Of The Present Ability Of America, With Some Miscellaneous Reflections 

I have never met with a man, either in England or America, who hath not confessed his opinion, that a separation between the countries, would take place one time or other. And there is no instance in which we have shown less judgment, than in endeavouring to describe, what we call, the ripeness or fitness of the Continent for independence.

As all men allow the measure, and vary only in their opinion of the time, let us, in order to remove mistakes, take a general survey of things and endeavour if possible, to find out the very time.  But we need not go far, the inquiry ceases at once, for the time hath found us.  The general concurrence, the glorious union of all things prove the fact.

It is not in numbers but in unity, that our great strength lies; yet our present numbers are sufficient to repel the force of all the world.  The Continent hath, at this time, the largest body of armed and disciplined men of any power under Heaven; and is just arrived at that pitch of [begin page 60] strength, in which no single colony is able to support itself, and the whole, who united can accomplish the matter, and either more, or, less than this, might be fatal in its effects.  Our land force is already sufficient, and as to naval affairs, we cannot be insensible, that Britain would never suffer an American man of war to be built while the continent remained in her hands.  Wherefore we should be no forwarder an hundred years hence in that branch, than we are now; but the truth is, we should be less so, because the timber of the country is every day diminishing, and that which will remain at last, will be far off and difficult to procure.

Were the continent crowded with inhabitants, her sufferings under the present circumstances would be intolerable.  The more sea port towns we had, the more should we have both to defend and to loose.  Our present numbers are so happily proportioned to our wants, that no man need be idle.  The diminution of trade affords an army, and the necessities of an army create a new trade.  Debts we have none; and whatever we may contract on this account will serve as a glorious memento of our virtue.

Can we but leave posterity with a settled form of government, an independent constitu- [begin page 61] tion of its own, the purchase at any price will be cheap.  But to expend millions for the sake of getting a few we acts repealed, and routing the present ministry only, is unworthy the charge, and is using posterity with the utmost cruelty; because it is leaving them the great work to do, and a debt upon their backs, from which they derive no advantage.  Such a thought is unworthy a man of honour, and is the true characteristic of a narrow heart and a peddling politician.

The debt we may contract doth not deserve our regard if the work be but accomplished.  No nation ought to be without a debt.  A national debt is a national bond; and when it bears no interest, is in no case a grievance.

Britain is oppressed with a debt of upwards of one hundred and forty millions sterling, for which she pays upwards of four millions interest.  And as a compensation for her debt, she has a large navy; America is without a debt, and without a navy; yet for the twentieth part of the English national debt, could have a navy as large again.  The navy of England is not worth, at this time, more than three millions and a half sterling.

The following calculations are given as a proof that the above estimation of the navy is a [begin page 62] just one.

The first and second editions of this pamphlet were published without the following calculations, which are now given as a proof that the above estimation of the navy is a just one. (See Entick's naval history, intro. page 56.)

The charge of building a ship of each rate, and furnishing her with masts, yards, sails and rigging, together with a proportion of eight months boatswain's and carpenter's sea-stores, as calculated by Mr. Burchett, Secretary to the navy, is as follows:

			£	
For a ship of	100	guns	35,553	
	90		29,886	
	80		23,638	
	70		17,785	
	60		14,197	
	50		10,606	
	40		7,558	
	30		5,846	
	20		3,710	
	
And from hence it is easy to sum up the value, or cost rather, of the whole British navy, which in the year 1757, when it was as its greatest glory consisted of the following ships and guns: 

Ships	Guns	Cost of One
£	Cost of All
£	
6	100	35,533	213,318	
12	90	29,886	358,632	
12	80	23,638	283,656	
43	70	17,785	746,755	
35	60	14,197	496,895	
40	50	10,606	424,240	
45	40	7,748	344,110	
58	20	3,710	215,180	
85 	Sloops, bombs, and fireships, one another	2,000	170,000	
		Cost	3,270,786	
		Remains for guns	229,214	
		Total	£3,500,000	

[begin page 63]
No country on the globe is so happily situated, so internally capable of raising a fleet as America.  Tar, timber, iron, and cordage are her natural produce.  We need go abroad for nothing.  Whereas the Dutch, who make large profits by hiring out their ships of war to the Spaniards and Portuguese, are obliged to import most of the materials they use.  We ought to view the building a fleet as an article of commerce, it being the natural manufactory of this country.  It is the best money we can lay out.  A navy when finished is worth more than it cost.  And is that nice point in national policy, in which commerce and protection are united.  Let us build; if we want them not, we can sell; and by that means replace our paper currency with ready gold and silver.

