the same reason which contends thus for the
first-born sonne, doth no lesse for the first born daughter.
    XVIII. But if he have no children, then the command shall
pass to his Brothers & Sisters, for the same reason, that the
children should have succeeded if he had had them: for those that
are nearest to us in nature, are supposed to be nearest in
benevolence; and to his brothers, sooner then his sisters, and to
the elder sooner then the yonger; for the reason is the same for
these which it was for the children.
    XIX. Furthermore, by the same reason that men succeed to the
power, doe they also succeed to the Right of succession: for if
the first-born dye before the Father, it will be judged, that he
transferred his Right of succession unto his children, unlesse
the Father have otherwise decreed it, and therefore the Nephewes
will have a fairer pretence to the succession, then the Uncles. I
say all these things will be thus, if the custome of the place
(which the Father by not contradicting, will be judged to have
consented to) doe not hinder them.

Chap. X

A comparison between 3. kinds of government, according to their
severall inconveniences.

    I. What Democraty, Aristocraty, and monarchy are, hath
already been spoken, but which of them tends most to the
preservation of the subjects Peace, and procuring their
advantages, we must see by comparing them together. But first let
us set forth the advantages, and disadvantages of a City in
generall, lest some perhaps should think it better, that every
man be left to live at his own will, then to constitute any
civill society at all. Every man indeed out of the state of
civill government hath a most entire, but unfruitfull liberty;
because that he who by reason of his own liberty acts all at his
own will, must also by reason of the same liberty in others,
suffer al at anothers wil; but in a constituted City, every
subject retains to himselfe as much freedom as suffices him to
live well, and quietly, & there is so much taken away from
others, as may make them not to be feared. Out of this state,
every man hath such a Right to all, as yet he can enjoy nothing;
in it, each one securely enjoyes his limited Right; Out of it,
any man may rightly spoyle, or kill one another; in it, none but
one. Out of it we are protected by our own forces; in it, by the
power of all. Out of it no man is sure of the fruit of his
labours; in it, all men are. Lastly, out of it, there is a
Dominion of Passions, war, fear, poverty, slovinlinesse,
solitude, barbarisme, ignorance, cruelty. In it, the Dominion of
reason, peace, security, riches, decency, society, elegancy,
sciences, and benevolence.
    II. Aristotle in his seventh book, and fourteenth Chapter of
his Politiques saith, that there are two sorts of governments,
whereof the one relates to the benefit of the Ruler, the other to
that of the Subjects; as if where Subjects are severely dealt
with, there were one, and where more mildly, there were another
form of government; which opinion may by no means be subscribed
to, for all the profits and disprofits arising from government
are the same, and common both to the Ruler, and the Subject; The
Dammages which befall some particular subjects through
misfortune, folly, negligence, sloth, or his own luxury, may very
well be severed from those which concern the Ruler, but those
relate not to the government it selfe, being such as may happen
in any form of government whatsoever. If these same happen from
the first institution of the City, they will then be truly called
the inconveniencies of government, but they will be common to the
Ruler with his subjects, as their benefits are common; but the
first and greatest benefit, Peace, and defence, is common to
both, for both he that commands, and he who is commanded, to the
end that he may defend his life, makes use at once of all the
forces of his fellow-subjects; and in the greatest inconvenience
that can befall a City, namely the slaughter of subjects, arising
from Anarchy, both the Commander, and the Parties commanded, are
equally concerned. Next, if the Ruler levie such a summe of vast
monies from his subjects, as they are not able to maintain
themselves, and their families, nor conserve their bodily
strength, and vigour, the disadvantage is as much his, as theirs,
who with never so great a stock, or measure of riches, is not
able to keep his authority or his riches without the bodies of
his subjects; but if he raise no more then is sufficient for the
due administration of his power, that is a benefit equall to
himselfe and his subjects, tending to a common Peace, and
defence. Nor is it imaginable which way publick treasures can be
a grievance to private subjects, if they be not so exhausted, as
to be wholly deprived from all possibility to acquire, even by
their industry, necessaries to sustain the strength of their
bodies, and mindes; for even thus the grievance would concern the
Ruler; nor would it arise from the ill institution, or ordination
of the government, (because in all manner of governments subjects
may be opprest) but from the ill administration of a well
established government.
    III. Now that Monarchy of the foresaid forms, of Democraty,
Aristocraty, and Monarchy, hath the preheminence, will best
appear by comparing the conveniences and inconveniences arising
in each one of them. Those arguments therefore that the whole
universe is governed by one God; that the Ancients preferr'd the
Monarchicall state before all others, ascribing the Rule of the
Gods to one Jupiter; that in the beginning of affairs, and of
Nations, the decrees of Princes were held for Laws; that
paternall government instituted by God himselfe in the Creation,
was Monarchicall. that other governments were compacted by the
artifice of men out of the ashes of Monarchy, after it had been
ruined with seditions; and that the people of God were under the
jurisdiction of Kings, although I say these doe hold forth
Monarchy as the more eminent to us, yet because they doe it by
examples and testimonies, and not by solid reason, we will passe
them over.
    Compacted by the artifice of men, &c.] It seems the Ancients
who made that same fable of Prometheus pointed at this. They say,
that Prometheus having stolne fire from the Sunne, formed a man
out of clay, and that for this deed he was tortured by Jupiter
with a perpetuall gnawing in his liver. which is, that by humane
invention (which is signified by Prometheus) Laws and Justice
were by imitation taken from Monarchy, by vertue whereof (as by
fire removed from its naturall orbe) the multitude (as the durt
and dregs of men) was as it were quickned and formed into a
civill Person, which is termed Aristocraty, or Democraty; but the
Awthours and Abettors being found, who might securely and quietly
have lived under the naturall jurisdiction of Kings, doe thus
smart for it, that being exposed still to alteration, they are
tormented with perpetuall cares, suspitions, and dissentions.
    IV. Some there are who are discontented with the government
under one, for no other reason, but because it is under one; as
if it were an unreasonable thing that one man among so many,
should so farre excell in power, as to be able at his own
pleasure to dispose of all the rest; these men sure, if they
could, would withdraw themselves from under the Dominion of one
God. But this exception against one is suggested by envie, while
they see one man in possession of what all desire: for the same
cause they would judge it to be as unreasonable, if a few
commanded, unlesse they themselves either were, or hoped to be of
the number; for if it be an unreasonable thing that all men have
not an equall Right, surely an Aristocraty must be unreasonable
also. But because we have shewed that the state of equality is
the state of warre, and that therefore inequality was introduc'd
by a generall consent; this inequality whereby he, whom we have
voluntarily given more to,enjoyes more, is no longer to be
accompted an unreasonable thing. The inconveniences therefore
which attend the Dominion of one man, attend his Person, not his
Unity. Let us therefore see whether brings with it the greater
grievances to the subject, the command of one man, or of many.
    V. But first, we must remove their opinion who deny that to
be any City at all, which is compacted of never so great a number
of servants under a common Lord. In the 9. Artic. of the 5.
Chapter, a City is defined to be one Person made out of many men,
whose will by their own contracts is to be esteemed as the wills
of them all, insomuch as he may use the strength and faculties of
each single Person for the publick Peace and safety; and by the
same article of the same Chapter, One Person is that, when the
wills of many are contained in the will of one. But the will of
each servant is contained in the will of his Lord, as hath been
declared in the 5. Article of the 8. Chapter, so as he may employ
all their forces and faculties according to his own will, and
pleasure; it followes therefore that that must needs be a city,
which is constituted by a Lord, and many servants; neither can
any reason be brought to contradict this which doth not equally
combat against a City constituted by a Father, and his Sonnes;
for to a Lord who hath no children, servants are in the nature of
sonnes; for they are both his honour, and safeguard; neither are
servants more subject to their Lords, then children to their
Parents, as hath been manifested above in the 5. Article of the
8. Chapter.
    VI. Among other grievances of supreme authority one is, that
the Ruler, beside those monies necessary for publick charges, as
the maintaining of publick Ministers, building, and defending of
Castles, waging warres, honourable sustaining his own houshold,
may also, if he will, exact others through his lust, whereby to
enrich his sonnes, kindred, favourites, and flatterers too. I
confesse this is a grievance, but of the number of those which
accompany all kindes of government, but are more tolerable in a
Monarchy then in a Democraty; for though the Monarch would enrich
them, they cannot be many, because belonging but to one. But in a
Democraty, look how many Demagoges, (that is) how many powerfull
Oratours there are with the people (which ever are many, and
daily new ones growing) so many Children, Kinsmen, friends, &
Flatterers, are to be rewarded; for every of them desire not
onely to make their families as potent, as illustrious in wealth,
as may be, but also to oblige others to them by benefits for the
better strengthning of themselves. A Monarch may in great part
satisfie his Officers and Friends, because they are not many,
without any cost to his Subjects, I mean, without robbing them of
any of those Treasures given in for the maintenance of War, and
Peace; In a Democraty, where many are to be satisfied, and
alwayes new ones, this cannot be done without the Subjects
oppression. Though a Monarch may promote unworthy Persons, yet
oft times he will not doe it; but in a Democraty all the popular
men are therefore suppos'd to doe it, because it is necessary;
for else, the power of them who did it would so encrease, as it
would not onely become dreadfull to those others, but even to the
whole City also.
    VII. Another grievance is, that same perpetuall fear of death
which every man must necessarily be in, while he considers with
himself that the Ruler hath power. not onely to appoint what
punishments he lists on any Transgressions, but that he may also
in his wrath, and sensuality, slaughter his innocent Subjects,
and those who never offended against the Lawes. And truly this is
a very great grievance in any forme of Government wheresoever it
happens: (for it is therefore a grievance because it is; not,
because it may be done) but it is the fault of the Ruler, not of
the Government; For all the acts of Nero are not essentiall to
Monarchie; yet Subjects are lesse often undeservedly condemn'd
under one Ruler, then under the People: For Kings are onely
severe against those who either trouble them with impertinent
Counsells, or oppose them with reproachfull words, or controule
their Wills; but they are the cause that that excesse of power
which one Subject might have above another becomes harmlesse.
Wherefore some Nero or Caligula reigning, no men can undeservedly
suffer, but such as are known to him, namely Courtiers, and such
as are remarkable for some eminent Charge; and not all neither,
but they onely who are possessed of what he desires to enjoy; for
they that are offensive, and contumelious, are deservedly
punisht. Whosoever therefore in a Monarchy will lead a retired
life, let him be what he will that Reignes, he is out of danger:
for the ambitious onely suffer, the rest are protected from the
injuries of the more potent. But in a popular Dominion there may
be as many Nero's, as there are Oratours who sooth the People;
for each one of them can doe as much as the People, and they
mutually give way to each others appetite (as it were by this
secret pact, Spare me to day, and Ile spare thee to morrow) while
they exempt those from punishment, who to satisfie their lust,
and private hatred, have undeservedly slain their
fellow-subjects. Furthermore, there is a certain limit in private
power, which if it exceed, it may prove pernicious to the Realme,
and by reason whereof it is necessary sometimes for Monarchs to
have a care that the common-weale do thence receive no prejudice.
When therefore this power consisted in the multitude of Riches,
they lessened it by diminishing their heaps; but if it were in
popular applause, the powerfull party without any other crime
laid to his charge, was taken from among them. The same was
usually practised in Democraties; for the Athenians inflicted a
punishment of ten yeares banishment on those that were powerfull,
meerly because of their powers, without the guilt of any other
crime; and those who by liberall gifts did seek the favour of the
common people, were put to death at Rome, as men ambitious of a
