The Rights of Man
Part Second

To M. de la Fayette

After an acquaintance of nearly fifteen years in difficult situations in America, and various consultations in Europe, I feel a pleasure in presenting to you this small treatise, in gratitude for your services to my beloved America, and as a testimony of my esteem for the virtues, public and private, which I know you to possess.
 
The only point upon which I could ever discover that we differed was not as to principles of government, but as to time.  For my own part I think it equally as injurious to good principles to permit them to linger, as to push them on too fast.  That which you suppose accomplishable in fourteen or fifteen years, I may believe practicable in a much shorter period.  Mankind, as it appears to me, are always ripe enough to understand their true interest, provided it be presented clearly to their understanding, and that in a manner not to create suspicion by anything like self-design, nor offend by assuming too much.  Where we would wish to reform we must not reproach.  [begin page 206]

When the American revolution was established I felt a disposition to sit serenely down and enjoy the calm. It did not appear to me that any object could afterwards arise great enough to make me quit tranquility and feel as I had felt before.  But when principle, and not place, is the energetic cause of action, a man, I find, is everywhere the same. 

I am now once more in the public world; and as I have not a right to contemplate on so many years of remaining life as you have, I have resolved to labour as fast as I can; and as I am anxious for your aid and your company, I wish you to hasten your principles and overtake me. 

If you make a campaign the ensuing spring, which it is most probable there will be no occasion for, I will come and join you.  Should the campaign commence, I hope it will terminate in the extinction of German despotism, and in establishing the freedom of all Germany.  When France shall be surrounded with revolutions she will be in peace and safety, and her taxes, as well as those of Germany, will consequently become less. 

Your sincere,
Affectionate Friend, London, Feb. 9, 1792 
Thomas Paine 

Preface

When I began the chapter entitled the "Conclusion" in the former part of the RIGHTS OF MAN, published last year, it was my intention to have extended it to a greater length; but in casting the whole matter in my mind, which I wish to add, I found that it must either make the work too bulky, or contract my plan too much.  I therefore brought it to a close as soon as the subject would admit, and reserved what I had further to say to another opportunity. 

Several other reasons contributed to produce this determination.  I wished to know the manner in which a work, written in a style of thinking and expression different to what had been customary in England, would be received before I proceeded farther.  A great field was opening to the view of mankind by means of the French Revolution.  Mr. Burke's outrageous opposition thereto brought the controversy into England.  He attacked principles which he knew (from information) I would contest with him, because they are principles I believe to be good, and which I have contributed to establish, and con- [begin page 208] ceive myself bound to defend. Had he not urged the controversy, I had most probably been a silent man. 

Another reason for deferring the remainder of the work was, that Mr. Burke promised in his first publication to renew the subject at another opportunity, and to make a comparison of what he called the English and French Constitutions.  I therefore held myself in reserve for him.  He has published two works since, without doing this: which he certainly would not have omitted, had the comparison been in his favour. 

In his last work, his "Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs," he has quoted about ten pages from the RIGHTS OF MAN, and having given himself the trouble of doing this, says he "shall not attempt in the smallest degree to refute them," meaning the principles therein contained.  I am enough acquainted with Mr. Burke to know that he would if he could.  But instead of contesting them, he immediately after consoles himself with saying that "he has done his part."- He has not done his part.  He has not performed his promise of a comparison of constitutions.  He started the controversy, he gave the challenge, and has fled from it; and he is now a case in point with his own opinion that "the age of chivalry [begin page 209] is gone!"  The title, as well as the substance of his last work, his "Appeal," is his condemnation.  Principles must stand on their own merits, and if they are good they certainly will.  To put them under the shelter of other men's authority, as Mr. Burke has done, serves to bring them into suspicion.  Mr. Burke is not very fond of dividing his honours, but in this case he is artfully dividing the disgrace. 

But who are those to whom Mr. Burke has made his appeal?  A set of childish thinkers, and half-way politicians born in the last century, men who went no farther with any principle than as it suited their purposes as a party; the nation was always left out of the question; and this has been the character of every party from that day to this.  The nation sees nothing of such works, or such politics, worthy its attention.  A little matter will move a party, but it must be something great that moves a nation. 