In point of manning a fleet, people in general run into great errors; it is not necessary that one-fourth part should be sailors.  The privateer Terrible, Captain Death, stood the hottest engagement of any ship last war, yet had not twenty sailors on board, though her complement of men was upwards of two hundred.  

A few able and social sailors will soon instruct a sufficient number of active landsmen in the common work of a ship.  Wherefore, we never can be more capable to begin on maritime mat[ [begin page 64] ters than now, while our timber is standing, our fisheries blocked up, and our sailors and shipwrights out of employ.  Men of war of seventy and eighty guns were built forty years ago in New England, and why not the same now?

Ship building is America's greatest pride, and in which, she will in time excel the whole world.  The great empires of the east are mostly inland, and consequently excluded from the possibility of rivalling her.  Africa is in a state of barbarism; and no power in Europe, hath either such an extent or coast, or such an internal supply of materials.  Where nature hath given the one, she has withheld the other; to America only hath she been liberal of both.  The vast empire of Russia is almost shut out from the sea; wherefore, her boundless forests, her tar, iron, and cordage are only articles of commerce.

In point of safety, ought we to be without a fleet?  We are not the little people now, which we were sixty years ago; at that time we might have trusted our property in the streets, or fields rather; and slept securely without locks or bolts to our doors or windows.  The case now is altered, and our methods of defence ought to improve with our increase of property.

A common pirate, twelve months ago, might [begin page 65] have come up the Delaware, and laid the city of Philadelphia under instant contribution, for what sum he pleased; and the same might have happened to other places.  Nay, any daring fellow, in a brig of fourteen or sixteen guns, might have robbed the whole Continent, and carried off half a million of money.  These are circumstances which demand our attention, and point out the necessity of naval protection.

Some, perhaps, will say, that after we have made it up with Britain, she will protect us.  Can we be so unwise as to mean, that she shall keep a navy in our harbours for that purpose?  Common sense will tell us, that the power which hath endeavoured to subdue us, is of all others the most improper to defend us.  Conquest may be effected under the pretence of friendship; and ourselves, after a long and brave resistance, be at last cheated into slavery.  And if her ships are not to be admitted into our harbours, I would ask, how is she to protect us?  A navy three or four thousand miles off can be of little use, and on sudden emergencies, none at all.  Wherefore, if we must hereafter protect ourselves, why not do it for ourselves?  Why do it for another?
 
The English list of ships of war is long and formidable, but not a tenth part of them are at [begin page 66] any one time fit for service, numbers of them not in being; yet their names are pompously continued in the list, if only a plank be left of the ship: and not a fifth part, of such as are fit for service, can be spared on any one station at one time.  The East, and West Indies, Mediterranean, Africa, and other parts over which Britain extends her claim, make large demands upon her navy.

From a mixture of prejudice and inattention, we have contracted a false notion respecting the navy of England, and have talked as if we should have the whole of it to encounter at once, and for that reason, supposed that we must have one as large; which not being instantly practicable, have been made use of by a set of disguised Tories to discourage our beginning thereon.

Nothing can be farther from truth than this; for if America had only a twentieth part of the naval force of Britain, she would be by far an over match for her; because, as we neither have, nor claim any foreign dominion, our whole force would be employed on our own coast, where we should, in the long run, have two to one the advantage of those who had three or four thousand miles to sail over, before they could attack [begin page 67] us, and the same distance to return in order to refit and recruit. 

And although Britain by her fleet, hath a check over our trade to Europe, we have as large a one over her trade to the West Indies, which, by laying in the neighbourhood of the Continent, is entirely at its mercy.

Some method might be fallen on to keep up a naval force in time of peace, if we should not judge it necessary to support a constant navy.  If premiums were to be given to merchants, to build and employ in their service, ships mounted with twenty, thirty, forty, or fifty guns, (the premiums to be in proportion to the loss of bulk to the merchants) fifty or sixty of those ships, with a few guard ships on constant duty, would keep up a sufficient navy, and that without burdening ourselves with the evil so loudly complained of in England, of suffering their fleet, in time of peace to lie rotting in the docks.