Kingdome. In this Democraty and Monarchy were eaven; yet differ'd
they much in fame, because fame derives from the People, and what
is done by many, is commended by many: and therefore what the
Monarch does, is said to be done out of envie to their vertues,
which if it were done by the People, would be accounted Politie.
    VIII. There are some who therefore imagine Monarchy to bee
more grievous then Democraty, because there is lesse liberty in
that, then in this. If by liberty they mean an exemption from
that subjection which is due to the Lawes (i.e.) the commands of
the People, neither in Democraty, nor in any other state of
government whatsoever, is there any such kind of liberty. If they
suppose liberty to consist in this, that there be few lawes, few
prohibitions, and those too such, that except they were
forbidden, there could be no Peace; then I deny that there is
more liberty in Democraty then Monarchy; for the one as truly
consisteth with such a liberty, as the other. For although the
word liberty, may in large, and ample letters be written over the
gates of any City whatsoever, yet is it not meant the Subjects,
but the Cities liberty, neither can that word with better Right
be inscribed on a City which is governed. by the people, then
that which is ruled by a Monarch. But when private men or
subjects demand liberty, under the name of liberty, they ask not
for liberty, but dominion, which yet for want of understanding,
they little consider; for if every man would grant the same
liberty to another, which he desires for himselfe, as is
commanded by the law of nature, that same naturall state would
return again, in which all men may by Right doe all things, which
if they knew, they would abhor, as being worse then all kind of
civill subjection whatsoever. But if any man desire to have his
single freedome, the rest being bound, what does he else demand
but to have the Dominion? for who so is freed from all bonds, is
Lord over all those that still continue bound. Subjects therefore
have no greater liberty in a Popular, then in a Monarchicall
State. That which deceives them, is the equall participation of
command, and publique places; for where the authority is in the
People, single subjects doe so far forth share in it as they are
parts of the People ruling; and they equally partake in publique
Offices so far forth as they have equall voices in choosing
Magistrates, and publique Ministers. And this is that which
Aristotle aim'd at, himself also, through the custome of that
time, mis-calling Dominion liberty, in his sixth Book, and second
Chapter of Politiques. In a popular State there is liberty by
supposition; which is a speech of the vulgar, as if no man were
free out of this State. From whence, by the way, we may collect,
That those Subjects, who in a Monarchy deplore their lost
liberty, doe onely stomack this, that they are not receiv'd to
the steerage of the Common-weal.
    IX. But perhaps for this very reason some will say, That a
Popular State is much to be preferr'd before a Monarchicall.
because that, where all men have a hand in publique businesses,
'there all have an opportunity to shew their wisedome, knowledge,
and eloquence, in deliberating matters of the greatest difficulty
and moment; which by reason of that desire of praise which is
bred in humane nature, is to them who excell in such like
faculties, and seeme to themselves to exceed others, the most
delightfull of all things. But in a Monarchy, this same way to
obtain praise, and honour, is shut up to the greatest part of
Subjects; and what is a grievance, if this be none? Ile tell you:
To see his opinion whom we scorne, preferr'd before ours; to have
our wisedome undervalued before our own faces; by an uncertain
tryall of a little vaine glory, to undergoe most certaine
enmities (for this cannot be avoided, whether we have the better,
or the worse); to hate, and to be hated, by reason of the
disagreement of opinions; to lay open our secret Counsells, and
advises to all, to no purpose, and without any benefit; to
neglect the affaires of our own Family: These, I say, are
grievances. But to be absent from a triall of wits, although
those trialls are pleasant to the Eloquent, is not therefore a
grievance to them, unlesse we will say, that it is a grievance to
valiant men to be restrained from fighting, because they delight
in it.
    X. Besides, there are many reasons why deliberations are
lesse successefull in great Assemblies, then in lesser Councells;
whereof one is, that to advise rightly of all things conducing to
the preservation of a Common-weal, we must not onely understand
matters at home, but Forraign Affaires too: at Home, by what
goods the Country is nourished, and defended, and whence they are
fetched; what places are fit to make Garrisons of; by what means
Souldiers are best to be raised, and maintained; what manner of
affections the Subjects bear toward their Prince, or Governours
of their Country, and many the like: Abroad, what the power of
each neighbouring Country is, and wherein it consists; what
advantage, or disadvantage we may receive from them; what their
dispositions are both to us-ward, and how affected to each other
among themselves, and what Counsell daily passeth among them.
Now, because very few in a great Assembly of men understand these
things, being for the most part unskilfull (that I say not
incapable) of them, what can that same number of advisers with
their impertinent Opinions contribute to good Counsells, other
then meer letts and impediments?
    XI. Another reason why a great Assembly is not so fit for
consultation is, because every one who delivers his opinion holds
it necessary to make a long continued Speech, and to gain the
more esteem from his Auditours, he polishes, and adornes it with
the best, and smoothest language. Now the nature of Eloquence is
to make Good and Evill, Profitable and Unprofitable, Honest and
Dishonest, appear to be more or lesse then indeed they are, and
to make that seem just, which is unjust, according as it shall
best suit with his end that speaketh. For this is to perswade;
and though they reason, yet take they not their rise from true
Principles, but from vulgar received opinions, which, for the
most part, are erroneous; neither endeavour they so much to fit
their speech to the nature of the things they speak of, as to the
Passions of their mindes to whom they speak; whence it happens
that opinions are delivered not by right reason, but by a certain
violence of mind. Nor is this fault in the Man, but in the nature
it selfe of Eloquence, whose end (as all the Masters of Rhetorick
teach us) is not truth (except by chance) but victory, and whose
property is not to inform, but to allure.
    XII. The third reason why men advise lesse successfully in a
great convent is, because that thence arise Factions in a
commonweal, and out of Factions, Seditions, and Civill War; for
when equall Oratours doe combat with contrary Opinions, and
Speeches, the conquered hates the Conquerour, and all those that
were of his side, as holding his Counsell, and wisedome in
scorne: and studyes all meanes to make the advise of his
adversaries prejudiciall to the State, for thus he hopes to see
the glory taken from him, and restored unto himself. Farthermore,
where the Votes are not so unequall, but that the conquered have
hopes by the accession of some few of their own opinion at
another sitting to make the stronger Party, the chief heads do
call the rest together; they advise apart how they may abrogate
the former judgment given; they appoint to be the first and
earliest at the next convent; they determine what, and in what
order each man shall speak, that the same businesse may again be
brought to agitation, that so what was confirmed before by the
number of their then present adversaries, the same may now in
some measure become of no effect to them, being negligently
absent. And this same kind of industry and diligence which they
use to make a people, is commonly called a faction. But when a
faction is inferiour in votes, and superiour, or not much
inferiour in power, then what they cannot obtain by craft, and
language, they attempt by force of armes, and so it comes to a
civill warre. But some will say, these things doe not
necessarily, nor often happen; he may as well say, that the chief
Parties are not necessarily desirous of vain glory, and that the
greatest of them seldom disagree in great matters.
    XIII. It followes hence, that when the legislative power
resides in such convents as these, the Laws must needs be
inconstant, and change, not according to the alteration of the
state of affaires, nor according to the changeablenesse of mens
mindes, but as the major part, now of this, then of that faction,
do convene; insomuch as the Laws do flote here, and there, as it
were upon the waters.
    XIV. In the fourth place, the counsels of great assemblies
have this inconvenience, that whereas it is oft of great
consequence, that they should be kept secret, they are for the
most part discovered to the enemy before they can be brought to
any effect, and their power, and will, is as soon known abroad,
as to the People it selfe commanding at home.
    XV. These inconveniences which are found in the deliberations
of great assemblies do so farre forth evince Monarchy to be
better then Democraty, as in Democraty affairs of great
consequence are oftner trusted to be discussed by such like
Committees, then in a Monarchy. Neither can it easily bee done
otherwayes; for there is no reason why every man should not
naturally rather minde his own private, then the publique
businesse, but that here he sees a means to declare his
eloquence, whereby he may gain the reputation of being ingenuous,
and wise, and returning home to his friends, to his Parents, to
his wife, and children, rejoyce, and triumph in the applause of
his dexterous behaviour: As of old all the delight Marcus
Coriolanus had in his warlike actions, was, to see his praises so
well pleasing to his Mother. But if the People in a Democraty
would bestow the power of deliberating in matters of Warre, and
Peace, either on one, or some very few, being content with the
nomination of Magistrates, and publique Ministers, that is to
say, with the authority without the ministration, then it must be
confest, that in this particular, Democraty and Monarchy would be
equall.
    XVI. Neither do the conveniencies or inconveniences which are
found to be more in one kind of government then another, arise
from hence, namely, because the government it self, or the
administration of its affairs, are better committed to one, then
many; or on the other side, to many, then to some few. For
Government, is the power, the administration of it, is the. act.
now the Power in all kind of government is equall; the acts only
differ, that is to say the actions, and motions of a
common-weale, as they flow from the deliberations of many, or
few, of skilfull, or impertinent men. Whence we understand, that
the conveniences, or inconveniences of any government, depend not
on him in whom the authority resides, but on his Officers; and
therefore nothing hinders, but that the common-weale may be well
governed, although the Monarch be a woman, or youth, or infant,
provided that they be fit for affaires, who are endued with the
publique Offices, and charges; And that which is said, Woe to the
land whose King is a childe, doth not signifie the condition of a
Monarchy to be inferiour to a Popular state, but contrariwise,
that by accident it is the grievance of a Kingdome, that the King
being a childe, it often happens, that many by ambition, and
power, intruding themselves into publique counsels, the
government comes to be administred in a Democraticall manner, and
that thence arise those infelicities which for the most part
accompany the Dominion of the People.
    XVII. But it is a manifest sign, that the most absolute
Monarchy is the best state of government, that not onely Kings,
but even those Cities which are subject to the people, or to
Nobles, give the whole command of warre to one only, and that so
absolute, as nothing can be more (wherein by the way this must be
noted also, that no King can give a Generall greater authority
over his army, then he himselfe by Right may exercise over all
his subjects). Monarchy therefore is the best of all governments
in the Camps. But what else, are many Common-wealths, then so
many Camps strengthened with armes, and men against each other,
whose state (because not restrained by any common power,
howsoever an uncertain peace, like a short truce, may passe
between them) is to be accounted for the state of nature, which
is the state of War.
    XVIII. Lastly, since it was necessary for the preservation of
our selves to be subject to some Man, or Councell, we cannot on
better condition be subject to any, then one whose interest
depends upon our safety, and welfare; and this then comes to
passe when we are the inheritance of the Ruler; for every man of
his own accord endeavours the preservation of his inheritance.
But the Lands, and Monies of the Subjects are not onely the
Princes Treasure, but their bodies, and active minds; which will
be easily granted by those who consider at how great rates the
Dominion of lesser Countries is valued, and how much easier it is
for men to procure mony, then money men; nor doe we readily meet
with any example that shewes us when any subject, without any
default of his own, hath by his Prince been despoiled of his
life, or goods, through the sole licenciousnesse of his
Authority.
    XIX. Hitherto we have compared a Monarchicall, with a Popular
State; we have said nothing of Aristocracy; we may conclude of
this, by what hath been said of those, that, that which is
hereditary, and content with the election of Magistrates; which
transmits its deliberations to some few, and those most able;
which simply imitates the government of Monarchs most, and the
People least of all, is for the Subjects both better, and more
lasting then the rest.

