A SECOND
VINDICATION
OF
Mr. LOCKE,
Wherein his Sentiments relating to
Personal Identity
Are clear'd up from some Mistakes of
The Rev. Dr. BUTLER,
IN HIS
DISSERTATION on that Subject.
And the various Objections rais'd against
Mr. LOCKE, by the learned Author
of An Enquiry into the Nature of
the Human Soul, are consider'd.
To which are added
Reflections on some Passages of Dr. Watts's
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS.

Confuse is the Tax a Man pays to the Publick for
being eminent.

Lord Bacon.

By Vin. Perronet, A. M. Vicar of Shoreham in Kent,
and Chaplain to the Right Hon. Earl STANHOPE.

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THE

PREFACE

OW far the learned and ingenious Gentlemen, whom I have taken the Liberty of dissenting from in the following Pages, have either rightly understood Mr. Locke, or have themselves been rightly understood by me, is entirely submitted to the Judgment of others.

As to the learned Author of An Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul, I shall here only beg Leave to observe, that, if he had thought it proper to have confined himself to
to the *Demonstration* of the Soul's *Immateriality*, and to the Proof of the real, but dependent Existence of Matter, he had been confined to a Task, to which he has shewn himself abundantly equal.

But 'tis plain, the ingenious Author judged something more to be needful. The Victory could not be compleat, without numberless Attacks upon Mr. Locke: With what Success, let the judicious Reader determine.

**P.S.** It is the first Edition of Dr. Butler's Book, which is here made use of. But the second Edition both of the *Enquiry*, and of Dr. Watts's *Essays*.

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ERRATA.
ERRATA.


P. 117. l. 17. for Mr. Locke, read Mr. Locke's.  P. 120. l. 17. for it, read it.

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Mr. LOCKE's SENTIMENTS
Relating to Personal Identity, &c.

HAT Persons of acknowledged Candor and Ingenuity may sometimes mistake the Meaning of the best of Writers, seems plain from the learned Author of the Dissertation on Personal Identity. Who tho' he has carefully distinguished between Mr. Locke, and those who have made a very absurd and wicked Use, of what is said by him upon this Subject; yet that he has not every where rightly apprehended him, will I hope appear from the following Reflections. But first, Dr. Butler observes, that

"Great
"Great Difficulties have been raised by some concerning Personal Identity, or the Sameness of living Agents. * That strange Perplexities have been raised about the Meaning of that Identity or Sameness of Person, which is imply'd in the Notion of our living Now and Hereafter, or in any two successive Moments. And that the Solution of these Difficulties hath been stranger than the Difficulties themselves. For Personal Identity has been explain'd by some, as to render the Inquiries concerning a future Life, of no Consequence at all to Us, the Persons who are making it. Now when it is asked, wherein Personal Identity consists, the Answer should be the same, as if it were asked, wherein consists Similitude or Equality. That all Attempts to define, would but perplex it."†

Had Gentlemen, who treat of this Subject, made a proper Use of Mr. Locke's Observations, I am persuaded many of those Difficulties and Perplexities the Dr. complains of, had been entirely avoided.

"The Difficulty or Obscurity, says Mr. Locke, that has been about this Matter, rather rises from the Names ill used, than from any Obscurity in Things themselves. For whatever makes the specific Idea, to which the Name is apply'd, if that Idea be steadily kept to, the Distinction of anything into the Same and Diverse, will easily be conceived, and there can arise no Doubt it."‡


Indeed such an "Explanation of Personal Identity (which the Dr. mentions) as renders the Inquiry concerning a future Life of no Consequence at all to us," may, it is greatly to be fear'd, proceed from a much worse Principle.

As to Personal Identity itself, if a Doubt should arise, whether a Person was the same to Day, he was Yesterday; it would, I presume, be very necessary to enquire, what was meant by Person, before any satisfactory Answer could possibly be given. But when Men had settled amongst themselves, what they meant by this Term, they might, I think, very easily agree, whether he were the same, or a different Person. So that I must beg leave to differ from this Gentleman's Opinion, that all Attempts to define Personal Identity, or That, in which it consists, would but perplex it. I rather take what he immediately subjoins, to be much righter, that there is no Difficulty at all in ascertaining the Idea. Tho' the Difference between This, and settling the Definition*, seems to me rather in the Expression, than the Thing itself. But this Ingenious Writer thus proceeds:

"Upon the Conscientiousness of ones Self or ones own Existence in any two Moments, being compared, there immediately arises to the Mind the Idea of Personal Identity. [This] Comparision, not only gives us the Idea of Personal Identity, but also shews us the Identity of our selves in those two Moments: The present, suppose, and that immediately past, or the present, and that, a Month,

"a Year, or twenty Years past. Or in other "Words, by reflecting upon That, which is "myself now, and That, which was myself "twenty Years ago, I discern They are not "two, but one, and the fame Self.""

Again, "Every Perfon is conscious, that he "is now the fame Perfon or Self he was, as far "back as his Remembrance reaches; since when "any One reflects upon a past Action of his own, "he is just as certain of the Perfon who did that "Action, namely Himself, the Perfon who "now reflects upon it, as he is certain that the "Action was at all done. Nay very often a "Perfon's Affurance of an Action having been "done, of which he is absolutely assured, "arises wholly from the Confciousnefs that he "Himself did it."†

What the Dr. here maintains, does not feem very different from what is laid down by Mr. "Locke: Who affirms "it to be the fame Con- "fciousnefs that makes a Man be himself to "himself. — And that as far as any intelli- "gent Being can repeat the Idea of any past "Action with the fame Confciousnefs it had of "it at first, and with the fame Confciousnefs it "has of any prefent Action; fo far it is the "fame Perfonal Self. For it is by the Confci- "ousnefs it has of its prefent Thoughts and "Actions, that it is Self to Itfelf now, and fo "will be the fame Self, as far as the fame Con- "fciousnefs can extend to Actions past, or to "come. — — — The fame Confciousnefs uniting "thofe Diftant Actions into the fame Perfon."

\[4\]

But how far these Gentlemen do really agree, will better appear hereafter.

"Tho' Confcioufsness, says Dr. Butler, does "thus afcerain our Perfonal Identity to ourfelves; "yet to fay, that Confcioufsness makes Per- "fonal Identity, or is necefsary to our being the "fame Perfons, is to fay, that a Perfon has not "exitfed a fingle Moment, nor done One Ac- "tion, but what he can remember; indeed none "but what he reflects upon. And one would re- "ally think it felf-evident, that Confcioufs- "ness of Perfonal Identity prefuppfes, and therefore "cannot conftitute Perfonal Identity, any more "than Knowledge in any other Cafe, can con- "ftitute Truth, which it prefuppfes."

It muft appear perfectly evident from these Objections, not only that Dr. Butler's Idea of "Perfon here differs from Mr. Locke's, and which we fhall more fully obferve hereafter; but that the Dr. did not here reflect, that Mr. Locke ex- "preffly makes a Diffinition between the fame Man, and the fame Perfon †. And therefore it will be very proper to confider in this Place, what Mr. Locke means by Perfon or Self, and what by Perfonal Identity.

"Perfon then he defines, a thinking intelli- "gent Being, that has Reason and Reflection, "and can confider itself as itselp, the fame think- "ing Thing in different Times and Places; "which it does only by that Confcioufsness, "which is inefparable from Thinking."

Again, "Self is that conscious thinking Thing "— which is fenfible, or conscious of Plea- 

§ 15. 20. †† Ibid. § 9.

"Sure
By comparing which together, I think it must appear sufficiently plain, that by Person, Mr. Locke does not mean either a Man, or any other living Agent, in general; but only such a Rational Being, as is actually conscious of its own Behaviour; capable of a Law, and answerable for its Actions. So that consequently One in a Phreny, notwithstanding his being a Man or living Agent, would not however, according to Mr. Locke, be esteem'd a Person. — For whatever Substance there is, says he, without Confciounnes, there is no Person. As to Personal Identity, This consists in Identity of Confciounnes, and in that alone. His Reason is — "It being the same Confciounnes, that makes a Man be himself to himself, Personal Identity "depends on That only." 

And indeed, since his Idea of Person, is a Being actually conscious of its own Actions, in what else can the Identity of such Person consist? And therefore when Dr. Butler thus expresses himself — "to say that Confciounnes makes Personal Identity, or is necessary to our being the same Persons, is to say that a Person has not existed a single Moment, nor done one Acti- "on, but what he can remember, &c." 