Though I see nothing in Mr. Burke's "Appeal" worth taking much notice of, there is, however, one expression upon which I shall offer a few remarks.  After quoting largely from the RIGHTS OF MAN, and declining to contest the principles contained in that work, he says: "This will most probably be done (if such writings shall [begin page 210] be thought to deserve any other refutation than that of criminal justice) by others, who may think with Mr. Burke and with the same zeal." 

In the first place, it has not yet been done by anybody.  Not less, I believe, than eight or ten pamphlets intended as answers to the former part of the RIGHTS OF MAN have been published by different persons, and not one of them to my knowledge, has extended to a second edition, nor are even the titles of them so much as generally remembered.  As I am averse to unnecessary multiplying publications, I have answered none of them.  And as I believe that a man may write himself out of reputation when nobody else can do it, I am careful to avoid that rock.
 
But as I would decline unnecessary publications on the one hand, so would I avoid everything that might appear like sullen pride on the other.  If Mr. Burke, or any person on his side the question, will produce an answer to the “Rights of Man” that shall extend to a half, or even to a fourth part of the number of copies to which the “Rights of Man” extended, I will reply to his work.  But until this be done, I shall so far take the sense of the public for my guide (and the world knows I am not a flatterer) that [begin page 211] what they do not think worth while to read, is not worth mine to answer.  I suppose the number of copies to which the first part of the “Rights of Man” extended, taking England, Scotland, and Ireland, is not less than between forty and fifty thousand. 

I now come to remark on the remaining part of the quotation I have made from Mr. Burke.  "If," says he, "such writings shall be thought to deserve any other refutation than that of criminal justice."
 
Pardoning the pun, it must be criminal justice indeed that should condemn a work as a substitute for not being able to refute it.  The greatest condemnation that could be passed upon it would be a refutation.  But in proceeding by the method Mr. Burke alludes to, the condemnation would, in the final event, pass upon the criminality of the process and not upon the work, and in this case, I had rather be the author, than be either the judge or the jury that should condemn it.
 
But to come at once to the point. I have differed from some professional gentlemen on the subject of prosecutions, and I since find they are falling into my opinion, which I will here state as fully, but as concisely as I can.  [begin page 212]

I will first put a case with respect to any law, and then compare it with a government, or with what in England is, or has been, called a constitution.
 
It would be an act of despotism, or what in England is called arbitrary power, to make a law to prohibit investigating the principles, good or bad, on which such a law, or any other is founded.
 
If a law be bad it is one thing to oppose the practice of it, but it is quite a different thing to expose its errors, to reason on its defects, and to show cause why it should be repealed, or why another ought to be substituted in its place.  I have always held it an opinion (making it also my practice) that it is better to obey a bad law, making use at the same time of every argument to show its errors and procure its repeal, than forcibly to violate it; because the precedent of breaking a bad law might weaken the force, and lead to a discretionary violation, of those which are good.
 
The case is the same with respect to principles and forms of government, or to what are called constitutions and the parts of which they are, composed.
 
It is for the good of nations and not for the [begin page 213] emolument or aggrandisement of particular individuals, that government ought to be established, and that mankind are at the expense of supporting it.  The defects of every government and constitution both as to principle and form, must, on a parity of reasoning, be as open to discussion as the defects of a law, and it is a duty which every man owes to society to point them out.  When those defects, and the means of remedying them, are generally seen by a nation, that nation will reform its government or its constitution in the one case, as the government repealed or reformed the law in the other.

The operation of government is restricted to the making and the administering of laws; but it is to a nation that the right of forming or reforming, generating or regenerating constitutions and governments belong; and consequently those subjects, as subjects of investigation, are always before a country as a matter of right, and cannot, without invading the general rights of that country, be made subjects for prosecution.  On this ground I will meet Mr. Burke whenever he please.  It is better that the whole argument should come out than to seek to stifle it.  It was himself that opened the controversy, and he ought not to desert it.
[begin page 214]
 
I do not believe that monarchy and aristocracy will continue seven years longer in any of the enlightened countries in Europe.  If better reasons can be shown for them than against them, they will stand; if the contrary, they will not.  Mankind are not now to be told they shall not think, or they shall not read; and publications that go no farther than to investigate principles of government, to invite men to reason and to reflect, and to show the errors and excellences of different systems, have a right to appear.  If they do not excite attention, they are not worth the trouble of a prosecution; and if they do, the prosecution will amount to nothing, since it cannot amount to a prohibition of reading.  This would be a sentence on the public, instead of the author, and would also be the most effectual mode of making or hastening revolutions.
 