Chap. XI

Places and Examples of Scripture of the Rights of Government
agreeable to what hath been said before

    I. We have in the 6. Chapter, and the 2. Article, so derived
the Originall of institutive, or politicall Government from the
consent of the Multitude, that it appears they must either all
consent, or be esteem'd as Enemies. Such was the beginning of
Gods Government over the Jewes instituted by Moses, If ye will
obey my voice indeed, & c. Ye shall be unto me a Kingdome of
Priests, & c. And Moses came, and called the Elders of the
People, & c. And all the people answered, and said: All that the
Lord hath spoken we will do, Exod. 19. ver. 5, 6, 7, 8. Such also
was the beginning of Moyses his power under God, or of his
Vicegerency. And all the people saw the thunderings and
lightenings, and the noyse of the Trumpet, &c. And they said unto
Moyses, speak thou unto us, and we will hear. Exod. 20. 18, 19.
The like beginning also had Sauls Kingdome. When yee saw that
Nahash King of the children of Ammon came out against you, yee
said unto me, nay, but a King shall raign over us, when the Lord
your God was your King; Now therefore behold the King whom yee
have chosen, and whom yee have desired. 1 Sam. 12. 12. But the
major part only consenting, and not all (for there were certain
Sons of Belial, who said, How shall this man save us? and they
dispised him, 1 Sam. 10. 27.) those who did not consent were put
to death as Enemies; And the people said unto Samuel, Who is he
that said, shall Saul reign over us? Bring the men that we may
put them to death. 1 Sam. 11:
    II. In the same 6. Chapter, the 6. and 7. Articles, I have
shewed, that all judgment and Wars depend upon the will and
pleasure of him who beares the Supreme Authority; that is to say,
in a Monarchy, on a Monarch, or King; and this is confirmed by
the Peoples owne judgement. Wee also will be like all the
Nations, and our King shall JUDGE us, and goe out before us, and
fight our BATTELS. 1 Sam. 8. 20. And what pertaines to
judgements, and all other matters, whereof there is any
controversie, whether they be Good, or Evill, is confirmed by the
testimony of King Solomon. Give therefore thy Servant an
understanding heart to JUDGE thy People, that I may discerne
between GOOD and EVILL. 1. Kings 3. 9. And that of Absolom, There
is no man deputed of the King to heare thee. 2. Sam. 15. 3.
    III. That Kings may not be punished by their subjects, as
hath been shewed above in the sixth Chapter, and the twelfth
Article, King David also confirmes, who, though Saul sought to
slay him, did notwithstanding refrain his hand from killing him,
and forbad Abishai, saying, Destroy him, not. for who can stretch
forth his hand against the Lords Anointed, and be innocent? 1
Sam: iv. 9. And when he had cut off the skirt of his garment, The
Lord forbid (saith he) that I should doe this thing unto my
Master the Lords Anointed, to stretchforth mine hand against him.
1 Sam. 24. 7. And commanded the Amalekite, who for his sake had
slain Saul, to be put to death. 2 Sam. 1. 15.
    IV. That which is said in the 17. Chapter of judges, at the
6. verse. In those dayes there was no King in Israel, but every
man did that which was right in his own eyes (as though where
there were not a Monarchy, there were an Anarchy or confusion of
all things) may be brought as a testimony to prove the excellency
of Monarchy above all other forms of government, unlesse that by
the word King may perhaps be understood, not one man onely, but
also a Court, provided that in it there reside a supreme power;
which if it be taken in this sense, yet hence it may follow, that
without a supreme and absolute power (which we have endeavoured
to prove in the sixth Chapter) there will be a liberty for every
man to doe what hee hath a minde, or whatsoever shall seem right
to himselfe; which cannot stand with the preservation of
mankinde, and therefore in all Government whatsoever, there is
ever a supreme power understood to be somewhere existent.
    V. We have in the 8. Chapter, the 7. and 8. Article, said,
that Servants must yeeld a simple obedience to their Lords, and
in the 9. Chapter, Article 7. that Sonnes owe the same obedience
to their Parents. Saint Paul sayes the same thing concerning
Servants, Servants obey in all things your Masters according to
the flesh, not with eye service, as men-pleasers, but in
singlenesse of heart, fearing God. Colos. 3. 22. Concerning
Sonnes, Children obey your Parents in all things, for this is
well pleasing unto the Lord. Colos. 3. 20. Now as wee by simple
obedience understand ALL THINGS which are not contrary to the
Lawes of God; so in those cited places of Saint Paul, after the
word ALL THINGS, we.must suppose, excepting those which are
contrary to the Lawes of God.
    VI. But that I may not thus by peecemeale prove the right of
Princes, I will now instance those testimonies which altogether
establish the whole power, (namely that there is an absolute and
simple obedience due to them from their subjects) And first out
of the new Testament. The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moyses
seat; all therefore, whatsoever they bid you observe, that
observe, and doe. Mat. 23. 2. Whatsoever they bid you, (sayes he)
observe, that is to say, obey simply: Why? Because they sit in
Moyses seat; namely, the civill Magistrates, not Aaron, the
Priests. Let every soule be subject to the higher powers, for
there is no Power but of God, the powers that be are ordained of
God; whosoever therefore resisteth the Power, resisteth the
ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive to
themselves damnation. Rom. 13. 1. Now because the powers that
were in Saint Pauls time were ordained of God, and all Kings did
at that time require an absolute entire obedience from their
subjects, it followes that such a power was ordained of God.
Submit your selves unto every ordinance of man for the Lords
sake, whether it bee to the King as supreme, or unto Governours,
as unto them that are sent by him, for the punishment of wicked
doers, and for the praise of them that doe well, for so is the
will of God. 1 Pet. 2. 13. Again Saint Paul to Titus, Put them in
mind to bee subject to Principalities and Powers, to obey
Magistrates, &c. Chap. 3. vers. 1. What Principalities? Was it
not to the Principalities of those times, which required an
absolute obedience? Furthermore, that we may come to the example
of Christ himselfe, to whom the Kingdome of the Jewes belonged by
hereditary Right, derived from David himselfe; He when he lived
in the manner of a subject, both paid tribute unto Caesar, and
pronounced it to be due to him. Give unto Caesar (saith he) the
things which are Caesars, and unto God, the things which are
Gods. Mat. 22. 21. When it pleased him to shew himselfe a King,
he required entire obedience. Goe (said he) into the village over
against you, and straightway yee shall finde an Asse tyed, and a
Colt with her, loose them, and bring them unto me; and if any man
say ought unto you, yee shall say the Lord hath need of them.
Mat: 2. This he did therefore by the right of being Lord, or a
King of the Jewes. But to take away a subjects goods on this
pretence onely, because the Lord hath need of them, is an
absolute power. The most evident places in the old Testament are
these, Goe thou near, and heare ALL that the Lord our God shall
say, and speak thou unto us all that the Lord our God shall speak
unto thee, and we will hear it, and doe it. Deut. 5. 27. But
under the word all, is contained absolute obedience. Again to
Joshua. And they answered Joshua saying, ALL that thou commandest
us, we will doe, and whithersoever thou sendest us, we will goe;
according as we hearkened unto Moyses in ALL things, so will we
hearken unto thee, onely the Lord thy God be with thee, as he was
with Moyses; whosoever hee be that doth rebell against thy
Commandement, and will not hearken unto thy words in ALL that
thou commandest him, he shall be put to death. Joshua 1. 16, 17,
18. And the Parable of the Bramble. Then said all the trees unto
the Bramble, Come thou, and reign over us; And the Bramble said
unto the trees, If in truth yee anoint me King over you, then
come and put your trust in my shadow. and if not, let fire come
out of the Bramble, and devoure the Cedars of Lebanon. Judges 9.
vers. 14, 15. The sense of which words is, that we must acquiese
to their sayings, whom we have truly constituted to be Kings over
us, unlesse we would chuse rather to be consumed by the fire of a
civill warre. But the Regall authority is more particularly
described by God himselfe, in the 1. Sam. 8. vers. 9. &c. Shew
them the Right of the King that shall reign over them, & c. This
shall be the Right of the King that shall reign over you; he will
take your Sons, and appoint them for himself, for his Chariots,
and to be his horsemen, and some shall runne before his Chariots,
& c. And he will take your daughters to be confectionaries, &c.
And he will take your vineyards, and give them to his Servants,
&c. Is not this power absolute? And yet it is by God himself
styled the KINGS RIGHT; neither was any man among the Jewes, no
not the High Priest himselfe, exempted from this obedience. For
when the King (namely Solomon) said to Abiathar the Priest, Get
thee to Anathoth unto thine own fields, for thou art worthy of
death, but I will not at this time put thee to death, because
thou barest the Ark of the Lord God before David my father, and
because thou hast been afflicted in all wherein my Father was
afflicted. So Solomon thrust out Abiathar from being Priest unto
the Lord. 1 Kings. 2. 26. It cannot by any argument be proved,
that this act of his displeased the Lord; neither read we, that
either Solomon was reproved, or that his Person at that time was
any whit lesse acceptable to God.

