The Crisis 
Number IX.

Had America pursued her advantages with half the spirit that she resisted her misfortunes, she would, before now, have been a conquering and a peaceful people; but lulled in the lap of soft tranquillity, she rested on her hopes, and adversity only has convulsed her into action.

Whether subtlety or sincerity at the close of the last year induced the enemy to an appearance for peace, is a point not material to know; it is sufficient that we see the effects it has had on our politics, and that we sternly rise to resent the delusion. 

The war, on the part of America, has been a war of natural feelings.  Brave in distress; serene in conquest; drowsy while at rest; and in every situation generously disposed to peace; a dangerous calm, and a most heightened zeal have, as circumstances varied, succeeded each other.  Every passion but that of despair has been called to a tour of duty; and so mistaken has been the enemy, of our abilities and disposition [begin page 232] that when she supposed us conquered, we rose the conquerors.

The extensiveness of the United States, and the variety of their resources; the universality of their cause, the quick operation of their feelings, and the similarity of their sentiments, have, in every trying situation, produced a something, which, favoured by providence, and pursued with ardour, has accomplished in an instant the business of a campaign.

We have never deliberately sought victory, but snatched it; and bravely undone in an hour the blotted operations of a season. 

The reported fate of Charleston, like the misfortunes of 1776, has at last called forth a spirit, and kindled up a flame, which perhaps no other event could have produced.  If the enemy has circulated a falsehood, they have unwisely aggravated us into life, and if they have told us the truth, they have unintentionally done us a service.

We were returning with folded arms from the fatigues of war, and thinking and sitting leisurely down to enjoy repose.  The dependence that has been put upon Charleston threw a drowsiness over America.  We looked on the business done - the conflict over - the matter  [begin page 233] settled - or that all which remained unfinished would follow of itself.

In this state of dangerous relaxation, exposed to the poisonous infusions of the enemy, and having no common danger to attract our attention, we were extinguishing, by stages, the ardour we began with, and surrendering by piece-meal the virtue that defended us. 

Afflicting as the loss of Charleston may be, yet if it universally rouse us from the slumber of twelve months past, and renew in us the spirit of former days, it will produce an advantage more important than its loss.  America ever is what she thinks herself to be.  Governed by sentiment, and acting her own mind, she becomes, as she pleases, the victor or the victim. 

It is not the conquest of towns, nor the accidental capture of garrisons, that can reduce a country so extensive as this.  The sufferings of one part can never be relieved by the exertions of another, and there is no situation the enemy can be placed in that does not afford to us the same advantages which he seeks himself.  By dividing his force, he leaves every post attackable.  It is a mode of war that carries with it a confession of weakness, and goes on the principle of distress rather than conquest.  [begin page 234]

The decline of the enemy is visible, not only in their operations, but in their plans; Charleston originally made but a secondary object in the system of attack, and it is now become their principal one, because they have not been able to succeed elsewhere.

It would have carried a cowardly appearance in Europe had they formed their grand expedition, in 1776, against a part of the continent where there was no army, or not a sufficient one to oppose them; but failing year after year in their impressions here, and to the eastward and northward, they deserted their capital design, and prudently contenting themselves with what they can get, give a flourish of honour to conceal disgrace.
 
But this piece-meal work is not conquering the continent.  It is a discredit in them to attempt it, and in us to suffer it.

It is now full time to put an end to a war of aggravations, which, on one side, has no possible object, and on the other has every inducement which honour, interest, safety and happiness can inspire.  If we suffer them much longer to remain among us, we shall become as bad as themselves.  An association of vice will reduce us more than the sword.  A nation hardened in [begin page 235] the practice of iniquity knows better how to profit by it, than a young country newly corrupted.

We are not a match for them in the line of advantageous guilt, nor they for us on the principles which we bravely set out with.  Our first days were our days of honour.  They have marked the character of America wherever the story of her wars are told; and convinced of this, we have nothing to do but wisely and unitedly to tread the well-known track.

The progress of a war is often as ruinous to individuals, as the issue of it is to a nation; and it is not only necessary that our forces be such that we be conquerors in the end, but that by timely exertions we be secure in the interim.  The present campaign will afford an opportunity which has never presented itself before, and the preparations for it are equally necessary, whether Charleston stand or fall.