All This, I think is a plain Demonstration, that by Person, Dr. here only means in general, a Man or living Agent; and that therefore his Objections have nothing to do with Person or Personal Identity, as understood by Mr. Locke. However that Gentleman thus proceeds, — "This wonderful Mistake may possibly "have arisen from hence, that to be induced with
"Consciousness, is inseparable from the Idea of a Person, or intelligent Being. For this might be expressed inaccurately thus, that Consciousness makes Personality; and from hence it might be concluded, to make Personal Identity. But though present Consciousness of what we at present do and feel, is necessary to our being the Persons we now are; yet present Consciousness of past Actions, or Feelings, is not necessary to our being the same Person, who perform'd those Actions or had those Feelings."

If this ingenious Objection had but duly consider'd, what it is that makes a Person, according to Mr. Locke, he would not have given himself the trouble of accounting for what he supposes a Mistake. However let us examine what is here advanced.

If by the Sameness of Person we are to understand the Sameness of living Agents, as this Gentleman elsewhere explains it; then present Consciousness of past Actions is certainly unnecessary to our being the same Persons, i.e. the same living Agents, who perform'd those Actions: Since we are undoubtedly the same living Agents, whether we are conscious of our past (or even present) Actions or not. But what has this to do with our being the same Persons in Mr. Locke's Sense of the Word?

I am persuaded if the learned Author would narrowly examine his Ideas, he would go near to find that he uses the Word Person, not in the same strict Meaning in both Places. In the former he appears evidently to use it in the Sense...

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* * The Analogy, &c. p. 302. † p. 11. of Mr. Locke; in the latter, the Word seems only to stand for Man or living Agent. Present Consciousness, says he, of what we at present do, is necessary to our being the Persons we now are. That is, to our being accountable Agents, or Persons, in Mr. Locke's Sense. But what is the Reason that Present Consciousness of past Actions is not necessary to our being the same Persons, who perform'd those Actions? It is not indeed necessary to our being the same Man, or living Agents, as has been already observed: But is Consciousness of what is past necessary to our being the same proper Objects of Punishment, which we were at the Time of Commission? If it be, then present Consciousness of past Actions is necessary to our being the same Persons; that is, according to Mr. Locke's Idea of the Word Person. Or shall we say, that every Man, who was guilty of a Crime whilst he enjoy'd his Senses, is under all Circumstances, justly punishable? Is the Mad Man justly punishable for what the Sober Man did? If he be not, then we must allow that something more is necessary to constitute the same Person, in Mr. Locke's Sense, than barely being the same Man. He that has lost his Understanding, and the Remembrance of his Crimes, is yet the same living Agent, and may, I presume, be call'd the same guilty Man: But if he be not the same Conscious Being, or the same proper Object of Punishment, he is not in Mr. Locke's Phrase, the same Person. And indeed his Opinion, that God Almighty will punish no Man hereafter for any Crime, but what is first brought home to his Mind and Conscience*, seems to have plain Reason, if not plain...
Revelation, on its Side. And he may well say that "in this Personal Identity, is founded all the Right and Justice of Reward and Punishment."* For tho’ to reward a Man in a Phrensy could do him no Hurt; yet the Attempt would be as absurd, as the punishing of him in those Circumstances, would be irrational and cruel. — But to proceed. —— "The Inquiry, says Dr. Butler, what makes Vegetables the same in the common Acceptation of the Word, does not appear to have any Relation to This of Personal Identity; because the Word Same, when apply’d to Them, and to Person, is not only apply’d to different Subjects, but it is also used in different Senses. For when a Man swears to the same Tree, as having stood fifty Years in the same Place, he means only the same as to all the Purposes of Property and Uses of common Life, and not that the Tree has been all that time the same in the strict Philosophic Sense of the Word. For he does not know, whether any one Particle of the present Tree, be the same with any one Particle of the Tree, which stood in the same Place fifty Years ago. And if they have not one common Particle of Matter, They cannot be the same Tree in the proper Philosophic Sense of the Word Same; it being evidently a Contradiction in Terms, to say They are, when no Part of their Substance, and no one of their Properties, are the same. — And therefore when we say the Identity or Same’s of a Plant consists, in a Continuation of the same Life, com-

* § 18.

"municated under the same Organization, to a Number of Particles of Matter whether the same or not; the Word Same when apply’d to Life and to Organization, cannot possibly be understood to signify, what it signifies in this very Sentence, when apply’d to Matter. In a looser and popular Sense then, the Life, and the Organization, and the Plant, are justly said to be the same, notwithstanding the perpetual Change of the Parts. But in a strict and Philosophical Manner of Speech, no Man, no Being, no Any-thing, can be the same with That, with which it hath indeed nothing the same. Now Same’s is used in this latter Sense when apply’d to Persons. "The Identity of These therefore, cannot subside with Diversity of Substances."*

I beg leave here to observe, that if the Same’s of a Vegetable consists in the same numerical Particles, the Identity is as much destroy’d by the Loss of a Few, as by the Change of All. And a Tree is no more the same, which has stood fifty Days, than what has stood fifty Years. But if the Identity of a Plant consists in what Mr. Locke supposes, then a Tree of fifty Years standing, is as much the same Tree, even in the strictest Sense of the Word same, as a Tree which has stood but so many Hours. And tho’ it be very certain, that no Being, nor indeed any thing else, can strictly be the same with That, with which it hath Nothing the same; yet I think it may be a Question, whether it be Unity of Substance that comprehends all Identity, or will determine it in every Case.†

* The Analogy, &c. p. 303, 304. † Hum. Und. B. 11 C.27. § 7 C 2 Mr.
Mr. Locke is of Opinion, that the Identity of Vegetables and Animals depends not, like the Identity of a Mafs of Matter, on the same Number of Particles; but on the contrary, that in "Them the Variation of great Parcels of Matter alters not the Identity: An Oak growing from a Plant to a great Tree, and then lopp’d, is fill’d the same Oak: And a Colt grown up to a Horse, sometimes fat, sometimes lean, is all the while the same Horse; tho’ in both these Cases, there may be a manifest Change of the Parts: So that truly they are not either of them the same Masses of Matter, tho’ they be truly one of them the same Oak, and the other the same Horse. The Reason whereof is, that in these two Cases, of a Mafs of Matter, and a living Body, Identity is not apply’d to the same Thing." As to the former, "Whilst two or more Atoms exist united together, the Mafs, consisting of the same Atoms, must be the same Mafs, or the same Body."* Whereas "a Plant continues the same, as long as it partakes of the same Life, though that Life be communicated to new Particles of Matter vitally united to the living Plant."† And "the same Animal is the same continued Life, communicated to different Particles of Matter, as they happen successively to be united to that organiz’d living Body."‡

Indeed, to one, who will judge of the Same-ness of all Beings, by what constitutes the Same-ness of a Mafs of unorganiz’d Matter, it is impossible that either Vegetable or Animal shou’d continue the same for one Day together. Whereas he that judges of Identity, by what answers to all the Purposes of Property, and Uses of common Life, can never be without the same Trees in his Park; provided, upon the Fall of any, there be others planted in their stead.

As to Mr. Locke’s Sentiments; I could as soon doubt, whether a Man were the same Man, after his Hair was cut and his Nails were pared, as I could doubt, whether a Tree was the same Tree (even in the strictest Sense of the Word same) after its Leaves were fall’n, or its Boughs trim’d. It is true, neither the one nor the other would consist of the same numerical Particles, they died before; and consequently they are not the same Masses of Matter: But then as my Idea of a Man or Vegetable, is not the Idea of a Mafs of mere unorganiz’d Matter; so That which is necessary to constitute the Identity of the One, does not appear to me necessary to the Identity of the Other. However this, as Mr. Locke observes, will be just according to our several Ideas of the Subjects, we apply Identity to: And Men may dispute for ever, whether Vegetable or Animal, whether Perfum, Man, or Substance, be the same; ’till they have agreed amongst themselves, what Ideas those different Words shall stand for.*

As to what the Dr. affirms, that "Sameness is used in a strict and Philosophical Manner of Speech, when apply’d to Perasons: And that the Identity of These cannot subsist with Diversity of Substance:" ——— I could wish he had been more particular in explaining,
what is here meant by 

Person, and what by 

Substance. For if by 

Person we understand the 

Immaterial Spirit only; and by 

Substance, the 

Substance of such Spirit: In this Case it would 

be saying, that the 

Identity of an Individual Spi- 

rit cannot subsist with the 

Diversity of its own 

Substance: And which, I 

presume, has not 

been controverted. But if by 

Substance, be 

meant That of the Body, the Proposition would 

amount to This, either that the Body never 

gain'd or lost any Particles of 

Matter; or that 

Immaterial Spirit could not continue the same, 

under such a Variation of the Substance of the 

Body. Or lastly, if by 

Person, be meant the 

whole Compound, Spirit and Body united; then 

the Identity of such 

Person may certainly subsist 

with Diversity of Substance; or we shall never 

be able to find the same 

Person, for perhaps two 

Hours together. — But this learned Writer 

thus proceeds.