Chap XII

Of the internal causes, tending to the dissolution of any
Government

    I. Hitherto hath been spoken by what causes, and Pacts,
Common-weals are constituted, and what the Rights of Princes are
over their subjects; Now we will briefly say somewhat concerning
the causes which dissolve them, or the reasons of seditions. Now
as in the motion of naturall bodies, three things are to be
considered, namely, internall disposition, that they be
susceptible of the motion to be produced; the externall Agent,
whereby a certain and determined motion may in act be produced;
and the action it selfe: So also in a Common-weale where the
subjects begin to raise tumults, three things present themselves
to our regard; First the Doctrines and the Passions contrary to
Peace, wherewith the mindes of men are fitted and disposed; next
their quality and condition who sollicite, assemble, and direct
them already thus disposed, to take up armes, and quit their
allegiance; Lastly, the manner how this is done, or the faction
it selfe. But one, and the first which disposeth them to
sedition, is this, That the knowledge of good and evill belongs
to each single man. In the state of nature indeed, where every
man lives by equall Right, and have not by any mutuall Pacts
submitted to the command of others, we have granted this to be
true, nay in the first Chapter, Article 9. we have demonstrated
it. But in the civil state it is false. For it was shown in chap.
6. art. 9] that the civill Lawes were the Rules of good and
evill, just and unjust, honest and dishonest; that therefore what
the Legislator commands, must be held for good, and what he
forbids for evill; and the Legislator is ever that Person who
hath the supreme power in the Commonweale, that is to say, the
Monarch in a Monarchy. We have confirmed the same truth in the
eleventh Chapter, Article 2. out of the words of Solomon; for if
private men may pursue that as good, and shun that as evill which
appears to them to be so, to what end serve those words of his?
Give therefore unto thy servant an understanding heart to judge
thy People, that I may discern between good and evill. Since
therefore it belongs to Kings to discerne betweene good and
evill, wicked are those, though usuall sayings, that he onely is
a King who does righteously, and that Kings must not be obeyed,
unlesse they command us just things, and many other such like.
Before there was any government, just and unjust had no being,
their nature onely being relative to some command, and every
action in its own nature is indifferent; that it becomes just, or
unjust, proceeds from the right of the Magistrate: Legitimate
Kings therefore make the things they command, just, by commanding
them, and those which they forbid, unjust, by forbidding them;
but private men while they assume to themselves the knowledge of
good and evill, desire to be even as Kings, which cannot be with
the safety of the Common weale. The most ancient of all Gods
commands is, Gen. 2. 15. Thou shalt not eat of the tree of
knowledge of good and evill; and the most ancient of all
diabolicall tentations, Chap. 3. vers. 5. Yee shall be as Gods,
knowing good and evill; and Gods first expostulation with man,
vers. 11. Who told thee that thou wert naked? Hast thou eaten of
the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat?
As if he had said, how comest thou to judge that nakedness,
wherein it seemed good to me to create thee, to be shamefull,
except thou have arrogated to thy selfe the knowledge of good and
evill?
    II. Whatsoever any man doth against his conscience is a
sinne, for he who doth so, contemns the Law. But we must
distinguish: That is my sinne indeed, which committing, I doe
beleeve to be my sinne; but what I beleeve to be another mans
sin, I may sometimes doe that without any sin of mine. For if I
be commanded to doe that which is a sin in him who commands me,
if I doe it, and he that commands me be by Right, Lord over me, I
sinne not; for if I wage warre at the Commandement of my Prince,
conceiving the warre to be unjustly undertaken, I doe not
therefore doe unjustly, but rather if I refuse to doe it,
arrogating to my selfe the knowledge of what is just and unjust,
which pertains onely to my Prince. They who observe not this
distinction, will fall into a necessity of sinning, as oft as any
thing is commanded them, which either is, or seems to be
unlawfull to them: for if they obey, they sin against their
conscience, and if they obey not, against Right. If they sin
against their conscience, they declare that they fear not the
paines of the world to come; if they sinne against Right, they
doe as much as in them lyes, abolish humane society, and the
civill life of the present world. Their opinion therefore who
teach, that subjects sinne when they obey their Princes commands,
which to them seem unjust, is both erroneous, and to be reckoned
among those which are contrary to civill obedience; and it
depends upon that originall errour which we have observed above
in the foregoing Article; for by our taking upon us to judge of
good and evill, we are the occasion, that as well our obedience,
as disobedience, becomes sin unto us.
    III. The third seditious doctrine springs from the same root,
That Tyrannicide is lawfull; Nay, at this day it is by many
Divines, and of old it was by all the Philosophers, Plato,
Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and the rest of the
maintainers of the Greek, and Roman Anarchies, held not only
lawful, but even worthy of the greatest praise. And under the
title of Tyrants, they mean not onely Monarchs, but all those who
bear the chief rule in any Government whatsoever; for not
Pisistratus onely at Athens, but those thirty also who succeeded
him, and ruled together, were all called Tyrants. But he, whom
men require to be put to death as being a Tyrant, commands either
by Right, or without Right; if without Right, he is an enemy, and
by Right to be put to death; but then this must not be called the
killing a Tyrant, but an enemy: if by Right, then the divine
interrogation takes place, Who hath told thee that he was a
Tyrant, hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that
thou shouldest not eat? For why doest thou call him a Tyrant,
whom God hath made a King, except that thou being a private
Person, usurpest to thy self the knowledge of good and evill? But
how pernicious this opinion is to all governments, but especially
to that which is Monarchicall, we may hence discerne, namely,
that by it every King, whether good or ill, stands exposed to be
condemned by the judgement, and slain by the hand of every
murtherous villain.
    IV. The fourth adversary opinion to Civill Society, is
theirs, who hold, That they who bear Rule are Subject also to the
Civill Lawes. Which hath been sufficiently proved before not to
be true in the 6. Chap. Artic. 14. from this Argument, That a
City can neither be bound to it self, nor to any subject; not to
it selfe, because no man can be obliged except it be to another;
not to any Subject, because the single wills of the Subjects are
contained in the will of the City, insomuch, that if the City
will be free from all such obligation, the Subjects will so too;
and by consequence she is so. But that which holds true in a
City, that must be supposed to be true in a man, or an assembly
of men, who have the Supreme Authority, for they make a City,
which hath no being but by their Supreme Power. Now that this
Opinion cannot consist with the very being of Government, is
evident from hence, that by it the knowledge of what is Good and
Evill, that is to say, the definition of what is, and what is not
against the Lawes, would return to each single Person: Obedience
therefore will cease as oft as any thing seemes to be commanded
contrary to the Civill Lawes, and together with it, all coercive
jurisdiction, which cannot possibly be without the destruction of
the very essence of Government. Yet this Errour hath great props,
Aristotle, and others; who, by reason of humane infirmity,
suppose the Supreme Power to be committed with most security to
the Lawes onely; but they seem to have lookt very shallowly into
the nature of, Government, who thought that the constraining
Power, the interpretation of Lawes, and the making of Lawes, (all
which are powers necessarily belonging to Government) should be
left wholly to the Lawes themselves. Now although particular
Subjects may sometimes contend in judgement, and goe to Law with
the Supreme Magistrate, yet this is onely then, when the question
is not what the Magistrate may, but what by a certain Rule he
hath declared he would doe. As, when by any Law the Judges sit
upon the life of a Subject, the question is not whether the
Magistrate could by his absolute Right deprive him of his life;
but whether by that Law his will was that he should be deprived
of it; but his will was, he should, if he brake the Law. else,
his will was he should not: This therefore, that a Subject may
have an action of Law against his Supreme Magistrate, is not
strength of Argument sufficient to prove that he is tyed to his
own Lawes. On the contrary, it is evident, that he is not tied to
his owne Lawes, because no man is bound to himself. Lawes
therefore are set for Titius, and Caius, not for the Ruler:
however, by the ambition of Lawyers, it is so ordered, that the
Lawes, to unskilfull men seeme not to depend on the Authority of
the Magistrate, but their Prudence.
    V. In the fifth place, That the Supreme Authority may be
divided, is a most fatall Opinion to all Common-weales. But
diverse men divide it diverse wayes. For some divide it so as to
grant a Supremacy to the Civill Power in matters pertaining to
Peace, and the benefits of this life, but in things concerning
the salvation of the Soul they transfer it on others. Now,
because justice is of all things most necessary to Salvation, it
happens, that Subjects measuring justice, not as they ought, by
the Civill Lawes, but by the precepts and doctrines of them who,
in regard of the Magistrate, are either private mens or
strangers, through a superstitious fear dare not perform the
obedience due to their Princes, through fear falling into that
which they most feared: Now what can be more pernicious to any
state, then that men should, by the apprehension of everlasting
torments, be deterred from obeying their Princes, that is to say,
the Lawes, or from being just? There are also some who divide the
Supreme Authority so as to allow the power of War, and Peace,
unto one, (whom they call a Monarch) but the right of raising
Monies they give to some others, and not to him: But because
monies are the sinewes of War, and Peace, they who thus divide
the Authority, doe either really not divide it at all, but place
it wholly in them, in whose power the money is, but give the name
of it to another, or if they doe really divide it, they dissolve
the Government: for neither upon necessity can War be waged, nor
can the publique Peace be preserved without Money.
    VI. It is a common doctrine, That faith and holinesse are not
acquired by study, and naturall reason, but are alwayes
supernaturally infused, and inspired into men: which, if it were
true, I understand not why we should be commanded to give an
account of our faith; or why any man, who is truly a Christian,
should not be a Prophet; or lastly, why every man should not
judge what's fit for him to doe, what to avoid, rather out of his
own inspiration, then by the precepts of his Superiours, or right
Reason. A return therefore must be made to the private knowledge
of Good and Evil; which cannot be granted without the ruine of
all Governments. This Opinion hath spread it self so largely
through the whole Christian world, that the number of Apostates
from natural reason is almost become infinite. And it sprang from
sick-brained men, who having gotten good store of Holy Words by
frequent reading of the Scriptures, made such a connexion of them
usually in their preaching, that their Sermons, signifying just
nothing, yet to unlearned men seemed most divine; for he whose
non-sense appears to be a Divine speech, must necessarily seeme
to be inspired from above.
    VII. The seventh Doctrine opposite to Government, is this,
That each subject hath an absolute Dominion over the goods he is
in possession of. That is to say, such a propriety as excludes
not only the right of all the rest of his fellow-subjects to the
same goods, but also of the Magistrate himself. Which is not
true; for they who have a Lord over them, have themselves no
Lordship, as hath been proved, Chap. 8. Artic. 5. Now the
Magistrate is Lord of all his Subjects, by the constitution of
Government. Before the yoke of Civill Society was undertaken, no
man had any Proper Right; all things were common to all men. Tell
me therefore, how gottest thou this propriety but from the
Magistrate? How got the Magistrates it, but that every man
transferred his Right on him? And thou therefore hast also given
up thy Right to him; thy Dominion therefore, and Propriety, is
just so much as he will, and shall last so long as he pleases;
even as in a Family, each Son hath such proper goods, and so long
lasting, as seeme good to the Father. But the greatest part of
men who professe Civill Prudence, reason otherwise; we are equall
(say they) by nature; there is no reason why any man should by
better Right take my goods from me, then I his from him; we know
that mony sometimes is needfull for the defence and maintenance
of the publique; but let them, who require it, shew us the
present necessity, and they shall willingly receive it. They who
talk thus, know not, that what they would have, is already done
from the beginning in the very constitution of Government, and
therefore speaking as in a dissolute multitude, and yet not
fashioned Government, they destroy the frame.
    VIII. In the last place, it's a great hindrance to Civill
Government, especially Monarchicall, that men distinguish not
enough between a People and a Multitude. The People is somewhat
that is one, having one will, and to whom one action may be
attributed; none of these can properly be said of a Multitude.
The People rules in all Governments, for even in Monarchies the
People Commands; for the People wills by the will of one man; but
the Multitude are Citizens, that is to say, Subjects. In a
Democraty, and Aristocraty, the Citizens are the Multitude, but
the Court is the People. And in a Monarchy, the Subjects are the
Multitude, and (however it seeme a Paradox) the King is the
People. The common sort of men, and others who little consider
these truthes, do alwayes speak of a great number of men, as of
the People, that is to say, the City; they say that the City hath
rebelled against the King (which is impossible) and that the
People will, and nill, what murmuring and discontented Subjects
would have, or would not have, under pretence of the People,
stirring up the Citizens against the City, that is to say, the
Multitude against the People. And these are almost all the
Opinions wherewith Subjects being tainted doe easily Tumult. And
forasmuch as in all manner of Government Majesty is to be
preserv'd by him, or them who have the Supreme Authority, the
crimen laesae Majestatis naturally cleaves to these Opinions.
    IX. There is nothing more afflicts the mind of man then
Poverty, or the want of those things which are necessary for the
preservation of life, and honour; and though there be no man but
knowes that riches are gotten with industry, and kept by
frugality, yet all the poor commonly lay the blame on the Evill
Government, excusing their own sloth, and luxury, as if their
private goods forsooth were wasted by publique exactions; But men
must consider, that they who have no patrimony, must not onely
labour that they may live, but fight too, that they may labour.
Every one of the Jewes, who in Esdras his time built the Walls of
Jerusalem, did the work with one hand, and held the Sword in the
other. In all Government we must conceive that the hand which
holds the Sword is the King, or Supreme Councell, which is no
lesse to be sustained, and nourisht, by the Subjects care and
industry, then that wherewith each man procures himself a private
fortune; and that Customes, and Tributes, are nothing else but
their reward who watch in Armes for us, that the labours and
endeavours of single men may not be molested by the incursion of
enemies; and that their complaint, who impute their poverty to
publick Persons, is not more just, then if they should say that
they are become in want by paying of their debts: But the most
part of men consider nothing of these things, for they suffer the
same thing with them who have a disease they call an Incubus,
which springing from Gluttony, it makes men believe they are
invaded, opprest, and stifled with a great weight: Now it is a
thing manifest of it selfe, that they who seeme to themselves to
be burthened with the whole load of the Common-weal, are prone to
be Seditious; and that they are affected with change, who are
distasted at the present state of things.
    X. Another noxious disease of the mind is theirs, who having
little employment, want Honour and Dignity. All men naturally
strive for Honour, and Preferment, but chiefly they who are least
troubled with caring for necessary things. For these men are
invited by their vacancy sometimes to disputation among
themselves concerning the Common-weal, sometimes to an easie
reading of Histories, Politiques, Orations, Poems, and other
pleasant Books; and it happens, that hence they think themselves
sufficiently furnisht both with wit, and learning, to administer
matters of the greatest consequence. Now because all men are not
what they appear to themselves, and if they were, yet all (by
reason of the multitude) could not be received to publique
Offices, its necessary that many must be passed by. These
therefore conceiving themselves affronted, can desire nothing
more, partly out of envy to those who were preferred before them,
partly out of hope to overwhelm them, then ill successe to the
publique Consultations; and therefore its no marvell if with
greedy appetites they seek for occasions of innovations.
    XI. The hope of overcomming is also to be numbred among other
seditious inclinations. For let there be as many men as you wil,
infected with opinions repugnant to Peace, and civill Government;
let there be as many as there can, never so much wounded and
torne with affronts, and calumnies, by them who are in Authority;
yet if there be no hope of having the better of them, or it
appear not sufficient, there will no sedition follow; every man
will dissemble his thoughts, and rather content himself with the
present burthen, then hazard an heavier weight. There are four
things necessarily requisite to this hope: Numbers, Instruments,
mutuall trust, and Commanders. To resist publique Magistrates
without a great number, is not Sedition, but Desperation. By
Instruments of war I mean all manner of armes, munition, and
other necessary provision, without which Number can doe nothing,
nor Arms neither without mutuall trust; Nor all these without
union under some Commander, whom of their own accord, they are
content to, obey. not as being engaged by their submission to his
command (for we have already in this very Chapter, supposed these
kind of men not to understand, being obliged beyond that which
seems right and good in their own eyes) but for some opinion they
have of his vertue, or military skill, or resemblance of humours.
If these four be near at hand to men grieved with the present
state, and measuring the justice of their actions by their own
judgements, there will be nothing wanting to sedition and
confusion of the Realme, but one to stirre up and quicken them.
    XII. Salust his Character of Catiline, (then whom there never
was a greater Artist in raising seditions) is this, That he had
great eloquence, and little wisdome. he separates wisdome from
eloquence, attributing this as necessary to a man born for
commotions, adjudging that as an instructresse of Peace, and
quietnesse. Now, eloquence is twofold. The one is an elegant, and
cleare expression of the conceptions of the mind, and riseth
partly from the contemplation of the things themselves, partly
from an understanding of words taken in their own proper, and
definite signification; the other is a commotion of the Passions
of the minde (such as are hope, fear, anger, pitty) and derives
from a metaphoricall use of words fitted to the Passions: That
forms a speech from true Principles, this from opinions already
received, what nature soever they are of. The art of that is
Logick, of this Rhetorick; the end of that is truth, of this
victory. Each hath its use, that in deliberations, this in
exhortations; for that is never disjoyned from wisdome, but this
almost ever. But that this kind of powerfull eloquence, separated
from the true knowledge of things, that is to say, from wisdome,
is the true character of them who sollicite, and stirre up the
people to innovations, may easily be gathered out of the work it
selfe which they have to doe; for they could not poyson the
people with those absurd opinions contrary to Peace and civill
society, unlesse they held them themselves, which sure is an
ignorance greater then can well befall any wise man. For he that
knows not whence the Lawes derive their power, which are the
Rules of just and unjust, honest and dishonest, good and evill;
what makes and preserves Peace among men, what destroyes it; what
is his, and what anothers; Lastly, what he would have done to
himselfe (that he may doe the like to others) is surely to be
accounted but meanly wise. But that they can turn their Auditors
out of fools into madmen; that they can make things to them who
are ill-affected seem worse, to them who are well-affected seem
evil; that they can enlarge their hopes, lessen their dangers
beyond reason: this they have from that sort of eloquence, not
which explains things as they are, but from that other, which by
moving their mindes, makes all things to appear to bee such as
they in their mindes prepared before, had already conceived them.
    XIII. Many men who are themselves very well affected to
civill society, doe through want of knowledge, cooperate to the
disposing of subjects mindes to sedition, whilst they teach young
men a doctrine conformable to the said opinions in their
Schooles, and all the people in their Pulpits. Now they who
desire to bring this disposition into Act, place their whole
endeavour in this, First, that they may joyn the ill affected
together into faction and conspiracy; next, that themselves may
have the greatest stroke in the faction: They gather them into
faction, while they make themselves the relators, and
interpretors of the counsels and actions of single men, and
nominate the Persons and Places, to assemble and deliberate of
such things whereby the present government may be reformed,
according as it shall seem best to their interests. Now to the
end that they themselves may have the chief rule in the faction,
The faction must be kept in a faction, that is to say, they must
have their secret meetings apart with a few, where they may order
what shall afterward be propounded in a general meeting, and by
whom, and on what subject, and in what order each of them shall
speak, and how they may draw the powerfullest, and most popular
men of the faction to their side: And thus when they have gotten
a faction big enough, in which they may rule by their eloquence,
they move it to take upon it the managing of affaires; and thus
they sometimes oppresse the Commonwealth, namely where there is
no other faction to oppose them, but for the most part they rend
it, and introduce a civill warre. For folly and eloquence
concurre in the subversion of government in the same manner (as
the fable hath it) as heretofore the daughters of Pelias King of
Thessaly, conspired with Medea against their father; They going
to restore the decrepit old man to his youth again, by the
counsell of Medea, they cut him into peeces, and set him in the
fire to boyle, in vain expecting when he would live again; So the
common people through their folly (like the daughters of Pelias)
desiring to renew the ancient government, being drawne away by
the eloquence of ambitious men, as it were by the witchcraft of
Medea, divided into faction, they consume it rather by those
flames, then they reforme it.