On all cases that apply universally to a nation, with respect to systems of government, a jury of twelve men is not competent to decide.  Where there are no witnesses to be examined, no facts to be proved, and where the whole matter is before the whole public, and the merits or demerits of it resting on their opinion; and where there is nothing to be known in a court, but what every body knows out of it, every twelve men [begin page 215] is equally as good a jury as the other, and would most probably reverse each other's verdict; or, from the variety of their opinions, not be able to form one.

It is one case, whether a nation approve a work, or a plan; but it is quite another case, whether it will commit to any such jury the power of determining whether that nation have a right to, or shall reform its government or not.  I mention those cases that Mr. Burke may see I have not written on Government without reflecting on what is law, as well as on what are rights.- The only effectual jury in such cases would be a convention of the whole nation fairly elected; for in all such cases the whole nation is the vicinage.  If Mr. Burke will propose such a jury, I will waive all privileges of being the citizen of another country, and, defending its principles, abide the issue, provided he will do the same; for my opinion is, that his work and his principles would be condemned instead of mine.
 
As to the prejudices which men have from education and habit, in favour of any particular form or system of government, those prejudices have yet to stand the test of reason and reflection. In fact, such prejudices are nothing.  No man is [begin page 216] prejudiced in favour of a thing, knowing it to be wrong.  He is attached to it on the belief of its being right; and when he sees it is not so, the prejudice will be gone.  We have but a defective idea of what prejudice is.  It might be said, that until men think for themselves the whole is prejudice, and not opinion; for that only is opinion which is the result of reason and reflection. I offer this remark, that Mr. Burke may not confide too much in what have been the customary prejudices of the country.
 
I do not believe that the people of England have ever been fairly and candidly dealt by.  They have been imposed upon by parties, and by men assuming the character of leaders.  It is time that the nation should rise above those trifles.  It is time to dismiss that inattention which has so long been the encouraging cause of stretching taxation to excess.  It is time to dismiss all those songs and toasts which are calculated to enslave, and operate to suffocate reflection.

On all such subjects men have but to think, and they will neither act wrong nor be misled.  To say that any people are not fit for freedom, is to make poverty their choice, and to say they had rather be loaded with taxes than not.  If such a case could be proved, it would equally [begin page 217] prove that those who govern are not fit to govern them, for they are a part of the same national mass.
 
But admitting governments to be changed all over Europe; it certainly may be done without convulsion or revenge. It is not worth making changes or revolutions, unless it be for some great national benefit: and when this shall appear to a nation, the danger will be, as in America and France, to those who oppose; and with this reflection I close my Preface.

Thomas Paine
London, Feb. 9, 1792.

Introduction

What Archimedes said of the mechanical powers, may be applied to Reason and Liberty: "Had we," said he, "a place to stand upon, we might raise the world."
 
The revolution of America presented in politics what was only theory in mechanics.  So deeply rooted were all the governments of the old world, and so effectually had the tyranny and the antiquity of habit established itself over the mind, that no beginning could be made in Asia, Africa, or Europe, to reform the political condition of man.  Freedom had been hunted round the globe; reason was considered as rebellion; and the slavery of fear had made men afraid to think.
 
But such is the irresistible nature of truth, that all it asks,- and all it wants,- is the liberty of appearing.  The sun needs no inscription to distinguish him from darkness; and no sooner did the American governments display themselves to the world, than despotism felt a shock and man began to contemplate redress.  [begin page 220]

The independence of America, considered merely as a separation from England, would have been a matter but of little importance, had it not been accompanied by a revolution in the principles and practice of governments.  She made a stand, not for herself only, but for the world, and looked beyond the advantages herself could receive.  Even the Hessian, though hired to fight against her, may live to bless his defeat; and England, condemning the viciousness of its government, rejoice in its miscarriage.
 
As America was the only spot in the political world where the principle of universal reformation could begin, so also was it the best in the natural world.  An assemblage of circumstances conspired, not only to give birth, but to add gigantic maturity to its principles.