"The Thing here consider'd, and demon- 

stratively, as I think, determined, is proposed 

by Mr. Locke in these Words:

"Whether it, i.e. the same Self or Person, be 

the same Identical Substance?

"And he has suggested what is a much bet- 

ter Answer to the Question, than that which 

he gives it in Form. For he defines Person, 

a thinking intelligent Being, &c., and Personal 

Identity, the Sameness of a rational Being."

"The Question then is, whether the same 

Rational Being is the same Substance; which 

needs no Answer, because Being and Substance, 

in this Place, stand for the same Idea. The 

Ground of the Doubt, Whether the same


C. 27. § 9, 10.

"Person

be the same Substance, is said to be 

This, that the Conscioufnes of our own 

Existence, in Youth, and in Old Age, or 

in any two joint successive Moments, is not 

the same individual Action*, i.e. not the same 

Conscioufnes, but different successive Con-

scioufnes. Now it is strange that This 

should have occasion'd such Perplexities; for 

it is surely conceivable, that a Person may 

have a Capacity of knowing some Object or 

other to be the same now, which it was 

when he contemplated it formerly: Yet in 

this Cafe, where, by the Supposition, the 

Object is perceiv'd to be the same, the Per-

ception of it in any two Moments, cannot 

be one and the same Perception.

"And thus, thro' the successive Conscioufnes 

which we have of our own Existence, are not 

the same, yet are they Conscioufnes of one 

and the same Thing or Object, of the same 

Person, Self, or living Agent. The Person, 

of whose Existence the Conscioufnes is felt 

now, and was felt an Hour or a Year ago, is 

discern'd to be, not two Persons, but one and 

the same Person; and therefore is one and 

the same."†

Mr. Locke observes that "Doubts are rais'd 

(by the Interruption of Conscioufnes, and our 

losing Sight of our past selves) whether we 

are the same thinking Thing, i.e. the same 

Substance or no?" Or as he had just before 

express'd himself, "Whether it [i.e. the 

same Self or Person] be the same Identical Sub-

stance?" || So that, I apprehend, the Doubt


B. II. C. 27. § 10. here
here mention’d, is, Whether That, which a Man calls Self to Day, be that very Being or Substance, which he call’d Self Yesterd’ay? But I think, as the Dr. seems to have taken the Queftion, it looks as if a Doubt had been started, Whether the fame Being or Substance, was the fame Being or Substance? And which, as he very juftly remarks, needs no Answer.

As to the Answer, which this ingenious Gentleman fuppofes Mr. Locke has fuggested to this Queftion; it does not, I think, appear to have any manner of relation to it. Mr. Locke is only there mentioning, what he means by Perfon; and what, by the Sameness of fuch Perfon: And fince This, according to him, always depends on the fame Consciousness, whether annexed to the fame or a different Substance; thofe Definitions can have nothing to do, towards folving a Doubt, whether a Man be the fame Substance to Day, which he was Yesterd’ay? —— Befides, as Mr. Locke obferves, thofe “Doubts, how “reafonable or unreafonable foever, concern not “Personal Identity at all.”* That is, Mr. Locke’s Hypothesis cannot be affected by them. For as that makes Personal Identity to confift in Consciousness only; it seems to fland clear of all Difficulties of this Sort. For let Men doubt as long as they pleafe, about their being the fame individual Self or Substance, which they were a Day, a Week, or a Year before; they are equally, according to Mr. Locke, the fame accountable Persons or Beings, as far as their Consciousness reaches; and answerable for every Transfaction of their whole Lives, which can thus by Con-

* Ibid.

sciousness be appropriated to themselves. So that let them determine of the fame Identical Substance as they will, they can never get clear, upon Mr. Locke’s Supposition, of the leaf Guilt they have ever contracted, by imagining any Change or Variation of Substance whatever.

But now, tho’ we are certainly able to discern ourselves to be the fame Perfons, we were formerly, as Mr. Locke every where fuppofes; yet, if by Perfon be meant the fame Substance, how will Consciousness prove to any Man, that he is the fame Perfon, in this Sense; unlefs by Perfon, he understands the immaterial Spirit, and that Only? But as All do not exclude every thing material out of their Idea of Perfon; it is imppoible they should by Consciousness be able to discern, that they are the fame Perfons, in the Sense here underfood.

Dr. Butler goes on to remark: ——— “Mr.

“Locke’s Obervations upon this Subject appear “hafy; and he seems to profess himfelf diffatif- “fied with Suppositions, which he has made re- “lating to it”. But fome of thofe hafy Ob- “fervations have been carried to a strange Length “by Others; whose Notion, when traced and “examined to the Bottom, amounts, I think, “to this:† That Personality is not a perma- “nent, but a tranfient Thing: That it lives “and dies, begins and ends continually: That “no one can any more remain one and the “fame Perfon two Moments together, than two “fucceffive Moments can be one and the fame “Moment: That our Substance is indeed con-

*Locke’s Works, p. 152. † See an Answer to Dr. Clarke’s third Defense of his Letter to Mr. Dodwell, 2d Edition P. 44 and 56, &c.
"...finally changing, but whether this be to or not, is, it seems, nothing to the Purpose, since it is not Substance but Consciousness alone, which constitutes Personality; which Consciousness being succesive, cannot be the same in any two Moments, nor consequently the Personality constituted by it."

To how many Readers any of Mr. Locke’s Observations upon this Subject may appear hasty, I cannot pretend to say. He seems to have been no very hasty Writer in general, and perhaps even his Observations in this Chapter, may rather be thought by some to carry plain Marks of great Application of Mind. Tho', as to his appearing dissatisfied with any of his own Suppositions; it is no wonder, that so modest a Writer as Mr. Locke, should not be over confident, where he owns himself to be greatly in the Dark.

"I am apt enough, says he, to think I have, in treating of this Subject, made some Suppositions that will look strange to some Readers, and possibly they are so in themselves. But yet, I think, they are such as are pardonable in this Ignorance we are in of the Nature of that thinking Thing that is in us, and which we look on as our selves. Did we know, what it was, or how it was tied to a certain System of fleeting Animal Spirits; or whether it could, or could not perform its Operations of Thinking and Memory out of a Body organized as ours is; and whether it has pleas’d God that no one such Spirit shall ever be united to any but one such Body, upon the right Constitution of whole Organs

* The Analogy, &c. p. 305.

its

...its Memory should depend, we might see the Absurdity of some of those Suppositions I have made."

So that this great Man does indeed acknowledge his own Ignorance, and treats some of his Suppositions with a Freedom, that few Writers are guilty of in respect of themselves. But some of these Observations, Dr. Butler remarks, have been carri’d to a strange Length by Others. To which I beg Leave to add, that whoever will but compare what Mr. Locke has advanced upon this Subject, with what the Dr. mentions from those other Writers, will find as wide a difference between them, as between any two express Contradictions whatever.

For whilst Mr. Locke everywhere maintains to this Effect, "That Consciousness unites the most distant Actions into one and the same Person: That wherever such Consciousness is, there is Personall Identity: That every Person is strictly accountable for whatever can be thus appropriated to himself by this Consciousness: And that in this Personall Identity is founded all the Right and Justice of Rewards and Punishments;" whilst Mr. Locke constantly maintains this, the Others affirm, "That Personallity is not a permanent, but Transient Thing: That it lives and dies, begins and ends continually: That no one can any more remain one and the same Person two Moments together, than two successive Moments can be one and the same Moment: And that Consciousness being successive, cannot be the same in any two Moments, nor consequently the

* Hum. Und. B. II. C. 27. § 27. † ibid. § 16. § 18.  

D 2 Perfo-
"sonality constituted by it."

Dr. Butler thus concludes his Dissertation:

"This He, Perfon, or Self must either be a
Substance, or the Property of some Substance.
If He, if Perfon, be a Substance, then Con-
sciousness that He is the fame Perfon, is Con-
sciousness that He is the fame Substance. If
the Perfon or He be the Property of a Sub-
stance, till Consciousness that He is the fame
(fame Property) is as certain a Proof,
that his Substance remains the fame, as Con-
sciousness that He remains the fame Substance
would be; since the fame Property cannot be
transferr'd from one Substance to another.