Chap. XIII

Concerning the duties of them who bear Rule

    I. By what hath hitherto been said, the duties of Citizens
and in any kind of government whatsoever, and the Power of the
supreme Ruler over them are apparent; but we have as yet said
nothing of the duties of Rulers, and how they ought to behave
themselves towards their Subjects; We must then distinguish
between the Right, and the exercise of supreme authority, for
they can be divided; as for example, when he who hath the Right,
either cannot, or will not be present in judging trespasses, or
deliberating of affaires: For Kings sometimes by reason of their
age cannot order their affaires, sometimes also though they can
doe it themselves, yet they judge it fitter, being satisfied in
the choyce of their Officers and Counsellors, to exercise their
power by them. Now where the Right and exercise are severed,
there the government of the Commonweale, is like the ordinary
government of the world, in which God, the mover of all things,
produceth naturall effects by the means of secondary causes; but
where he, to whom the Right of ruling doth belong, is himselfe
present in all judicatures, consultations, and publique actions,
there the administration is such, as if God beyond the ordinary
course of nature, should immediately apply himself unto all
matters. We will therefore in this Chapter summarily and briefly
speak somewhat concerning their duties who exercise authority,
whether by their own or others Right. Nor is it my purpose to
descend into those things, which being divers from others, some
Princes may doe, for this is to be left to the Politicall
Practices of each Common weale.
    II. Now all the duties of Rulers are contained in this one
sentence, The safety of the people is the supreme Law; for
although they who among men obtain the chiefest Dominion, cannot
be subject to Lawes properly so called, that is to say, to the
will of men, because to be chief, and subject, are
contradictories; yet is it their duty in all things, as much as
possibly they can, to yeeld obedience unto right reason, which is
the naturall, morall, and divine Law. But because dominions were
constituted for Peaces sake, and Peace was sought after for
safeties sake, he, who being placed in authority, shall use his
power otherwise then to the safety of the people, will act
against the reasons of Peace, that is to say, against the Lawes
of nature; Now as the safety of the People dictates a Law by
which Princes know their duty, so doth it also teach them an art
how to procure themselves a benefit; for the power of the
Citizens, is the power of the City, that is to say, his that
bears the chief Rule in any state.
    III. By the people in this place we understand, not one
civill Person, namely the City it selfe which governs, but the
multitude of subjects which are governed; for the City was not
instituted for its own, but for the subjects sake; and yet a
particular care is not required of this or that man; for the
Ruler (as such) provides no otherwise for the safety of his
people, then by his Lawes, which are universall; and therefore he
hath fully discharged himselfe, if he have throughly endeavoured
by wholesome constitutions, to establish the welfare of the most
part, and made it as lasting as may be; and that no man suffer
ill, but by his own default, Or by some chance which could not be
prevented; but it sometimes conduces to the safety of the most
part, that wicked men doe suffer.
    IV. But by safety must be understood, not the sole
preservation. of life in what condition soever, but in order to
its happines. For to this end did men freely assemble themselves,
and institute a government, that they might, as much as their
humane condition would afford, live delightfully. They therefore
who had undertaken the administration of power in such a kinde of
government, would sinne against the Law of nature (because
against their trust who had committed that power unto them) if
they should not study, as much as by good Laws could be effected,
to furnish their subjects abundantly, not only with the good
things belonging to life, but also with those which advance to
delectation. They who have acquired Dominion by arms, doe all
desire that their subjects may be strong in body and mind, that
they may serve them the better; wherefore if they should not
endeavour to provide them, not only with such things whereby they
may live, but also with such whereby they may grow strong and
lusty, they would act against their own scope and end.
    V. And first of all, Princes doe beleeve that it mainly
concerns eternall salvation, what opinions are held of the Deity,
and what manner of worship he is to be adored with; which being
supposed, it may be demanded, whether chief Rulers, and whosoever
they be, whether one or more, who exercise supreme authority, sin
not against the Law of nature, if they cause not such a doctrine,
and worship, to be taught and practised (or permit a contrary to
be taught and practised) as they beleeve necessarily conduceth to
the eternall salvation of their subjects? It is manifest that
they act against their conscience, and that they will, as much as
in them lies, the eternall perdition of their subjects; for if
they willed it not, I see no reason why they should suffer, (when
being supreme they cannot be compelled) such things to be taught
and done, for which they beleeve them to be in a damnable state.
But we will leave this difficulty in suspence.
    VI. The benefits of subjects respecting this life only, may
be distributed into foure kindes. 1. That they be defended
against forraign enemies. 2. That Peace be preserved at home. 3.
That they be enrich't as much as may consist with publique
security. 4. That they enjoy a harmelesse liberty; For supreme
Commanders can conferre no more to their civill happinesse, then
that being preserved from forraign and civill warres, they may
quietly enjoy that wealth which they have purchased by their own
industry.
    VII. There are two things necessary for the Peoples defence;
To be warned, and to be forearmed; for the state of
Common-wealths considered in themselves, is natural, that is to
say, hostile; neither if they cease from fighting, is it
therefore to be called Peace, but rather a breathing time, in
which one enemy observing the motion and countenance of the
other, values his security not according to the Pacts, but the
forces and counsels of his adversary; And this by naturall Right,
as hath been shewed in the second Chapter, 10. Artic. from this,
that contracts are invalid in the state of nature, as oft as any
just fear doth intervene; It is therefore necessary to the
defence of the City, First, that there be some who may as near as
may be, search into, and discover the counsels and motions of all
those who may prejudice it. For discoverers to Ministers of
State, are like the beames of the Sunne to the humane soule, and
we may more truly say in vision politicall, then naturall, that
the sensible, and intelligible Species of outward things, not
well considered by others, are by the ayre transported to the
soule, (that is to say to them who have the Supreme Authority)
and therefore are they no lesse necessary to the preservation of
the State, then the rayes of the light are to the conservation of
man; or if they be compared to Spiders webs, which extended on
all sides by the finest threds, doe warn them, keeping in their
small holds, of all outward motions; They who bear Rule can no
more know what is necessary to be commanded for the defence of
their Subjects without Spies, then those Spiders can when they
shall goe forth, and whether they shall repair, without the
motion of those threds.
    VIII. Farthermore, its necessarily requisite to the peoples
defence, that they be fore-armed. Now to be fore-armed is to be
furnisht with Souldiers, Armes, Ships, Forts and Monies, before
the danger be instant; for the listing of Souldiers, and taking
up of Armes after a blow is given, is too late, at least if not
impossible. In like manner, not to raise Forts, and appoint
Garrisons in convenient places, before the Frontiers are invaded,
is to be like those Country Swains (as Demosthenes said) who
ignorant of the art of Fencing, with their Bucklers guarded those
parts of the body where they first felt the smart of the strokes.
But they who think it then seasonable enough to raise Monies for
the maintenance of Souldiers, and other Charges of War, when the
danger begins to shew it self, they consider not surely how
difficult a matter it is to wring suddainly out of close-fisted
men so vast a proportion of Monies; for almost all men, what they
once reckon in the number of their goods, doe judge themselves to
have such a right and propriety in it, as they conceive
themselves to be injured whensoever they are forced to imploy but
the least part of it for the publique good. Now a sufficient
stock of monies to defend the Country with Armes, will not soon
be raised out of the treasure of Imposts, and Customes; we must
therefore, for fear of War, in time of Peace hoord up good summs,
if we intend the safety of the Common-weal. Since therefore it
necessarily belongs to Rulers for the Subjects safety to discover
the Enemies Counsell, to keep Garrisons, and to have Money in
continuall readinesse, and that Princes are by the Law of Nature
bound to use their whole endeavour in procuring the welfare of
their Subjects, it followes, that its not onely lawfull for them
to send out Spies, to maintain Souldiers, to build Forts, and to
require Monies for these purposes, but also, not to doe thus, is
unlawfull. To which also may be added, whatsoever shall seeme to
conduce to the lesning of the power of forraigners whom they
suspect, whether by sleight, or force. For Rulers are bound
according to their power to prevent the evills they suspect, lest
peradventure they may happen through their negligence.
    IX. But many things are required to the conservation of
inward Peace, because many things concur (as hath been shewed in
the foregoing Chapter) to its perturbation. We have there shewed,
that some things there are which dispose the minds of men to
sedition, others which move and quicken them so disposed. Among
those which dispose them, we have reckoned in the first place
certaine perverse doctrines. Its therefore the duty of those who
have the chief Authority; to root those out of the mindes of men,
not by commanding, but by teaching; not by the terrour of
penalties, but by the perspicuity of reasons; the Lawes whereby
this evill may be withstood are not to be made against the
Persons erring, but against the Errours themselves. Those errours
which in the foregoing Chapter we affirmed were inconsistent with
the quiet of the Common-weal, have crept into the mindes of
ignorant men, partly from the Pulpit, partly from the daily
discourses of men, who by reason of little employment, otherwise,
doe finde leasure enough to study; and they got into these mens
mindes by the teachers of their youth in publique schooles.
Wherefore also, on the other side, if any man would introduce
sound Doctrine, he must begin from the Academies: There, the
true, and truly demonstrated foundations of civill Doctrine are
to be laid, wherewith young men being once endued, they may
afterward both in private and publique instruct the vulgar. And
this they will doe so much the more cheerfully, and powerfully,
by how much themselves shall be more certainly convinced of the
truth of those things they profess, and teach; for seeing at this
day men receive propositions, though false, and no more
intelligible, then if a man should joyne together a company of
termes drawn by chance out of an urne, by reason of the frequent
use of hearing them; how much more would they for the same reason
entertain true doctrines suitable to their own understandings,
and the nature of things? I therefore conceive it to be the duty
of Supreme Officers to cause the true elements of civill Doctrine
to be written, and to command them to be taught in all the
Colledges of their severall Dominions.
    X. In the next place we shewed that grief of mind arising
from want did dispose the Subjects to Sedition, which want,
although deriv'd from their own luxury, and sloth, yet they
impute it to those who govern the Realm, as though they were
drained and opprest by publique Pensions. Notwithstanding it may
sometimes happen that this complaint may be just, namely, when
the burthens of the Realm are unequally imposed on the Subjects;
For that which to all together is but a light weight, if many
withdraw themselves, it wil be very heavy, nay, even intollerable
to the rest: Neither are men wont so much to grieve at the
burthen it self, as at the inequality. With much earnestnes
therefore men strive to be freed from taxes, & in this conflict
the lesse happy, as being overcome, do envy the more fortunate.
To remove therefore all just complaint, its the interest of the
publique quiet, and by consequence it concernes the duty of the
Magistrate, to see that the publique burthens be equally born.
Furthermore, since what is brought by the subjects to publick
use, is nothing else but the price of their bought Peace, its
reason good, that they who equally share in the peace, should