To unite the sinews of commerce and defence is sound policy; for when our strength and our riches, play into each other's hand, we need fear no external enemy.

In almost every article of defence we abound.  Hemp flourishes even to rankness, so that we need not want cordage.  Our iron is superior [begin page 68] to that of other countries.  Our small arms equal to any in the world.  Cannon we can cast at pleasure.  Saltpetre and gunpowder we are every day producing.  Our knowledge is hourly improving.  Resolution is our inherent character, and courage hath never yet forsaken us.  Wherefore, what is it that we want?  Why is it that we hesitate? 

From Britain we can expect nothing but ruin.  If she is once admitted to the government of America again, this Continent will not be worth living in.  Jealousies will be always arising; insurrections will be constantly happening; and who will go forth to quell them?  Who will venture his life to reduce his own countrymen to a foreign obedience?

The difference between Pennsylvania and Connecticut, respecting some unlocated lands, shows the insignificance of a British government, and fully proves, that nothing but Continental authority can regulate Continental matters.

Another reason why the present time is preferable to all others, is, that the fewer our numbers are, the more land there is yet unoccupied, which instead of being lavished by the King on his worthless dependents, may be hereafter applied, not only to the discharge of the present [begin page 69] debt, but to the constant support of government.  No nation under heaven hath such an advantage as this.
 
The infant state of the Colonies, as it is called, so far from being against, is an argument in favour of independence.  We are sufficiently numerous, and were we more so, we might be less united.  It is a matter worthy of observation, that the more a country is peopled, the smaller their armies are.  In military numbers, the ancients far exceeded the moderns: and the reason is evident, for trade being the consequence of population, men become too much absorbed thereby to attend to anything else.  Commerce diminishes the spirit, both of patriotism and military defence.  And history sufficiently informs us, that the bravest achievements were always accomplished in the non-age of a nation.

With the increase of commerce England hath lost its spirit.  The city of London, notwithstanding its numbers, submits to continued insults with the patience of a coward.  The more men have to lose, the less willing are they to venture.  The rich are in general slaves to fear, and submit to courtly power with the trembling duplicity of a spaniel.

Youth is the seed-time of good habits, as well [begin page 70] in nations as in individuals.  It might be difficult, if not impossible, to form the Continent into one government half a century hence.  The vast variety of interests, occasioned by an increase of trade and population, would create confusion.  Colony would be against colony.  Each being able might scorn each other's assistance: and while the proud and foolish gloried in their little distinctions, the wise would lament that the union had not been formed before.

Wherefore, the present time is the true time for establishing it.  The intimacy which is contracted in infancy, and the friendship which is formed in misfortune, are, of all others, the most lasting and unalterable.  Our present union is marked with both these characters: we are young, and we have been distressed; but our concord hath withstood our troubles, and fixes a memorable area for posterity to glory in.

The present time, likewise, is that peculiar time, which never happens to a nation but once, viz., the time of forming itself into a government.  Most nations have let slip the opportunity, and by that means have been compelled to receive laws from their conquerors, instead of making laws for themselves.  First, they had a King, and then a form of government; whereas [begin page 71] the articles or charter of government, should be formed first, and men delegated to execute them afterwards: but from the errors of other nations, let us learn wisdom, and lay hold of the present opportunity- to begin government at the right end.

When William the Conqueror subdued England he gave them law at the point of the sword; and until we consent that the seat of government in America, be legally and authoritatively occupied, we shall be in danger of having it filled by some fortunate ruffian, who may treat us in the same manner, and then, where will be our freedom?  where our property?

As to religion, I hold it to be the indispensable duty of all government, to protect all conscientious professors thereof, and I know of no other business which government hath to do therewith.  Let a man throw aside that narrowness of soul, that selfishness of principle, which the niggards of all professions are so unwilling to part with, and he will be at once delivered of his fears on that head.  Suspicion is the companion of mean souls, and the bane of all good society.

For myself I fully and conscientiously believe, that it is the will of the Almighty, that there should be diversity of religious opinions among [begin page 72] us: It affords a larger field for our Christian kindness.  Were we all of one way of thinking, our religious dispositions would want matter for probation; and on this liberal principle, I look on the various denominations among us, to be like children of the same family, differing only, in what is called their Christian names.