"But tho' we are thus certain, that we are
the fame Agents, living Beings or Substances
now, which we were as far back as our Re-
membrance reaches, yet it is asked, whether
we may not possibly be deceiv'd in it? And
this Question may be asked at the End of any
Demonstration whatever, Because it is a
Question concerning the Truth of Perception
by Memory; And he who can doubt, whe-
ther Perception by Memory can in this Case
be depended upon, may doubt also, whether
Perception by Deduction and Reasoning,
which also include Memory, or indeed whe-
ther intuitive Perception, can. Here then
we can go no farther. For it is ridiculous to
attempt to prove the Truth of those Percep-
tions, whose Truth we can no otherwise prove,
than by other Perceptions of exactly the fame
Kind with them, and which there is just the
fame Ground to suspect; or to attempt to
prove the Truth of our Faculties, which can
no otherwise be proved, than by the Use or
Means

"Means of those very suspected Faculties them-
elves *.

Tho' He, Perfon, or Self be certainly a Sub-
stance; yet Consciousness that He is the fame
Perfon, cannot, I think, be Consciousness that
He is the fame Substance, to any Man, who makes
the Body one Part of his Self or Perfon.
Indeed where the Idea of Perfon, is only the
Idea of an individual immaterial Substance, a
Consciousness we are the same Perfon, is beyond
all Question, a Consciousness, that we are the
fame Substance. And in this Case to doubt,
whether the same Perfon, be the same Substance,
would be only to doubt, whether the same indi-
vidual Substance, was the same individual Sub-
stance.

According to Mr. Locke, we may always be
fure, that we are the same Persons, that is, the
same accountable Agents, or Beings now, which
we were as far back as our Remembrance reaches:
Or as far as a perfectly Just and Good God
will cause it to reach.

As to any Thing, that looks like doubting,
either after a Demonstration, intuitive Perception,
or Perception by Memory; I am thoroughly per-
suaded this ingenious Gentleman did not design
in the leaf to charge Mr. Locke with it. It is
true indeed, Mr. Locke thus expresses himself:—
"Why one Intellectual Substance may not have
reprezent to it, as done by itself, what it
ever did, and was perhaps done by some
other Agent; why such a Reprezentation may
not possibely be without Reality of Matter of
Fact, as well as several Reprezentations in

* The Analogy, &c. p. 308.

Dreams
"Dreams are, which yet, whilst dreaming, "we take for true, will be difficult to con- "clude from the Nature of Things."

But then it should be remembered, that he thus imme- diately adds, "And that it never is so, will "by us, 'till we have clearer Views of the Na- ture of thinking Substances, be best revolv'd "into the Goodness of God, who, as far as the "Happiness or Misery of any of his sensible "Creatures is concern'd in it, will not by a fa- "tal Error of theirs transfer from one to another "that Consciouness, which draws Reward or "Punishment with it."

And therefore it may not be amiss to observe, that Mr. Locke has sufficiently secured this Point; when he rests it upon no weaker a Foundation, "than the Goodness of God. Of which, I pre- "sume, we may be as infallibly assured, as of the Truth of any of our Faculties whatever. A Man may certainly, with as much Modesty, doubt of the Truth of his own Memory or Per- "ceptions, as call in question that Divine Attri- "bute. And surely he that can do this, may with equal Reason, doubt of the very Being of "a God, or of his own Existence.

Mr. Locke indeed supposed, that we knew not enough of the Nature of Thinking Sub- "stances, peremptorily to determine that such Repre sentations could never happen; and therefore he esteem'd it the most effectual Way to ob- "viate Doubts of this Kind, to resolve the Whole "into that Adorable Goodness, which could not "suffer us to be so far deceiv'd, as to be render'd "for ever undeservedly miserable. And at the

† Ibid.

same time, he "leaves it to be considered, how "far this may be an Argument against those, "who would place Thinking in a System of fleet- "ing Animal Spirits."

And a very powerful Argument this must certainly appear to every Man, who has any just or rational Conceptions either of the Deity, or of his own Nature.

Upon the whole, Mr. Locke has been so far from encouraging any Unreasonable Doubts (I mention this for the sake of those Readers, who may either mistake Mr. Locke or Dr. Butler) that he has expressly endeavour'd to guard us against them, since he tells us, that let our Ignorance of the Nature of thinking Substances, and of their Operations upon one another, be what it will; yet we may be infallibly assured, we can never be deceiv'd in that Consciouness which draws Reward or Punishment with it, from the Hands of God. But that whatever Actions such Consciouness appropriates to us, whether good or evil, are most certainly our own; that we are the very Persons, who once actually did those Actions; and that we alone are justly rewardable or punishtable for them.

As to the learned Author of the Dissertation, it is by no Means surprizing, if he and Mr. Locke differ with regard to Personal Identity: Since whilst they both talk of the same Person, they sometimes talk of very different Things. Mr. Locke will not allow any unconscious Being, Agent, or Substance to be a Person; he esteems Consciouness as essential in this respect, that he affirms "A Carcase may be a Person, as well as "any Sort of Substance be so, without Consci-"
ousnesses." Whereas, tho' a present Consciousness of what we at present do, is supposed necessary to our being the Persons we now are; — I think Person, in the Doctor's Sense of the Word, may generally stand for any living unconscious Man whatever. And therefore as their Ideas of what constitutes a Person, are different, it is no Wonder they disagree as to what constitutes the Same-ness of That Person.

However it is submitted, whether Mr. Locke's Sentiments in relation to Personal Identity, have been altogether placed by Dr. Butler in their proper Light; and withal, how far they have been affected by the Objections of that learned and ingenious Writer?

* Hum. Und. B. II. C. 27. § 23.

THE

O B J E C T I O N S

Rais'd against

Mr. L O C K E

BY

The Learned Author of An ENQUIRY into the Nature of the Human Soul, Consider'd.

"INCE Matter, says this Writer, cannot be percipient, it cannot have Ideas; Ideas are perceiv'd, and are consequently nothing but Perceptions; and therefore "it cannot have Sensation, Feeling, or Life, "because all these imply Perception." Vol. I. P. 192.

This being laid down, the ingenious Author proceeds thus to remark: — "From this we E "may
may see what little Reason Mr. Locke had to be fo peremptory in his Dispute with the Bishop of Worcester about the Possibility of Matter’s Thinking; where, to prove it possible, he says, for Example, God creates an extended solid substance, without superadding any Thing else to it, and so we may consider it at reft: To some Parts of it he superadds Motion, but it has still the Essence of Matter. Other Parts of it he frames into Plants, with all the Excellencies of Vegetation, Life, and Beauty, which is to be found in a Rose, or a Peach-tree, above the Essence of Matter in general, but it is still but Matter. To other Parts he adds Sense and spontaneous Motion, and those other Properties that are to be found in an Elephant. Hitherto it is not doubted but the Power of God may go, [and that the Properties of a Rose, a Peach, or an Elephant, superadd to Matter, change not the Properties of Matter; but Matter is in thee Things Matter still*:] But if one venture to go one Step farther, and say, God may give to Matter Thought, Reason, and Volition, as well as Sense and spontaneous Motion, there are Men ready presently to limit the Power of the Omnipotent Creator, and tell us he cannot do it, because it destroys the Essence, or changes the Essential Properties of Matter †.

To this our Author replies, —— "A Man may warrantably say, That to effect a Con-straction is not the Object of any Power; nothing less limits Omnipotence: And such it is to effect that a Substance, which as solidly extended, must resist all Change of State, should, while remaining solidly extended, become of dull, dead Earth, Life, Sense, and spontaneous Motion*; for that is to say, it becomes living, sensible, and spontaneously moving Earth, while it remains dull and dead Earth." Vol. I. p. 192—194.

After our Author has reproved Mr. Locke for having been over peremptory; he proceeds next to charge him with a Contradiction, which, like the Egyptian Darkness, may really be felt. For it seems according to Mr. Locke, Earth may become living, sensible, and spontaneously moving, whilst it remains without Life, or Sense, or Motion! Not that Mr. Locke is taxed with maintaining this in fo many Words; but only what amounts to it. If we enquire after Mr. Locke’s Proposition, here it seems to be: —— "A Substance, whilst solidly extended, may become of dull, dead Earth, Life, Sense, and spontaneous Motion!" At least this Proposition must be supposed to contain Mr. Locke’s Meaning; since we are refered to the very Page, Volume, and Edition of his Works. But whether our Author has not given us a very faulty Paraphrase of his own, rather than the Words or Sense of Mr. Locke, may be partly conjectured from the very Letter publifi’d by Mr. Locke himself.