also pay an equall part either by contributing their Monies, or
their labours to the Common-weal. Now it is the Law of Nature (by
the 15. Article of the 3. Chapter) that every man in distributing
right to others, doe carry himself equall to all; wherefore
Rulers are by the naturall Law obliged to lay the burthens of the
Common-weal equally on their Subjects.
    XI. Now in this place we understand an equality, not of
Money, but of Burthen, that is to say, an equality of reason
between the Burthens, and the Benefits. For although all equally
enjoy Peace, yet the benefits springing from thence, are not
equall to all; for some get greater possessions, others lesse;
and againe, some consume lesse, others more. It may therefore be
demanded whether Subjects ought to contribute to the publique,
according to the rate of what they gain, or of what they spend,
that is to say, whether the persons must be taxt, so as to pay
contribution according to their wealth, or the goods themselves,
that every man contribute according to what he spends. But if we
consider, where Monies are raised according to wealth, there they
who have made equall gain, have not equall possessions, because
that one preserves what he hath got by frugality, another wastes
it by luxury, and therefore equally rejoycing in the benefit of
Peace, they doe not equally sustaine the Burthens of the
Common-weal: and on the other side, where the goods themselves
are taxt, there every man, while he spends his private goods, in
the very act of consuming them he undiscernably payes part due to
the Common-weal, according to, not what he hath, but what by the
benefit of the Realm he hath had. It is no more to be doubted,
but that the former way of commanding monies is against equity,
and therefore against the duty of Rulers, the latter is agreeable
to reason, and the exercise of their authority.
    XII. In the third place, we said that that trouble of minde
which riseth from ambition was offensive to publique Peace. For
there are some who seeming to themselves to be wiser then others,
and more sufficient for the managing of affaires then they who at
present doe govern, when they can no otherwise declare how
profitable their vertue would prove to the Common-weale, they
shew it, by harming it; but because ambition and greedinesse of
honours cannot be rooted out of the mindes of men, its not the
duty of Rulers to endeavour it; but by constant application of
rewards, and punishments, they may so order it, that men may know
that the way to honour is, not by contempt of the present
government, nor by factions, and the popular ayre, but by the
contraries. They are good men who observe the Decrees, the Lawes
and Rights of their Fathers; if with a constant order we saw
these adorned with honours, but the factious punisht, and had in
contempt by those who bear command, there would be more ambition
to obey, then withstand. Notwithstanding it so happens sometimes,
that as we must stroke a horse by reason of his too much
fiercenesse, so a stiffe-neckt subject must be flatter'd for fear
of his power; but as that happens when the rider, so this, when
the Commander is in danger of falling. But we speak here of
those, whose authority and power is intire. Their duty (I say) it
is to cherish obedient subjects, and to depresse the factious all
they can; nor can the publique power be otherwise preserved, nor
the subjects quiet without it.
    XIII. But if it be the duty of Princes to restrain the
factious, much more does it concern them to dissolve and
dissipate the factions themselves. Now I call a faction, a
multitude of subjects gathered together, either by mutuall
contracts among themselves, or by the power of some one, without
his or their authority who bear the supreme Rule: A faction
therefore is as it were a City in a City; for as by an Union of
men in the state of nature a City receives its being, so by a new
union of subjects, there ariseth a faction. According to this
definition, a multitude of subjects who have bound themselves
simply to obey any forreign Prince, or Subject, or have made any
Pacts, or Leagues of mutuall defence between themselves against
all men, not excepting those who have the supreme power in the
City, is a faction. Also favour with the vulgar if it be so
great, that by it an Army may be rais'd, except publique caution
be given, either by hostages, or some other pledges, contains
faction in it; The same may be said of private wealth, if it
exceed, because all things obey mony. Forasmuch therefore as it
is true, that the state of Cities among themselves is naturall,
and hostile, those Princes who permit factions, doe as much as if
they received an enemy within their walls, which is Contrary to
the subjects safety, and therefore also against the Law of
nature.
    XIV. There are two things necessary to the enriching of
Subjects, Labour and thrift; there is also a third which helps,
to wit the naturall increase of the earth and water; and there is
a fourth too, namely the Militia, which sometimes augments, but
more frequently lessens the subjects stock. The two first are
only necessary. For a City constituted in an Island of the Sea,
no greater then will serve for dwelling, may grow rich without
sowing, or fishing, by merchandize, and handicrafts only; but
there is no doubt if they have a territory, but they may be
richer with the same number, or equally rich, being a greater
number. But the fourth, namely the Militia, was of old reckoned
in the number of the gaining Arts, under the notion of Booting or
taking Prey; and it was by mankind, (disperst by families) before
the constitution of civill societies, accounted just and
honourable; for preying, is nothing else but a warre waged with
small forces; And great Common-weales, namely that of Rome, and
Athens, by the spoyles of warre, forraigne tribute, and the
territories they have purchased by their armes, have sometimes so
improved the Common-wealth, that they have not onely not required
any publique monies from the poorer sort of subjects, but have
also divided to each of them both monies and lands. But this kind
of increase of riches, is not to be brought into rule and
fashion: For the Militia in order to profit, is like a Dye
wherewith many lose their estates, but few improve them. Since
therefore there are three things only, the fruits of the earth
and water, Labour and Thrift, which are expedient for the
enriching of subjects, the duty of Commanders in chief, shall be
conversant onely about those three. For the first, those lawes
will be usefull which countenance the arts that improve the
increase of the earth, and water, such as are husbandry, and
fishing. For the second, all Lawes against idlenesse, and such as
quicken industry, are profitable; the art of Navigation (by help
whereof the commodities of the whole world, bought almost by
labour only, are brought into one City) and the Mechanicks,
(under which I comprehend all the arts of the most excellent
workmen) and the Mathematicall sciences, the fountains of
navigatory and mechanick employments, are held in due esteem and
honour. For the third, those lawes are usefull, whereby all
inordinate expence, as well in meats, as in clothes, and
universally in all things which are consumed with usage, is
forbidden. Now because such lawes are beneficiall to the ends
above specified, it belongs also to the Office of supreme
Magistrates, to establish them.
    XV. The liberty of subjects consists not in being exempt from
the Lawes of the City, or that they who have the supreme power
cannot make what Laws they have a mind to; but because all the
motions and actions of subjects, are never circumscribed by
Lawes, nor can be, by reason of their variety, it is necessary
that there be infinite cases, which are neither commanded, nor
prohibited, but every man may either doe, or not doe them, as he
lists himselfe. In these, each man is said to enjoy his liberty,
and in this sense liberty is to be understood in this place,
namely, for that part of naturall Right, which is granted and
left to Subjects by the civill Lawes. As water inclosed on all
hands with banks, stands still and corrupts; having no bounds, it
spreds too largely, and the more passages it findes, the more
freely it takes its current; so subjects, if they might doe
nothing without the commands of the Law would grow dull, and
unwildly, if all, they would be disperst, and the more is left
undetermined by the Lawes, the more liberty they enjoy. Both
extremes are faulty, for Lawes were not invented to take away,
but to direct mens actions, even as nature ordained the banks,
not to stay, but to guide the course of the streame. The measure
of this liberty is to be taken from the subjects, and the Cities
good. Wherefore in the first place it is against the charge of
those who command, and have the authority of making lawes, that
there should be more lawes then necessarily serve for good of the
Magistrate, and his Subjects; for since men are wont commonly to
debate what to do, or not to do, by naturall reason, rather then
any knowledge of the Lawes, where there are more Lawes then can
easily be remembred, and whereby such things are forbidden, as
reason of it selfe prohibites not of necessity, they must through
ignorance, without the least evill intention, fall within the
compasse of Lawes, as gins laid to entrap their harmelesse
liberty, which supreme Commanders are bound to preserve for their
subjects by the Lawes of nature.
    XVI. It is a great part of that liberty which is harmlesse to
civill government, and necessary for each subject to live
happily, that there be no penalties dreaded, but what they may
both foresee, and look for. and this is done, where there are
either no punishments at all defined by the Lawes, or greater not
required then are defined. Where there are none defined, there he
that hath first broken the Law, expects an indefinite or
arbitrary punishment, and his feare is supposed boundlesse,
because it relates to an unbounded evill; now the Law of nature
commands them who are not subject to any civill Lawes, (by what
we have said in the third Chapter, Artic. 11.) and therefore
supreme Commanders, that in taking revenge and punishing, they
must not so much regard the past evill, as the future good, and
they sin, if they entertain any other measure in arbitrary
punishment, then the publique benefit. But where the punishment
is defined, either by a Law prescribed, as when it is set down in
plain words, that he that shall doe thus, or thus, shall suffer
so and so; or by practice, as when the penalty, (not by any Law
prescribed, but arbitrary from the beginning) is afterward
determined by the punishment of the first. delinquent (for
naturall equity commands that equall transgressors be equally
punished); there to impose a greater penalty then is defined by
the Law, is against the Law of nature. For the end of punishment
is not to compell the will of man, but to fashion it, & make it
such as he would have it who hath set the penalty. And
deliberation is nothing else but a weighing, as it were in
scales, the conveniencies, and inconveniencies of the fact we are
attempting; where, that which is more weighty, doth necessarily
according to its inclination prevaile with us. If therefore the
Legislator doth set a lesse penalty on a crime, then will make
our feare more considerable with us, then our lust; that excesse
of lust above the feare of punishment, whereby sinne is
committed, is to be attributed to the Legislator (that is to say)
to the supreme; and therefore if he inflict a greater punishment,
then himselfe hath determined in his Lawes, he punisheth that in
another, in which he sinned himselfe.
    XVII. It pertaines therefore to the harmlesse and necessary
liberty of subjects, that every man may without feare, enjoy the
rights which are allowed him by the Lawes; for it is in vain to
have our own distinguisht by the Lawes from anothers, if by wrong
judgement; robbery, theft, they may bee again confounded. But it
falls out so, that these doe happen where Judges are corrupted;
for the fear whereby men are deterred from doing evill, ariseth
not from hence, namely, because penalties are set, but because
they are executed; for we esteeme the future by what is past,
seldome expecting what seldome happens. If therefore Judges
corrupted either by Gifts, Favour, or even by pitty it self, do
often forbear the execution of the Penalties due by the Law, and
by that meanes put wicked men in hope to passe unpunisht: honest
Subjects encompast with murtherers, theeves and knaves, will not
have the liberty to converse freely with each other, nor scarce
to stirre abroad without hazard; nay, the City it self is
dissolved, and every mans right of protecting himself at his own
will returnes to him. The Law of Nature therefore gives this
precept to Supreme Commanders, that they not onely doe
righteousnesse themselves, but that they also by penalties cause
the Judges, by them appointed, to doe the same; that is to say,
that they hearken to the complaints of their Subjects; and as oft
as need requires, make choice of some extraordinary Judges, who
may hear the matter debated concerning the ordinary ones.