Earlier in this work, I threw out a few thoughts on the propriety of a Continental Charter, (for I only presume to offer hints, not plans) and in this place, I take the liberty of re-mentioning the subject, by observing, that a charter is to be understood as a bond of solemn obligation, which the whole enters into, to support the right of every separate part, whether of religion, personal freedom, or property, A firm bargain and a right reckoning make long friends.

In a former page I likewise mentioned the necessity of a large and equal representation; and there is no political matter which more deserves our attention.  A small number of electors, or a small number of representatives, are equally dangerous.  But if the number of the representatives be not only small, but unequal, the danger is increased.  As an instance of this, I mention the following; when the Associators petition was before the House of Assembly of [begin page 73] Pennsylvania; twenty-eight members only were present, all the Bucks County members, being eight, voted against it, and had seven of the Chester members done the same, this whole province had been governed by two counties only, and this danger it is always exposed to.  The unwarrantable stretch likewise, which that house made in their last sitting, to gain an undue authority over the delegates of that province, ought to warn the people at large, how they trust power out of their own hands.

A set of instructions for the Delegates were put together, which in point of sense and business would have dishonoured a school-boy, and after being approved by a few, a very few without doors, were carried into the house, and there passed in behalf of the whole colony; whereas, did the whole colony know, with what ill-will that House hath entered on some necessary public measures, they would not hesitate a moment to think them unworthy of such a trust.

Immediate necessity makes many things convenient, which if continued would grow into oppressions.  Expedience and right are different things.  When the calamities of America required a consultation, there was no method so ready, or at that time so proper, as to appoint [begin page 74] persons from the several Houses of Assembly for that purpose and the wisdom with which they have proceeded hath preserved this continent from ruin.

But as it is more than probable that we shall never be without a Congress, every well-wisher to good order, must own, that the mode for choosing members of that body, deserves consideration.   And I put it as a question to those, who make a study of mankind, whether representation and election is not too great a power for one and the same body of men to possess?  Whenever we are planning for posterity, we ought to remember that virtue is not hereditary.

It is from our enemies that we often gain excellent maxims, and are frequently surprised into reason by their mistakes.  Mr. Cornwall (one of the Lords of the Treasury) treated the petition of the New York Assembly with contempt, because that House, he said, consisted but of twenty-six members, which trifling number, he argued, could not with decency be put for the whole.  We thank him for his involuntary honesty.  [begin page75]

To conclude: However strange it may appear to some, or however unwilling they may be to think so, matters not, but many strong and striking reasons may be given, to show, that nothing can settle our affairs so expeditiously as an open and determined declaration for independence.  Some of which are: 

First. It is the custom of nations, when any two are at war, for some other powers, not engaged in the quarrel, to step in as mediators, and bring about the preliminaries of a peace: but while America calls herself the subject of Great Britain, no power, however well disposed she may be, can offer her mediation.  Wherefore, in our present state we may quarrel on for ever.
 
Secondly. It is unreasonable to suppose, that France or Spain will give us any kind of assistance, if we mean only to make use of that assistance for the purpose of repairing the breach, and strengthening the connection between Britain and America; because, those powers would be sufferers by the consequences.
 
Thirdly. While we profess ourselves the subjects of Britain, we must, in the eye of foreign nations, be considered as rebels.  The precedent is somewhat dangerous to their peace, for men to be in arms under the name of subjects; we on the [begin page 76] spot, can solve the paradox: but to unite resistance and subjection, requires an idea much too refined for common understanding. 

Fourthly. Were a manifesto to be published, and despatched to foreign courts, setting forth the miseries we have endured, and the peaceable methods we have ineffectually used for redress; declaring, at the same time, that not being able, any longer to live happily or safely under the cruel disposition of the British court, we had been driven to the necessity of breaking off all connection with her; at the same time assuring all such courts of our peaceable disposition towards them, and of our desire of entering into trade with them.

Such a memorial would produce more good effects to this Continent, than if a ship were freighted with petitions to Britain.

Under our present denomination of British subjects we can neither be received nor heard abroad: The custom of all courts is against us, and will be so, until, by an independence, we take rank with other nations.

These proceedings may at first appear strange and difficult; but, like all other steps which we have already passed over, will in a little time become familiar and agreeable; and, [begin page 77] until an independence is declared, the continent will feel itself like a man who continues putting off some unpleasant business from day to day, yet knows it must be done, hates to set about it, wishes it over, and is continually haunted with the thoughts of its necessity.