"If the Omnipotent Creator, says Mr. Locke, had not superadded to the Earth, which produced the irrational Animals, Qualities far * The Words here inclosed are left out in the Quotation. The ingenious Obje&or might think them superfluous; but they may not appear so to others.
† B. IV. c. 3. § 6. In the Note at these Words —— we have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking, &c.
"surpassing those of the dull, dead Earth, out
of which they were made, Life, Sense, and
spontaneous Motion, nobler Qualities than
were before in it, it had still remain'd rude
senseless Matter."

Pray what is here of the dull dead Earth
becoming Life, and Sense, and spontaneous Mo-
tion? May not Creatures form'd of Earth, be
endued with Life, and Sense, and Motion, with-
out becoming those very Powers or Qualities? or
does Mr. Locke affirm any thing else?

Indeed in these three Pages which begin the
Attack, Mr. Locke is very closely press'd. At
the Bottom of p. 193, after our Author has quoted
a Paragraph from that Gentleman, where he says, "It is impossible for us, by the Con-
templation of our own Ideas, without Reve-
lution, to discover whether Omnipotence has
not given to some Systems of Matter fitly dis-
pos'd, a Power to perceive and think, or else
join'd and fix'd to Matter so dispos'd, a think-
ing immaterial Substance," [B.IV. C 3. § 6.]
I say, after this we meet with the following extra-
onary Remark: — "This is founded
upon what Mr. Locke elsewhere endeavours to
maintain, That our Ideas are only arbitrary
Combinations, without Connexion to any Thing
in Nature."

What can this Gentleman mean by this
Affertion? Was Mr. Locke's Doubt, to wit,
Whether Omnipotence had done the one or the
other, founded upon this Supposition, that our

* Third Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, p. 399, 400.
See also the fifth Edition of the Essay, p. 458. As to that
Edition of Mr. Locke's Works which is refer'd to, I have had
no Opportunity of consulting it.

Ideas

† Vol. I. p. 370. and Notes.

"all


"all the Art and Power of an Omnipotent Creator or allow no Power and Art beyond what we know? Let any one answer this at his Leisure. We are but in the first Stage of Existence." Let him who hath the Term Infinite Power] often in his Mouth, consider only the Import of it.

Is it possible for a Man to have so just a Sense of the Almighty Power of God, without thinking great Indulgence due to that Person, who, thro' an awful Regard to Omnipotence, is betray'd into a Contradiction?

But be this as it will, after our Author has endeavour'd to fix the Absurdity about the dull dead Earth upon Mr. Locke, he thus triumphs:

So that, notwithstanding this Complaint, as if the Bishop had been unreasonable in opposing his Conclusion, it appears the Reason was good, and that he could not go one Step farther, without destroying the Essence of Matter, viz. solid Extension; and that he had gone a Step or two too far before, in making the spontaneous Mover in an Elephant, and the external Mover in the Mechanism both of Plants and Animals, Properties of dull and dead Earth." Vol. I. p. 194.

The Reader, I durst say, will observe, that all this is not only ascertained, but ascertained in the very Page of a Quotation where Mr. Locke plainly denies so much as Motion to be a Property of Matter! Where he affirms the Vegetation and Life of a Rose or Peach-tree to be above the general Essence of Matter, tho' such Rose or Peach-tree be still Matter! And withal, whilst he


tells us (in the Place refer'd to by our Author) that the Life, and Sense, and spontaneous Motion of Animals are Qualities far surpassing those of the dull dead Earth: Nobler Qualities than are to be found in rude fenjeflee Matter! And yet this Gentleman ventures to tell his Reader, that Mr. Locke makes the spontaneous Mover in an Elephant, and the external Mover in the Mechanism both of Plants and Animals, Properties of dull and dead Earth!

Let the judicious Reader now determine, which of these Gentlemen has advanced a Step or two too far.

However, it seems, "Mr. Locke hath well observed, that they are different Considerations that prove the Soul immortal and immaterial; but yet when he says, that It is as evident to him that [some] Brutus reason in certain Instancies, as that they have Sense;" [B. II. C. 11. § 11. fifth Edit.] and here takes it for granted, that it is but mere Matter with super-added Properties that thus reason (tho' he offers no Proof of either of these Assertions) and since all Men suppose the Matter of the Brute Body finally dissipated at Death, this gives an ignorant Sceptic Courage to affirm that it may be so with the Human Soul: Why should we maintain a Point gratis, and barely for maintaining's Sake; as here Mr. Locke allows the Soul is immaterial, but contends it might have been material; why, I say, should he maintain a Point gratis, that hath a bad Tendency? Were all other Arguments wanting, this itself would be one against it. No Truth by being known, could have a bad Effect on the Minds and Lives of Men: And contra-
"rily, what will always have a bad Effect on the Minds and Lives of Men, will have strong Probability at least against its being Truth, supposing no Argument could be brought for or against it." Vol. I. p. 194, 195.

As to the first of these proofs or Assertions, Mr. Locke tells us in the very Section refer'd to, that "If Brutes have any Ideas at all, and are not bare Machines (as some would have them)

Since the late learned Author of the Procedure, Extent, and Limits of Human Understanding, has maintaine'd that "Brutes are mere Matter, p. 169, and that all their Actions, as he calls 'em, are from a Necessity of Nature, like the Motion of a Clock, or a Watch, or as one Ball struck against another, and that they are moved by the internal Impulse of Ideas, without any Capacity of moving themselves, or "of intending, designing, or altering any Motion," p. 162, 164, 395. Besides what has been already ob serv'd, [See Vind. of Mr. Locke, Dial. VI.] I beg leave here to propose an Argument against this Hypothesis, which, tho' not an Argument of the abstract Kind, will, I hope, appear to have some Weight in it. — It is confus'd on all Hands, that an Horse, for Instance, will pass quietly by some Objects, but not by others. Shall we say the Reason is, because the great Author of their Being has, in Order to their Preservation, united such particular Effects to such and such Causes: So that whatever is hurtful, or likely to prove so, shall constantly be attended with such various Motions of these Animals, as are most likely to secure and protect 'em from Danger? This, I presume, is the most that can be said for the different Behaviour of these Creatures, upon the Cartesian Hypothesis, which seems to me much the same with that Gentleman's. [See the Vindication of Mr. Locke, in the Place just refer'd to.] But now if this be the Cause that Brutes will startle at one Object, and not at another: What Reason is to be assign'd, why they will more frequently endanger their Rider at the Sight of that which can never hurt 'em, than at the Sight of which actually may? Will not the same Horse fly from a dead Dog, or a Bundle of Chips, who will pass unconcern'd thro' an Army of Men? And on the other Hand, with what Difficulty are these Creatures removed when a Sus-

"we cannot deny them to have some Reason." Presuming, I suppose, that if they have Ideas, they might make some use of 'em. And he moreover infers from the Behaviour of some of these Animals, that they not only have Ideas, but lay them up in their Memories, and use them upon Occasion. [B. II. C. 1. § 19. C. 10. § 10.] But notwithstanding this, it seems Mr. Locke has not so much as offer'd a Proof, that [some] Brutes reason in certain Instances!

Well, but Mr. Locke takes it for granted, viz. in his Dispute with the Bishop of Worcester, that an Elephant (whom else where he affirms to have some Degree of Reason) is only Matter with superadded Properties. As Mr. Locke had no Dispute with that learned Prelate in Regard to the Composition of Elephants, what were we to expect he should prove about 'em? That

ble is in Flames, and they in the utmost Danger of perishing? Surely if these helpless Animals have not a Power of Self-motion; but are necessarily impell'd by their Ideas, is it to be imagined that the wise Author of Nature would establish such Laws, as should operate in so propitious a Manner? Is it conceivable that Brutes should lie under a Necessity of conforming themselves to a certain blind Impulse of Ideas; which in some Instances, forced them to fly where there was no Danger, and in others, oblig'd 'em to stay, tho' with the utmost Rilie and Hazard of their Lives? I should be glad to see these Difficulties fairly answer'd, upon that Hypothesis. Whereas, allowing these Animals a Power of Self-motion, that they are really conscious of something that affect's 'em, that they can properly discern and distinguish one Object from another; and that as Objects are more or less familiar, and appear more or less agreeable or terrifying, they conform themselves to their Motions accordingly; upon these Suppositions, where is the Wonder if Brutes are mistaken as well as Creatures of a far superior Rank; or if their Fears and Apprehensions often impose upon 'em?

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which is there mention'd, he plainly supposes his Lordship would grant; and therefore, as any other wife Man would have done, he says no more than he had Occasion to say.