Chap. XIV

Of Lawes and Trespasses

    I. Hey who lesse seriously consider the force of words, doe
sometimes confound Law with Counsell, sometimes with Covenant,
sometimes with Right. They confound Law with Counsell, who think,
that it is the duty of Monarchs not onely to give ear to their
Counsellours, but also to obey them, as though it were in vaine
to take Counsell, unlesse it were also followed. We must fetch
the distinction between Counsell, and Law, from the difference
between Counsell, and Command. Now COUNSELL is a precept in which
the reason of my obeying it, is taken from the thing it self
which is advised; but COMMAND is a precept in which the cause of
my obedience depends on the will of the Commander. For it is not
properly said, Thus I will, and thus I Command, except the will
stand for a Reason. Now when obedience is yielded to the Lawes,
not for the thing it self, but by reason of the advisers will,
the Law is not a Counsell, but a Command, and is defined thus,
LAW is the command of that Person (whether Man, or Court) whose
precept containes in it the reason of obedience; as the Precepts
of God in regard of Men, of Magistrates in respect of their
Subjects, and universally of all the powerfull in respect of them
who cannot resist, may be termed their Lawes. Law and Counsell
therefore differ many ways; Law belongs to him who hath power
over them whom he adviseth, Counsell to them who have no power.
To follow what is prescribed by Law, is duty, what by Counsell,
is free-will. Counsell is directed to his end that receives it,
Law, to his that gives it. Counsell is given to none but the
willing, Law even to the unwilling. To conclude, the right of the
Counsellour is made void by the will of him to whom he gives
Counsell, the right of the Law-giver is not abrogated at the
pleasure of him who hath a Law imposed.
    II. They confound Law, and Covenant, who conceive the Lawes
to be nothing else but certain omologemata or forms of living,
determined by the common consent of men: Amongst whom is
Aristotle, who defines Law on this manner, Nomos esti logos
orismenos kath omologian koinen poleos, minuon pos dei prattein
ekasta, that is to say, Law is a speech limited according to the
common consent of the City, declaring every thing that we ought
to doe. Which definition is not simply of Law, but of the Civill
Law; for it is manifest that the Divine Lawes sprang not from the
consent of men, nor yet the Lawes of Nature; for if they had
their originall from the consent of men, they might also by the
same consent be abrogated; but they are unchangeable. But indeed
that's no right definition of a Civill Law; for in that place a
City is taken either for one civill person, having one will, or
for a multitude of men who have each of them the liberty of their
private wills. If for one person, those words, common consent,
are ill placed here, for one person hath no common consent;
neither ought he to have said, (declaring what was needfull to be
done) but commanding; for what the City declares, it commands its
Subjects. He therefore by a City understood a multitude of men
declaring by common consent (imagine it a writing confirm'd by
Votes) some certain formes of living; but these are nothing else
but some mutuall contracts which oblige not any man (and
therefore are no Lawes) before that a Supreme Power being
constituted which can compell, have sufficient remedy against the
rest, who otherwise are not likely to keep them. Lawes therefore,
according to this definition of Aristotle, are nothing else, but
naked, and weak contracts, which then at length, when there is
one who by right doth exercise the Supreme Power, shall either
become Lawes, or no Lawes, at his will and pleasure: Wherefore he
confounds Contracts with Lawes, which he ought not to have done;
for Contract is a promise, Law a command. In Contracts we say, I
will do this; In Lawes, Doe this. Contracts oblige us, Lawes tie
us fast, being obliged. A Contract obligeth of it self, The Law
holds the party obliged by vertue of the universall Contract of
yeelding obedience; Therefore in Contract its first determined
what is to be done, before we are obliged to doe it; But in Law
we are first obliged to performe, and what is to be done, is
determined afterwards. Aristotle therefore ought to have defined
a civill law thus, A civill law is a speech limited by the will
of the City, commanding every thing behoofefull to be done, which
is the same with that we have given above in the 6. Chap. art. 9.
to wit, that the civill lawes are the command of him (whether
man, or Court of men) who is endued with supreme Power in the
city, concerning the future actions of his Subjects.
    Contracts oblige us. To be obliged, and to be tyed being
obliged, seems to some men to be one, and the same thing, and
that therefore here seems to be some distinction in words, but
none indeed. More cleerly therefore, I say thus, That a man is
obliged by his contracts, that is, that he ought to performe for
his promise sake; but that the Law tyes him being obliged, that
is to say, it compells him to make good his promise, for fear of
the punishment appointed by the Law.
    III. They confound Lawes with Right, who continue still to
doe what is permitted by divine Right, notwithstanding it be
forbidden by the civill Law: That which is prohibited by the
divine Law, cannot bee permitted by the civill, neither can that
which is commanded by the divine Law, be prohibited by the
civill. Notwithstanding that which is permitted by the divine
Right, that is to say, that which may be done by divine Right,
doth no whit hinder why the same may not be forbidden by the
civill Lawes; for inferiour Lawes may restrain the liberty
allowed by the superiour, although they cannot enlarge them. Now
naturall liberty is a Right not constituted, but allowed by the
Lawes. For the Lawes being removed, our liberty is absolute; This
is first restrained by the naturall, and divine Lawes, the
residue is bounded by the civill Law, and what remains may again
be restrained by the constitutions of particular Towns, and
Societies. There is great difference therefore between Law, and
Right; For Law is a fetter, Right is freedome, and they differ
like contraries.
    IV. All Law may be divided, first according to the diversity
of its Authors into Divine and humane. The Divine, according to
the two wayes whereby God hath made known his will unto men, is
twofold, naturall (or morall) and positive; naturall is that
which God hath declared to all men by his eternall word borne
with them, to wit, their naturall Reason; and this is that Law
which in this whole book I have endeavoured to unfold. Positive
is that, which God hath revealed to us by the word of Prophesie,
wherein he hath spoken unto men as a man: Such are the Lawes
which he gave to the Jewes concerning their government, and
divine worship, and they may be termed the Divine civill Lawes,
because they were peculiar to the civill government of the Jewes,
his peculiar people. Again, the naturall Law may be divided into
that of Men, which alone hath obtained the title of the Law of
nature, and that of Cities, which may be called that of Nations,
but vulgarly it is termed the Right of Nations. The precepts of
both are alike, but because Cities once instituted doe put on the
personall proprieties of men, that Law, which speaking of the
duty of single men, we call naturall, being applyed to whole
Cities, and Nations, is called the Right of Nations. And the same
Elements of naturall law, and Right, which have hitherto been
spoken of, being transferred to whole Cities and Nations, may be
taken for the Elements of the lawes, and Right of Nations.
    V. All humane law is civill. For the state of men considered
out of civill society, is hostile, in which, because one is not
subject to another, there are no other Lawes, beside the dictates
of naturall reason, which is the divine Law. But in civill
government the City onely, that is to say, that man, or Court, to
whom the supreme power of the City is committed, is the
Legislator, and the Lawes of the City are civill. The civill
Lawes may be divided according to the diversity of their subject
matter, into sacred, or secular; sacred are those which pertain
to Religion, that is to say, to the ceremonies, and worship of
God (to wit what Persons, things, places, are to be consecrated,
and in what fashion, what opinions concerning the Deity are to be
taught publiquely, and with what words, and in what order
supplications are to be made, and the like) and are not
determined by any divine positive Law. For the civill sacred
Lawes are the humane Lawes (which are also called
Ecclesiasticall) concerning things sacred; but the secular under
a generall notion, are usually called the civill Lawes.
    VI. Again, the civill Law (according to the two offices of
the. Legislator, whereof one is to judge; the other to constrain
men to acquiesce to his judgements) hath two parts; the one
distributive, the other vindicative, or penall. By the
distributive it is, that every man hath his proper Right, that is
to say, it sets forth Rules for all things, whereby we may know
what is properly ours, what another mans; so as others may not
hinder us from the free use and enjoyment of our own; and we may
not interrupt others in the quiet possession of theirs; and what
is lawfull for every man to doe or omit, and what is not lawfull.
Vindicative is that whereby it is defined what punishment shall
be inflicted on them who break the Law.
    VII. Now distributive, and vindicative, are not two severall
Species of the Lawes, but two parts of the same Law. For if the
Law should say no more, but (for example) whatsoever you take
with your net in the Sea, be it yours, its in vain; For although
another should take that away from you which you have caught, it
hinders not, but that it still remains yours; for in the state of
nature where all things are common to all, yours, and others, are
all one, insomuch as what the Law defines to be yours, was yours
even before the Law, and after the Law ceases not to bee yours,
although in another mans possession. Wherefore the Law doth
nothing, unlesse it bee understood to bee so yours, as all other
men be forbidden to interrupt your free use, and secure enjoyment
of it at all times, according to your own will, and pleasure. For
this is that which is required to a propriety of goods, not that
a man may be able to use them, but to use them alone, which is
done by prohibiting others to be an hinderance to him. But in
vain doe they also prohibit any men, who doe not withall strike a
fear of punishment into them; in vain therefore is the Law,
unlesse it contain both parts, that which forbids injuries to be
done, and that which punisheth the doers of them. The first of
them which is called distributive, is Prohibitory, and speaks to
all; the second which is styled vindicative, or paenary, is
mandatory, and onely speaks to publique Ministers.
    VIII. From hence also we may understand, that every civill
Law hath a penalty annexed to it, either explicitly, or
implicitly; For where the penalty is not defined, neither by any
writing, nor by example of any one who hath suffered the
punishment of the transgressed Law there the penalty is
understood to be arbitrary, namely, to depend on the will of the
Legislator, that is to say, of the supreme Commander. For in vain
is that Law which may be broken without punishment.
    IX. Now because it comes from the civill Lawes, both that
every man have his proper Right, and distinguisht from anothers,
and also that he is forbidden to invade anothers Rights, it
followes, that these Precepts ( Thou shalt not refuse to give the
honour defin'd by the Lawes unto thy Parents: Thou shalt not kill
the man whom the Lawes forbid thee to kill: Thou shalt avoid all
copulation forbidden by the Laws: Thou shalt not take away
anothers goods against the Lords will: Thou shalt not frustrate
the Laws and Judgements by false testimony) are Civill Lawes. The
naturall Lawes command the same things but implicitly. for the
law of nature (as hath been said in the 3. Chap. Art. 2.)
commands us to keep contracts, and therefore also to performe
obedience when we have covenanted obedience, and to abstaine from
anothers goods when it is determin'd by the civill Law what
belongs to another. But all Subjects (by the 13. Art. of the 6.
Chap.) do covenant to obey his commands who hath the supreme
power, that is to say the civill Lawes, in the very constitution
of government, even before it is possible to break them. For the
Law of nature did oblige in the state of nature, where first
(because nature hath given all things to all men) nothing did
properly belong to another, and therefore it was not possible to
invade anothers right; next, where all things were common, and
therefore all carnall copulations lawfull; Thirdly, where was the
state of Warre, and therefore lawfull to kill; Fourthly, where
all things were determined by every mans own judgement, and
therefore paternall respects also: Lastly, where there were no
publique judgements, and therefore no use of bearing witnesse,
either true, or false.
    X. Seeing therefore our obligation to observe those Laws, is
more ancient then the promulgation of the Laws themselves, as
being contained in the very constitution of the City, by the
vertue of the naturall Law which forbids breach of Covenant, the
Law of nature commands us to keep all the civill Laws; for where
we are tyed to obedience, before we know what will be commanded
us, there we are universally tyed to obey in all things. Whence
it followes, that no civil Law whatsoever, which tends not to a
reproach of the Deity (in respect of whom, Cities themselves have
no right of their own, and cannot be said to make Lawes) can
possibly be against the Law of nature; for though the Law of
nature forbid theft, adultery, &c. yet if the civill Law command
us to invade any thing, that invasion is not theft, adultery, &c.
For when the Lacedemonians of old permitted their youths by a
certaine Law, to take away other mens goods, they commanded that
these goods should not bee accounted other mens, but their own
who took them; and therefore such surreptions were no thefts. In
like manner, copulations of heathen Sexes, according to their
Lawes, were lawfull marriages.
    XI. Its necessary to the essence of a Law, that the Subjects
be acquainted with two things, First, what man or Court hath the
supreme power, that is to say, the Right of making Lawes.
Secondly, what the Law it self sayes; for he that neither knew
either to whom or what he is tyed to, cannot obey, and by
consequence is in such a condition, as if he were not tyed at
all. I say not that it is necessary to the essence of a Law, that
either one, or the other be perpetually known, but onely that it
be once knowne; and if the Subject afterward forget either the
Right he hath who made the Law, or the Law it self, that makes
him no lesse tyed to obey, since he might have remembred it, had
he had a will to obey.
    XII. The knowledge of the Legislator depends on the Subject
himselfe; for the right of making Lawes could not be conferr'd on
any man without his owne consent, and covenant, either exprest,
or suppos'd; exprest, when from the beginning the Citizens doe
themselves constitute a forme of governing the City, or when by
promise they submit themselves to the Dominion of any one; or
suppos'd at least, as when they make use of the benefit of the
Realme, and Lawes, for their protection and conservation against
others. For to whose Dominion we require our fellow Subjects to
yeeld obedience for our good, his Dominion we acknowledge to be
legitimate by that very request. And therefore ignorance of the
power of making Lawes, can never be a sufficient excuse; for
every man knowes what he hath done himselfe.
    XIII. The knowledge of the lawes depends on the Legislator,
who must publish them, for otherwise they are not Lawes; for Law
is the command of the Law-maker, and his command is the
Declaration of his Will; it is not therefore a Law, except the
will of the Law-maker be declar'd, which is done by promulgation.
Now in promulgation two things must be manifest, whereof one is,
that he or they who publish a Law, either have a right themselves
to make Lawes, or that they doe it by authority deriv'd from him
or them who have it; the other is the sense of the Law it selfe.
Now, that the first, namely publisht Lawes proceed from him who
hath the supreme command, cannot be manifest (speaking exactly
and philosophically) to any, but them who have received them from
the mouth of the Commander; the rest beleeve, but the reasons of
their beliefe are so many, that it is scarce possible they should
not believe. And truly in a Democratical City where every one may
be present at the making of Laws if he will, he that shall be
absent, must beleeve those that were present; but in monarchies
and Aristocraties, because its granted but to few to be present,
and openly to heare the commands of the monarch or the Nobles, it
was necessary to bestow a power on those few of publishing them
to the rest. And thus we beleeve those to be the Edicts and
Decrees of Princes, which are propounded to us for such, either
by the writings, or voices of them, whose office it is to publish