The scene which that country presents to the eye of a spectator, has something in it which generates and encourages great ideas.  Nature appears to him in magnitude.  The mighty objects he beholds, act upon his mind by enlarging it, and he partakes of the greatness he contemplates.-  Its first settlers were emigrants from different European nations, and of diversified professions of religion, retiring from the governmental persecutions of the old world, and meeting in the [begin page 221] new, not as enemies, but as brothers.  The wants which necessarily accompany the cultivation of a wilderness produced among them a state of society, which countries long harassed by the quarrels and intrigues of governments, had neglected to cherish. In such a situation man becomes what he ought.  He sees his species, not with the inhuman idea of a natural enemy, but as kindred; and the example shows to the artificial world, that man must go back to Nature for information.
 
From the rapid progress which America makes in every species of improvement, it is rational to conclude that, if the governments of Asia, Africa, and Europe had begun on a principle similar to that of America, or had not been very early corrupted therefrom, those countries must by this time have been in a far superior condition to what they are.  Age after age has passed away, for no other purpose than to behold their wretchedness.  Could we suppose a spectator who knew nothing of the world, and who was put into it merely to make his observations, he would take a great part of the old world to be new, just struggling with the difficulties and hardships of an infant settlement.  He could not suppose that the hordes of miserable poor with which old countries abound could be any [begin page 222] other than those who had not yet had time to provide for themselves.  Little would he think they were the consequence of what in such countries they call government.
 
If, from the more wretched parts of the old world, we look at those which are in an advanced stage of improvement we still find the greedy hand of government thrusting itself into every corner and crevice of industry, and grasping the spoil of the multitude.  Invention is continually exercised to furnish new pretences for revenue and taxation.  It watches prosperity as its prey, and permits none to escape without a tribute.
 
As revolutions have begun (and as the probability is always greater against a thing beginning, than of proceeding after it has begun), it is natural to expect that other revolutions will follow.  The amazing and still increasing expenses with which old governments are conducted, the numerous wars they engage in or provoke, the embarrassments they throw in the way of universal civilisation and commerce, and the oppression and usurpation acted at home, have wearied out the patience, and exhausted the property of the world.  In such a situation, and with such examples already existing, revolutions are to be looked for.  They are become subjects of uni- [begin page 223] versal conversation, and may be considered as the Order of the day.
 
If systems of government can be introduced less expensive and more productive of general happiness than those which have existed, all attempts to oppose their progress will in the end be fruitless.  Reason, like time, will make its own way, and prejudice will fall in a combat with interest.  If universal peace, civilisation, and commerce are ever to be the happy lot of man, it cannot be accomplished but by a revolution in the system of governments.  All the monarchical governments are military.  War is their trade, plunder and revenue their objects.  While such governments continue, peace has not the absolute security of a day.

What is the history of all monarchical governments but a disgustful picture of human wretchedness, and the accidental respite of a few years' repose?  Wearied with war, and tired with human butchery, they sat down to rest, and called it peace.  This certainly is not the condition that heaven intended for man; and if this be monarchy, well might monarchy be reckoned among the sins of the Jews. 

The revolutions which formerly took place in the world had nothing in them that interested [begin page 224] the bulk of mankind.  They extended only to a change of persons and measures, but not of principles, and rose or fell among the common transactions of the moment.  What we now behold may not improperly be called a "counter-revolution."

Conquest and tyranny, at some earlier period, dispossessed man of his rights, and he is now recovering them.  And as the tide of all human affairs has its ebb and flow in directions contrary to each other, so also is it in this.  Government founded on a moral theory, on a system of universal peace, on the indefeasible hereditary Rights of Man, is now revolving from west to east by a stronger impulse than the government of the sword revolved from east to west.  It interests not particular individuals, but nations in its progress, and promises a new era to the human race.
 
The danger to which the success of revolutions is most exposed is that of attempting them before the principles on which they proceed, and the advantages to result from them, are sufficiently seen and understood.  Almost everything appertaining to the circumstances of a nation, has been absorbed and confounded under the general and mysterious word government. [begin page 225]  Though it avoids taking to its account the errors it commits, and the mischiefs it occasions, it fails not to arrogate to itself whatever has the appearance of prosperity.  It robs industry of its honours, by pedantically making itself the cause of its effects; and purloins from the general character of man, the merits that appertain to him as a social being.

It may therefore be of use in this day of revolutions to discriminate between those things which are the effect of government, and those which are not.  This will best be done by taking a review of society and civilisation, and the consequences resulting therefrom, as things distinct from what are called governments.  By beginning with this investigation, we shall be able to assign effects to their proper causes and analyse the mass of common errors.