But still these Assertions, whether proved or not, encourage an ignorant Sceptic to draw bad Inferences.

Suppose Mr. Locke had maintain'd, that not only Elephants, but Fleas and Mites have immaterial Souls*; will this Gentleman assure us, that an ignorant Sceptic could not draw a foolish Conclusion from it?

But then, Why should Mr. Locke maintain a Point gratis, which has a bad Tendency? With all Submission, the proper Question is, Why should Mr. Locke write whilst there were Fools to read? If Men will leave God Almighty out, where Mr. Locke has always declared be is present; if they will infer their Souls shall die, whilst he maintains the reverse†, as directly the reverse, and as expressly the contrary, as Light is to Darkness; who is to be answerable for the bad Tendency of this? Suppose it be affirmed, that "there is no Being but what is naturally immortal as long as God doth not extinguish it; And that otherwise there is no Being at all, but what is naturally mortal: That all Immortality is founded on the Will and Design of God, and that it is therefore absurd to seek for a Demonstration of it in the Nature of the created Being itself": This let it be said, and let an ignorant Sceptic read it, as he reads Mr. Locke; pray what would become of the Immortality of the Soul? Or where would be the Difference in Point of Immortality, betwixt the Soul of a Man, and the Body of a Brute? But who is answerable for all this? Shall we say that no one ought to answer for the Folly and Wickedness of others but Mr. Locke only? Or shall we find out a Definition, and affirm that nothing is here maintain'd gratis? What a surprizing Difference must this make in the bad Tendency of a Proposition? And how differently will an ignorant Sceptic find himself affected by it?

What our Author afterwards observes, that "No Truth by being known could have a bad Effect on the Minds and Lives of Men," is, I presume, very firmly held by all the various Sects of Philosophers whatever. Thus our own Hypotheses being always true, and Truth having no bad Effects, it is plain all the Danger can only arise from the Doctrine of our Opponents. Thou' indeed this Gentleman has given us Authority to say, that "the Things we are afraid of, may be but our own particular Prejudices." Vol. I. p. 247. in the Notes.

This Author disputing against a Scheme of a very learned Prelate *, who undertakes to prove the Non-existence of Matter, he thus expresses himself: "Mr. Locke speaks of Sensitive Knowledge with much Fairness and Candor, giving it the third Place, or making the Degrees of our Knowledge to be Intuitive, Demonstrative, and Sensitive, B. IV. C. 2. § 14. and C. 11. But with much Submission, the


F 2 Existence

* Bishop Berkeley.
"Existence of Matter in general, or at least of material Sensories, to which the Soul is united, seems to me — to be nearer Intuitive than Demonstrative Knowledge, if the same Perception of Parts proves to us both the Spirit and a material Sensory." Vol. II. p. 339.

Here appears to be some little Difference between this Gentleman's Thoughts and Mr. Locke's; tho' what it is, I must own is not very clear to me. It seems however as if Mr. Locke had supposed the Existence of Matter in general, or of material Sensories, to be the Object of Demonstrative Knowledge; whereas according to Mr. Locke, such Knowledge, I believe, is not Demonstrative but Sensitive*. However, let the Miltake lie where it will, it is an Affair of little Importance. Our Author's Observation, that Mr. Locke speaks of Sensitive Knowledge with much Fairness and Candor, is most certainly true. And I will beg leave to add, that he not only speaks of Intuitive and Demonstrative Knowledge in the same Manner; but that he has said enough in the Places last mention'd (notwithstanding he is so often charged with encouraging of Sceptics) to root out all unreasonable Scepticism from the Minds of Men, if the Thing itself was capable of being done.

Mr. Locke had told his learned Antagonist, the Bishop of Worcester, that "if his Lordship allow'd Brutes to have Sensation, it would follow, either that God can and doth give to some Parcels of Matter a Power of Perception and Thinking, or that all Animals have immortal, and consequently, according to his


"Lordship, immortal Souls, as well as Men." Lett. 2. p. 406.

"Here, says our Author, Mr. Locke supposes that Sensation implies Thinking, as much as it implies Perception; which is quite wrong, I conceive." Vol. I. p. 214. Notes.

It is not unlikely but Mr. Locke might suppose that a Creature could not be conscious of Pain or Pleasure, without attending in some Degree to those different Sensations. And hence, I presume it is, that in the Place just mention'd, he says, that Sensation is comprehended under Thinking in general; as elsewhere he makes Sensation a Mode of Thinking, B. II. C. 19. § 1. and how any Animal can be sensible of the Smart of a Wound, without thinking in some Measure upon it, let him that can, conceive.

But in Answer to this, we may be told, that "without Freedom there cannot be a thinking Being; and that an active Being, a thinking Being, and a free Being are synonymous Terms." Vol. I. p. 203. Notes.

However, does not this Gentleman allow Brutes to be spontaneous as to the Power of beginning some Motions, as well as Men? p. 177. Notes; and that they have a spontaneous Mover within 'em? p. 194. and withal that they are active in willing *Motion? p. 190. and that Activity and Power belong to Spirit by its Nature

* As to the being active in willing, see Dr. Clarke's Remarks upon a Philosophical Enquiry concerning Human Liberty, p. 9—9. 22, 23. Indeed our Author seems to use willing not for the passive Perception of the Understanding; but for the Exertion of the Self-motive Power, for he maintains, that to will is to act. V. i. p. 203. Notes; and consequently, the being active in willing, is only the being active in acting.
and Constitution? p. 255. How then, it may be ask'd, can a Creature be active in willing; or how can it have Activity and Power belonging to its very Nature, and yet be no active Being? or, which is much the same Thing, how can it be spontaneous* without Freedom? But be this as it will, neither the Immateriality of the Souls of Brutes, nor their Spontaneity, Activity, or Power will entitle 'em to the Privilege of Thinking: for "wanting the other Species of Activity, the "spontaneous Direction of their perceptive Capa-" pacity towards and thro' their past Percep-" tions, they cannot be called thinking Creatures." Vol. I. p. 190.

But still some may apprehend, that since a Brute Animal can often remember his Lessons; and frequently appears fhy of one Man and fond of another, this looks as if his perceptive Capacity was directed towards his past Perceptions. However, what if this should not be spontaneous? or granting it was, yet there may be as much Difference between spontaneous and spontaneous, as between active and active. But now with Submission to this Gentleman, to maintain that the Activity of the Human Soul is of two kinds, and its Perceptivity twofold, the one more noble than the other; but that the Soul of Brutes has only the single Activity and Perceptivity of the lower Sort, to which thinking does not belong; [Vol. I. p. 351—353] all this is no more than fancying in other Words, that Brutes cannot think. — The vast Difference between the thinking of Men and Brutes is finely observ'd by Mr. Locke; [B. II. C. 11. § 5—11.] but because the

* See Dr. Clarke's first Letter to a Gentleman at Cambridge concerning Liberty and Necessity.

Thoughts of the one are neither employ'd about the fame sublime Subjects as those of the other, nor in so extensive a manner, therefore to maintain they think not, is little better reasoning than to infer a Creature sees not, unless it has the Eyes of a Hawk or an Eagle.—— Our Author farther observes, that "if the Brute "Soul super-exist the Dissolution of the Body, we "cannot conceive it without the perceptive Capacity," as to external Objects; and that in a great-

"er Degree than when confined to it; but even "here it is inferior to the Human Soul. It is not "perceipient of Harmony in Sound," &c. p. 353.

Notes.

If this last Clause relate to the Super-existence of the Brute Soul, one would be glad to know how this Gentleman came by his Information? If it belong to their present State, it may be Matter of Surprize to some, how those Creatures that can charm Mankind with their own melodious Notes, and who are capable of learning musical Lessons from us, should yet not be perceipient of Harmony in Sound! Again, "if the "[Brute Soul] super-exist, it is easier to conceive "that it must have some kind of Activity, than to "determine what that is." p. 354. Notes. I don't find that this ingenious Gentleman cares to let those Creatures think hereafter, any more than at present. He really seems to be as much afraid of their thinking, tho' he has furnished 'em with immaterial Souls, as ever the learned

* Des Cartes could be, who made nothing of 'em, but so many Systems of Matter.

But it seems, "since Mr. Locke wrote (that is since he told the learned Prelate what must follow from his Lordship's Concession) "others have caught the Hint, and brought in the "Eels in Vinegar, and other Microscopical Ani- "malcula, to expose the Impartiality of Souls." Vol. I. p. 215. Notes.