Suppose the first, it is in that case only a failure of the enemy, not a defeat.  All the conquest that a besieged town can hope for, is, not to be conquered; and compelling an enemy to raise the siege, is to the besieged a victory.  But there must be a probability amounting almost to a certainty, that would justify a garrison marching out to attack a retreat.  Therefore should [begin page 236] Charleston not be taken, and the enemy abandon the siege, every other part of the continent should prepare to meet them; and, on the contrary, should it be taken, the same preparations are necessary to balance the loss, and put ourselves in a position to co-operate with our allies, immediately on their arrival.

We are not now fighting our battles alone, as we were in 1776; England, from a malicious disposition to America, has not only not declared war against France and Spain, but, the better to prosecute her passions here, has afforded those powers no military object, and avoids them, to distress us.  She will suffer her West India islands to be overrun by France, and her southern settlements to be taken by Spain, rather than quit the object that gratifies her revenge.

This conduct, on the part of Britain, has pointed out the propriety of France sending a naval and land force to co-operate with America on the spot.  Their arrival cannot be very distant, nor the ravages of the enemy long.  The recruiting the army, and procuring the supplies, are the two things most necessary to be accomplished, and a capture of either [begin page 237] of the enemy's divisions will restore to America peace and plenty. 

At a crisis, big, like the present, with expectation and events, the whole country is called to unanimity and exertion.  Not an ability ought now to sleep, that can produce but a mite to the general good, nor even a whisper to pass that militates against it.  The necessity of the case, and the importance of the consequences, admit no delay from a friend, no apology from an enemy.  To spare now, would be the height of extravagance, and to consult present ease, would be to sacrifice it perhaps forever. 

America, rich in patriotism and produce, can want neither men nor supplies, when a serious necessity calls them forth.  The slow operation of taxes, owing to the extensiveness of collection, and their depreciated value before they arrived in the treasury, have, in many instances, thrown a burden upon government, which has been artfully interpreted by the enemy into a general decline throughout the country.

Yet this, inconvenient as it may at first appear, is not only remediable, but may be turned to an immediate advantage; for it makes no real difference, whether a certain number of men, or company of militia (and in this country every [begin page 238] man is a militia-man), are directed by law to send a recruit at their own expense, or whether a tax is laid on them for that purpose, and the man hired by government afterwards.

The first, if there is any difference, is both cheapest and best, because it saves the expense which would attend collecting it as a tax, and brings the man sooner into the field than the modes of recruiting formerly used; and, on this principle, a law has been passed in this state, for recruiting two men from each company of militia, which will add upwards of a thousand to the force of the country. 

But the flame which has broken forth in this city since the report from New York, of the loss of Charleston, not only does honour to the place, but, like the blaze of 1776, will kindle into action the scattered sparks throughout America.  The valour of a country may be learned by the bravery of its soldiery, and the general cast of its inhabitants, but confidence of success is best discovered by the active measures pursued by men of property; and when the spirit of enterprise becomes so universal as to act at once on all ranks of men, a war may then, and not till then, be styled truly popular. 

In 1776, the ardour of the enterprising part [begin page 239] was considerably checked by the real revolt of some, and the coolness of others.  But in the present case, there is a firmness in the substance and property of the country to the public cause.

An association has been entered into by the merchants, tradesmen, and principal inhabitants of the city, to receive and support the new state money at the value of gold and silver; a measure which, while it does them honour, will likewise contribute to their interest, by rendering the operations of the campaign convenient and effectual. 

Nor has the spirit of exertion stopped here.  A voluntary subscription is likewise begun, to raise a fund of hard money, to be given as bounties, to fill up the full quota of the Pennsylvania line.

It has been the remark of the enemy, that every thing in America has been done by the force of government; but when she sees individuals throwing in their voluntary aid, and facilitating the public measures in concert with the established powers of the country, it will convince her that the cause of America stands not on the will of a few but on the broad foundation of property and popularity. 

Thus aided and thus supported, disaffection [begin page 240] will decline, and the withered head of tyranny expire in America.  The ravages of the enemy will be short and limited, and like all their former ones, will produce a victory over themselves. 

COMMON SENSE. 
Philadelphia, June 9, 1780.

P.S.  At the time of writing this number of the Crisis, the loss of Charleston, though believed by some, was more confidently disbelieved by others.  But there ought to be no longer a doubt upon the matter.  Charleston is gone, and I believe for the want of a sufficient supply of provisions.  The man that does not now feel for the honour of the best and noblest cause that ever a country engaged in, and exert himself accordingly, is no longer worthy of a peaceable residence among a people determined to be free. 

C. S.