them. But yet when we have these causes of beliefe, that we have
seen the Prince, or supreme Councell constantly use such
Counsellors, Secretaries, publishers, and seales, and the like
arguments for the declaring of his will; that he never took any
authority from them; that they have bin punisht who not giving
credit to such like promulgations have transgrest the Law; not
onely he who thus believing shall not obey the Edicts and Decrees
set forth by them is every where accus'd, but he that not
believing, shall not yield obedience, is punisht. For the
constant permission of these things is a manifest signe enough,
and evident declaration of the Commanders will; provided there be
nothing contain'd in the Law, Edict or Decree, derogatory from
his supreme power: For it is not to be imagin'd that he would
have ought taken from his power by any of his Officers as long as
he retaines a will to governe. Now the sense of the law, when
there is any doubt made of it, is to be taken from them to whom
the supreme authority hath committed the knowledge of causes, or
Judgements; for to judge is nothing else then by interpretation
to apply the lawes to particular cases. Now we may know who they
are that have this Office granted them, in the same manner, as we
know who they be that have authority given them to publish Laws.
    XIV. Againe the civill law according to its two fold manner
of publishing, is of two sorts, written & unwritten; By written,
I understand that which wants a voice, or some other signe of the
will of the Legislator that it may become. a Law. For all kind of
Laws are of the same age with mankinde, both in nature, and time,
and therefore of more antiquity then the invention of letters,
and the Art of writing. Wherefore not a writing, but a voice is
necessary for a written law. this alone is requisite to the
being, that to the Remembrance of a Law; for we reade, that
before letters were found out for the help of memory, that Lawes
contracted into Meetre, were wont to be sung. The unwritten is
that which wants no other publishing then the voice of nature, or
naturall reason; such are the lawes of nature. For the naturall
Law although it be distinguisht from the civill, for as much as
it commands the Will, yet so farre forth as it relates to our
actions it is civill; for example, this same, Thou shalt not
covet, which onely appertaines to the minde, is a naturall Law,
onely. but this, Thou shalt not invade, is both naturall and
civill. For seeing it is impossible to prescribe such universall
Rules, whereby all future contentions which perhaps are infinite,
may be determined, its to be understood that in all cases not
mentioned by the written lawes, the law of naturall equity is to
be followed, which commands us to distribute equally to equals;
and this by the vertue of the civill law, which also punisheth
those who knowingly and willingly doe actually transgresse the
lawes of nature.
    XV. These things being understood, it appeares first, That
the Lawes of Nature, although they were describ'd in the Books of
some Philosophers, are not for that reason to be termed Written
lawes: and that the Writings of the Interpreters of the Lawes,
were no Lawes, for want of the Supreme Authority; nor yet those
orations of the Wise, (that is to say) Judges, but so farre forth
as by the consent of the Supreme power they part into custome;
and that then they are to be received among the Written lawes,
not for the Customes sake (which by its own force doth not
constitute a Law) but for the Will of the Supreme Commander,
which appeares in this, that he hath suffer'd his Sentence,
whether equall, or unequall, to passe into custome.
    XVI. Sinne, in its largest signification, comprehends every
deed, word and thought, against right reason. For every man by
reasoning seeks out the meanes to the end which he propounds to
himselfe. If therefore he reason right (that is to say, beginning
from most evident principles, he makes a discourse out of
consequences continually necessary,) he will proceede in a most
direct way; otherwise hee'l goe astray, that is to say, he will
either doe, say, or endeavour, somewhat against his proper end:
which when he hath done, he will indeed in reasoning be said to
have erred, but in action and will to have sinned; for sin
followes errour, just as the Will doth the understanding: And
this is the most generall acception of the word, under which is
contain'd every imprudent action, whether against the Law, as to
overthrow another mans house, or not against the Law, as to build
his owne upon the Sand.
    XVII. But when we speak of the Lawes, the word Sinne is taken
in a more strict sense, and signifies not every thing done
against right reason, but that onely which is blameable, and
therefore is call'd malum culpae, the evill of fault; but yet if
any thing be culpable it is not presently to be term'd a sinne,
or fault, but onely if it be blameable with reason. We must
therefore enquire what is to be blameable with reason, what
against reason. Such is the nature of man, that every one calls
that good which he desires, and evill which he eschewes; and
therefore through the diversity of our affections, it happens
that one counts that good, which another counts evill; and the
same man what now he esteem'd for good, he immediately looks on
as evill; and the same thing which he calls good in himselfe, he
tearmes evill in another. For we all measure good and evill by
the pleasure or paine we either feele at present, or expect
hereafter. Now seeing the prosperous actions of enemies (because
they increase their honours, goods, and power) and of equalls,
(by reason of that strife of honours which is among them) both
seeme and are irkesome, and therefore evill to all; and men use
to repute those evill, that is to say, to lay some fault to their
charge from whom they receive evill; its impossible to be
determined by the consent of single men whom the same things doe
not please and displease, what actions are, and what not to be
blam'd. They may agree indeed in some certaine generall things,
as that theft, adultery, and the like are sinnes, as if they
should say that all men account those things evill to which they
have given names which are usually taken in an evill sense; but
we demand not whether theft be a Sinne, but what is to be term'd
theft, and so concerning other in like manner. For as much
therefore as in so great a diversity of censurers, what is by
reason blameable, is not to bee measur'd by the reason of one man
more then another, because of the equality of humane nature, and
there are no other reasons in being, but onely those of
particular men, and that of the City, it followes, that the City
is to determine what with reason is culpable: So as a fault, that
is to say, a SINNE, is that, which a man do's, omits, sayes, or
wills, against the reason of the City, that is, contrary to the
Lawes.
    XVIII. But a man may doe somewhat against the Lawes through
humane infirmity, although he desire to fulfill them, and yet his
action as being against the Lawes, is rightly blam'd, and call'd
a Sinne. But there are some, who neglect the Lawes, and as oft as
any hope of gain and impunity doth appear to them, no conscience
of contracts and betrothed faith can withhold them from their
violation. Not only the deeds, but even the mindes of these men
are against the Lawes. They who sinne onely through infirmity,
are good men even when they sinne; but these even when they doe
not sin, are wicked. For though both the action, and the mind be
repugnant to the Lawes, yet those repugnancies are distinguisht
by different appellations, for the irregularity of the action is
called adikema, unjust deed; that of the mind adikia, and kakia,
injustice, and malice; that is, the infirmity of a disturbed
soule, this the pravity of a sober mind.
    XIX. But seeing there is no sin which is not against some
Law, and that there is no Law which is not the command of him who
hath the supreme power, and that no man hath a supreme power
which is not bestowed on him by our own consent; in what manner
will he be said to sinne, who either denies that there is a God,
or that he governs the world, or casts any other reproach upon
him? For he will say, that he never submitted his will to Gods
will, not conceiving him so much as to have any being. And
granting that his opinion were erroneous, and therefore also a
sin, yet were it to be numbred among those of imprudence or
ignorance, which by right cannot be punished. This speech seems
so farre forth to be admitted, that though this kind of sin be
the greatest and most hurtful, yet is it to be refer'd to sins of
imprudence; but that it should be excused by imprudence or
ignorance, is absurd. For the Atheist is punisht either
immediately by God himselfe, or by Kings constituted under God;
not as a Subject is punished by a King, because he keeps not the
Lawes, but as one enemy by another, because he would not accept
of the Lawes; that is to say, by the Right of warre, as the
Giants warring against God: For whosoever are not subject either
to some common Lord, or one to another, are enemies among
themselves.
    (Yet is it to be referred to sins of imprudence) Many find
fault that I have referr'd Atheisme to imprudence, and not to
injustice; yea by some it is taken so, as if I had not declared
my selfe an enemy bitter enough against Atheists: They object
farther, that since I had elsewhere said that it might be knowne
there is a God, by naturall reason, I ought to have acknowledged
that they sin at least against the Law of nature, and therefore
are not only guilty of imprudence, but injustice too. But I am so
much an enemy to Atheists, that I have both diligently sought
for, and vehemently desired to find some Law whereby I might
condemne them of injustice; but when I found none, I enquired
next what name God himselfe did give to men so detested by him.
Now God speaks thus of the Atheist: The fool hath said in his
heart, there is no God. therefore I placed their sinne in that
rank which God himselfe referres to; next, I shew them to be
enemies of God. But I conceive the name of an enemy to be
sometimes somewhat sharper, then that of an unjust man. Lastly, I
affirme that they may under that notion be justly punisht both by
God, and supreme Magistrates, and therefore by no meanes excuse
or extenuate this sinne. Now that I have said that it might be
known by naturall reason that there is a God, is so to be
understood, not as if I had meant that all men might know this,
except they think that because Archimedes by naturall reason
found out what proportion the circle hath to the square, it
followes thence, that every one of the vulgar could have found
out as much. I say therefore, that although it may be knowne to
some by the light of reason that there is a God, yet men that are
continually engaged in pleasures, or seeking of riches and
honour, also men that are not wont to reason aright, or cannot do
it, or care not to doe it, lastly, fools, in which number are
Atheists, cannot know this.
    XX. Seeing that from the vertue of the Covenant whereby each
Subject is tyed to the other to perform absolute and universall
obedience (such as is defined above Chap. 6. art. 13.) to the
City, that is to say, to the Soveraign power, whether that be one
man or Councel, there is an obligation derived to observe each
one of the civill Lawes, so that that Covenant contains in it
self all the Laws at once; it is manifest that the subject who
shall renounce the generall Covenant of obedience, doth at once
renounce all the Lawes. Which trespasse is so much worse then any
other one sinne, by how much to sinne alwayes, is worse then to
sinne once. And this is that sin which is called TREASON; and it
is a word or deed whereby the Citizen, or Subject, declares that
he will no longer obey that man or Court to whom the supreme
power of the City is entrusted. And the Subject declares this
same will of his by deed, when he either doth, or endeavours to
do violence to the Soveraigns Person, or to them who execute his
commands; of which sort are Traytors, Regicides, and such as take
up armes against the City, or during a warre, flye to the enemies
side. And they shew the same will in word, who flatly deny that
themselves or other subjects are tyed to any such kind of
obedience, either in the whole, as he who should say that wee
must not obey him (keeping the obedience which we owe to God
intire) simply, absolutely, and universally; or in part, as he
who should say, that he had no Right to wage warre at his own
will, to make Peace, list souldiers, levie monies, electing
Magistrates, and publique Ministers, enacting Lawes, deciding
controversies, setting penalties, or doing ought else, without
which the State cannot stand. And these and the like words and
deeds are Treason by the naturall, not the civill Law. But it may
so happen, that some action which before the civill Law was made,
was not Treason, yet will become such, if it be done afterwards.
As if it be declared by the Law, that it shall be accounted for a
sign of renouncing publique obedience (that is to say for
Treason) if any man shall coyn monies, or forge the Privie Seale,
he that after that Declaration shall doe this, will be no lesse
guilty of Treason then the other. Yet he sinnes lesse, because he
breakes not all the Laws at once, but one Law only; for the Law
by calling that Treason which by nature is not so, doth indeed by
Right set a more odious name, and perhaps a more grievous
punishment on the guilty persons, but it makes not the sinne it
selfe more grievous.
    XXI. But that sinne which by the Law of nature is Treason, is
a Transgression of the naturall, not the civill Law. For since
our obligation to civill obedience, by vertue whereof the civill
Lawes are valid, is before all civill Law, and the sin of Treason
is naturally nothing else but the breach of that obligation; it
followes that by the sin of Treason, that Law is broken which
preceded the civill Law, to wit, the naturall, which forbids us
to violate Covenants, and betrothed faith. But if some Soveraign
Prince should set forth a Law on this manner, Thou shalt not
rebell, he would effect just nothing: For except Subjects were
before obliged to obedience, that is to say, not to rebell, all
Law is of no force; now the obligation which obligeth to what we
were before obliged to, is superfluous.
    XXII. Hence it followes, that Rebels, Traytors, and all
others convicted of Treason, are punisht not by civill, but
naturall Right; that is to say, not as civill Subjects, but as
Enemies to the Government, not by the Right of Soveraignty, and
Dominion, but by the Right of Warre.
    XXIII. There are some who think that those acts which are
done against the Law, when the punishment is determined by the
Law it selfe, are expiated, if the punished willingly undergoe
the punishment; and that they are not guilty before God of
breaking the naturall Law (although by breaking the civill Lawes,
we break the naturall too, which command us to keep the civill)
who have suffered the punishment which the Law required; as if by
the Law, the fact were not prohibited, but a punishment were set
instead of a price, whereby a licence might be bought of doing
what the Law forbids. By the same reason they might inferre too,
that no transgression of the Law were a sin, but that every man
might enjoy the liberty which he hath bought by his own perill.
But we must know that the words of the Law may be understood in a
twofold sense, the one as containing two parts (as hath been
declared above in the seventh Art.) namely that of absolutely
prohibiting, as, Thou shalt not doe this; and revenging, as, he
that doth this, shall be punisht; The other, as containing a
condition, for example, Thou shalt not doe this thing, unlesse
thou wilt suffer punishment; and thus, the Law forbids not
simply, but conditionally. If it be understood in the first
sense, he that doth it, sins, because he doth what the Law
forbids to be done; if in the second, he sins not, because he
cannot be said to doe what is forbidden him, that performs the
condition; For in the first sense, all men are forbidden to doe
it; in the second, they only who keep themselves from the
punishment. In the first sense, the vindicative part of the Law
obligeth not the guilty, but the Magistrate to require
punishment; in the second, he himselfe that owes the punishment
is obliged to exact it, to the payment whereof, if it be
capitall, or otherwise grievous, he cannot be obliged. But in
what sense the Law is to be taken, depends on the will of him who
hath the Soveraignty. When there is therefore any doubt of the
meaning of the Law, since we are sure they sinne not who doe it
not, it will be sin if we doe it, howsoever the Law may afterward
be explained; for so to doe that which a man doubts whether it be
a sin or not, when he hath freedome to forbear it, is a contempt
of the Lawes, and therefore by the 28. Art. of the third Chapter,
a sin against the Law of nature. Vain therefore is that same
distinction of obedience into Active and Passive, as if that
could be expiated by penalties constituted by humane decrees,
which is a sinne against the Law of nature, which is the Law of
God; or as though they sinned not, who sinne at their own perill.