I hope this Gentleman don't mean to infin- ate that all who have talk'd a little poofly of the Souls of such Animalcula, have either done it with a Design to expose the Impartiality of the Human Soul, or that they have caught the Hint from Mr. Locke*. If we had been favour'd with a more particular Account of these others, it had been more easy to determine how far Mr. Locke might be involved in their Guilt.

The next Article against Mr. Locke relates to his "using the Word Spirit for a thinking Sub- stance, without excluding Materiality out of "it, by the Authority of Virgil and Cicero." But first let us hear what Mr. Locke says upon this very Occasion. [This] "perhaps will be "thought too great a Liberty, and such as de- serves Censure. — I readily own, that Words "should be sparingly ventur'd on in a Senfe "wholly new; and nothing but absolute Ne- "cessity can excuse the BOLDNESS of using any "Term in a Senfe, whereof we can produce no "Example. But in the present Case, I think "I have great Authorities to justify me." [Af- ter having mention'd his Authorities, he thus proceeds:] "Whether they thought right in "this, that is not the Question; but whether

* See the Author of the Proced. p. 175, 174. or the Vindication of Mr. Locke, p. 110, 111.

"they spoke properly, when they called an "active, thinking, subtle Substance, out of "which they excluded only grofs and palpable "Matter, Spiritus. I think that no body will de- "ny, That if any among the Romans can be "allow'd to speak properly, Tully and Virgil "are the two, who may most securely be depend- "ed on for it*.

"But with Submission, replies our Author, I "think no Man ever before defended the PROPRIETY "of an Expression, exclusive of the Truth of it, "in a Philosophical Controversy †." — Ad- "mitting this to be true, What may be the Mif- "chief or Absurdity of it? Why, "If the Accep- "tation of a Word is such as determines the "Question, without farther Argument, as "in this Case; to justify the PROPRIETY of it then, "is to make the common Use of Language de- "cide in Points of Philosophy ‡." What Question may this Gentleman be here talking of? Mr. Locke's Question was only, whether Virgil and Cicero spoke properly? But whether they did, or did not, how will this make common Language decide in Points of Philo- "sophy? The Reason is, I presume, because the PROPRIETY of common Language, and the Truths of Philosophy are always inseparably connected.

However, "If Cicero or Virgil had wrong "Ideas as to the Impartiality of the Soul, tho' "they express'd these wrong Ideas right, that "doth not mend the Matter‖.

Unfortunate Mr. Locke! The whole, he con- "tended for, is admitted; and yet he has loft his

Point notwithstanding! For tho' Cicero and Virgil might with Propriety call That Spirit, which they thought was Juble Matter; yet Mr. Locke cannot with Propriety do the same Thing!

Besides, "The Dispute between the Bishop "and Mr. Locke, was, whether Matter could "think, and not the classical Acceptation of the "Word Spiritus."

Now suppose this Gentleman had said, that the Dispute was, whether God Almighty can, if he please, superadd to Matter a Faculty of Thinking; — I say if our Author had chose to express himself in this Manner, it is submitted, whether such a Representation had not been full as kind and as just, as his own present Account? What we are to infer from his telling us, that the Dispute was not about the classical Acceptation of the Word Spiritus, I know not. He could never design to insinuate, that Mr. Locke was guilty of a needless or impertinent Digression; for the ingenious Author most certainly knew better †.

But be that as it will, Mr. Locke is next corrected about the Mobility of Spirits.

"Having, says our Author, mention'd Mo-""ment as an Affection of real Motion in Mat-""ter, let me be permitted to explain, and re-""strain a little, what Mr. Locke hath advanced "concerning the Motion of all finite Spirits. "In B. II. C. 23. § 17, 18. [Mr. Locke] having "enumerated the primary Ideas peculiar to Bo-""dy and Spirit, as contradistinguishing'd to each "other; he makes Mobility common to them

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* See Mr. Locke's first Letter to the Bishop of Herefor, p. 64, and Hum. Und. B. IV. C. 5. § 6.
† First Letter, p. 64—75.

"both; which he illustrates and defends "Seft. 19—21. He hath before ascribed Mo-""tivity, or a Power of putting Body into Mo-""tion by Thought, to Spirit, as one of the Ideas "peculiar to it; so that by Mobility he seems to "mean a Capacity in Spirit of being moved "by something ab extra, and not the Power of "moving, which is included in Moticity; espe-""cially since he makes Mobility common to both "Matter and Spirit. Which, with Submision, "I think is very wrong, and tends to confound "the Natures of the two Substances he would "distinguish. — A Substance that no way "impedes Motion, but effects it, can with no "Propriety, I think, have the Capacity of Mo-""bility ascribed to it; as it is ascribed to Body, "a Substance which resists Motion, and no way "effects it. — To make Spirit Material, and "so at once both to caufe and hinder Motion, "is a plain Contradiction. — Even in the "Journey betwixt London and Oxford, where "the Man's Spirit is not the Mover, but the "Horset move the Coach, his Body and all "his Spirit doth not impede the Motion, or "make the Draught harder; or is not properly "a Moved. So that, in Effect, Mobility doth "not belong in common both to Body and "Spirit. Nor farther, can Motion belong to "both, but in very different Senses. — It is "true, Spirits change Place, and Motion in this "Sensè is competent to all finite Spirits. But "in this Motion they are not Moved but Movers; "which is the Distinction endeavour'd to be "confounded. Sceptical People conclude from

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* See the Vindication of Mr. Locke, p. 57—60.
this, that whatever moves, is material. But it will not follow, that whatever moves as a Mover, is material, and has the relations of Matter."

This Gentleman has very well observ'd in another Place, that "it is an easy but a fallacious Method, to run away with a Flux of Words: We may draw up, says he, such a specious Show of Probabilities, supported by Prejudices, as shall make a dreadful Appearance taken all together; and yet turn to Nothing at all, when examined and sifted sepately." But let us now consider his Objections. And First, the Mobility ascribed by Mr. Locke to finite Spirits, tends to confound the Natures of the two Substances he would distinguish. After This we are told, that the Distinction between Moved and Movers is endeavour'd to be confounded.

But this, notwithstanding it looks a little sufficiently, cannot be design'd for Mr. Locke. For how is it possible, he should endeavour to confound those things which our Author affixes us, he would distinguish?

However, as to the Supposition itself, that One Spirit may be moved by another, what Confusion need it occasion? or what bad Confusions can arise from it? Why, Sceptical People may conclude from this, that whatever moves, is material. However, now this Gentleman has explain'd the Matter; it is to be hoped they will conclude more wisely for the future. But then, A Spirit is a Substance that no way impedes Motion, but effects it. And yet Nothing is more demonstra-

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ble, than that a Spirit can as well do the One as the Other.

Does not this Gentleman himself tell us,—Spirit, it is true, fops Motion? P. 230. However, This is perform'd "by the same living Efficacy, "by which it begins it, not by a Deadness and "Resistance in itself to be moved.——It hath no "Moment, as Body hath, proceeding from its "Vis inertiae. The Capacity of Mobility can "with no Propriety be ascribed to it, as it is "ascribed to Body. And it doth not in a Journey "[whilst the Body is in the Coach] impede "the Motion, or make the Draught heavier."

Well then, the whole seems to amount to this, —A Spirit can both effect and impede Motion; tho' it never by its Weight, or Deadness, or Sluggishness hinders or retards it.

But now, where has Mr. Locke so much as suggested one Word to the Contrary? Or how will all this prove, that One Spirit can't move Another?

If the Active Force of A be twice superior to that of B, what should hinder A from compelling B to move; tho' never so much against his Inclination? It is admitted, that B makes no Resistance by his Weight or Deadness: He only retards by the Exertion of his Active Power; but when that is overcome by a superior Force, must he not of Necessity give Way to it? So that it is submitted, whether Mobility, even in this Sense, be not competent to finite Spirits?

But now after all, if by the Mobility of Spirits, Mr. Locke should only mean their being moved by themselves, or their changing the Place they were before in, by their own proper Motion; I say,
if he should mean no more than this, the dreadful Appearance may all turn to Nothing. And that he means no more, I appeal to any Reader, who will but turn to the Sections, where Mr. Locke speaks of this Mobility.

"There is no Reason, says he, why it should be thought strange, that I make Mobility belong to Spirits: For having no other Idea of Motion, but Change of Distance with other Beings, that are considered as at rest; and finding that Spirits cannot operate but where they are; I cannot but attribute Change of Place to all finite Spirits. For my Soul being a real Being, as well as my Body, is certainly as capable of changing Distance with any other Being, as Body itself; and so is capable of Motion. One may certainly conceive a Distance, and a Change of Distance between two Spirits; and so conceive their Motion, their Approach, or Removal one from another. The Soul being united to the Body, constantly changes Place all the whole Journey, and I think may be said to be truly all that while in Motion. To consider [the Soul] as going out of the Body, or leaving it, and yet to have no Idea of its Motion, seems to me impossible."

But here it may be objected, If this be Mr. Locke's Meaning, how comes he to ascribe Mobility both to Body and Spirit?

Has Body a Power of moving itself? Or if it has not, how does Mobility belong in common to Both?


Whoever will with Candor consider what Mr. Locke says in the Places just cited, will find that Mobility, as refer'd to Body, can mean no more, than a Power of being moved by some thing else; but not a Power of Self-motion, which it signifies, when ascribed to Spirit.

However, our Author approves of Mr. Locke, because he "allows that the internal, unknown Constitution of Things is something; which I think, says he, is very right, for Qualities cannot depend on Nothing. This is taken Notice of, because sceptical Men begin to suppose they have Mr. Locke's Authority for infinuating that the unknown Constitution of Things is in itself Nothing; and that Substance, or what he calls Substratum, is but empty Sound".

Tho' I am very glad that Mr. Locke is here out of Danger; yet I must beg Leave to take Notice, that there are some other Persons, besides sceptical Men, who look upon Substance, as distinguished from certain Powers or Properties, to be no more than a very needless Word: And who seem to think they have, in some Measure, Mr. Locke's Authority with them. However suppose they are mistaken as to both; as with regard to the latter, I presume it will be shewn; yet since neither of these Gentlemen, I believe, ever fell under the Suspicion of Scepticism, this discovers, with how much Caution, Terms of an odious Sound should be used.

he had before call'd the Being of a Thing, whereby it is, what it is; he immediately after exprest in these Words, — The real, internal, but generally in Substances, unknown Constitution of Things.

But now, notwithstanding Mr. Locke has so clearly explain'd what he means by the Being of any Thing; yet our Author can by no means approve of the Word.

"Mr. Locke, says he, rather takes Essence "for the Being of any thing; tho' we usually "say, such a Property is of the Nature or Es-"tence of a thing, taking either Word indifferently; but never that it is of the Being of it, "which rather imports its Existence." Again, "Being, I think, is equivocal, and signifies the "internal, unknown Constitution of Things, less "properly, at least, less commonly, than any "other thing. The Being of a thing is oftentimes "taken in Opposition to the not-being of it; and "then it is the same as the Existence of it. We "say such a Thing is not in being. — But "granting that Essence, Being, and the internal "unknown Constitution of Substances are pro-"perly the same Thing; we must resolve the "Essence of things into Idea, and make it the "same with their Nature.""

However this Concession is afterwards revoked: This Gentleman refutes the Debate again after a short Intermission, and attacks Mr. Locke afresh from a Title Page of the late learn'd Dr. Clarke.

* B. III. C. 3. § 15. † Vol. I. P. 322--324, and Notes.
"But then, says our Author, as to his Acceptation of the Word Essence; as it seems not just in itself; so I think, it is inconvenient in Philosophy. The Word Being, by which he explains Essence, rather imports the actual Existence of a Thing, than its internal unknown Constitution, as hath been observed. Thus Dr. Clarke calls his Excellent Book, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God; that is, a Demonstration that there really exists a God, and what his Attributes are. It would have sounded strangely to have said, a Demonstration of the Essence, or internal unknown Constitution," &c. *

This extraordinary Criticism may be left, I presume, in its full Force, without any Remark. But since the learned Dr. Clarke is brought in upon this Occasion, I beg leave just to observe, what he says of the Word in Controversy. — Essence according to him, may be taken either for the inmost Substance of Things, or for their Essential Properties. This last he calls the proper metaphysical Sense of the Word. In which Sense, the Attributes of God constitute his Essence; and Solidity or Impenetrability is the Essence of Matter. "He does indeed himself use that Word for Substance; and which he likewise calls the inmost Substance of Things, and the inmost Nature of such Substance †."

Whether Essence, in this Acceptation, be not exactly the same with Mr. Locke's real Essence, is submitted to the Reader's Judgment.

*Vol. I. P. 329. † See the Preface to the second Volume of his Boyle's Lectures; 7th Edit. p. 132, 133.

However, since our Author maintains, that "If there is any such thing as Qualities or Properties, there must be some farther Thing, to which they belong: since a Quality could not subsist by itself, or without a Subject. And that this other Thing — must be call'd Subject, Support, Substance, or some such Name, let Men ridicule as much as they please: For though we know not what the Substratum, or Support of Properties is, nor have any particular Idea of it; yet we know that it is, unless Properties could subsist by themselves:"

I say forasmuch as this is maintain'd, why should a Demonstration of the Divine Essence be thought by him to sound strangely? For is it possible, there could be a Demonstration of the Divine Attributes, which would not at the same time be a Demonstration of that Real Essence, that inmost unknown Nature of the Divine Substantial, from whence those Attributes flow, and on which they depend? And if by Essence we only understand Modes or Properties, what is then a Demonstration of the Divine Essence, but merely a Demonstration of the Divine Attributes?

But it is farther objected, "If Substances have unknown Essences, and other things have not; it will either follow, that there are two different Species of Essences; or that other things, besides Substances, have no Essence at all †."

And what if we should suppose there are two different Species of Essences, would any Inconvenience arise from hence to Philosophy? On the contrary,
contrary, suppose Mr. Locke has shewn that there
"are unknown Essences belonging to Substance,
"and that the real unknown Essence, on which
"the discoverable Properties of Substance de-
"pend, is a very different Thing from those
"Properties, which he calls the Nominal Es-
"sence; tho' this Nominal Essence be often mis-
taken for the other: Suppose he has shewn
"Men the Difference between them; has taught
"us how to distinguish the one from the other,
"and thus has clear'd up what was dark and
"confused before. Suppose he has proved, that
"things are not forted by Men according to
"their real unknown Essence; but are put into
"different Classes, according to the Conceptions
"of Mens Minds: that is, according to that
"Abstract Idea, which Men by Observation
"have framed of the several Properties and
"Powers of Substances, and which Collection
"contain'd in such Idea, Mr. Locke calls the
"Nominal Essence." If Mr. Locke has done all
this, muft it not be own'd that he has done real
Service to Mankind; and that the learned World
are greatly obliged to him? Some indeed may
think fo: but our Author seems of a very
different Opinion.

"He observes that Mr. Locke hath been
"thrown upon the Distinction of real and No-
minal Essences; which, says this Gentleman,
"though it hath obtained, since he wrote his
"Book, yet I humbly beg leave to say, I do
"not see any Service it hath done to Philo-
fifth Edition of the Essay, p. 354. 357. in the Notes.}

But pray, did not this Gentleman see Caufe
of commending Mr. Locke*, for allowing the
internal, unknown Constitution of Things to be
something? And does he not there make a Di-

* See above. † Vol I. p. 323 Notes. 


† Vol I. p. 323 Notes.


† Vol. I. p. 323 Notes.
Power of turning Virtue into Vice, and Vice into Virtue; but of turning Circles into Squares, and Squares into Circles?

But in what Part of his Works has Mr. Locke endanger'd the first and immutable Natures of these Things? Are the particular Places cited, which are to support this Charge? Indeed they are not. They are left entirely to the Reader's Sagacity, to find out. The late learn'd Le Clerc somewhere calls such an Omission, a bad Custom.

But with Submission to that great Critic, there may be good Reasons for it. To such Readers, as are already acquainted with those Passages, such Quotations would be superfluous. To those of an implicit Faith, they would be to little Purpose. And as to the candid and impartial Enquirer, tho' they might save him some Trouble, they might however do a Writer much Mischief. How far this may be the present Cafe, will be worth while to examine.

Mr. Locke then observes, that "The Mind often exercises an Active Power in making those several Combinations of Ideas, which he calls mixed Modes."

"Who can doubt, says he, but the Ideas of Sacrilege or Adultery might be framed in the Mind of Men, and have Names given them; and so these Species of mixed Modes be constituted, before either of them was ever committed; and might be as well discovered of, and reasoned about, and as certain Truths discovered of them, whilst yet they had no Being but in the Understanding, as well as now, that they have but too frequently a real Existence? whereby it is plain, how much the Sorts of mixed Modes are the Creatures of the Understanding, where they have a Being as subervient to all the Ends of real Truth and Knowledge, as when they really exist."

But now, what is here contrary to the immutable Nature of Things? How many Ideas would a Man find in that Complex Idea, Sacrilege, if he was to give himself the Trouble of taking the Composition to Pieces? But how came they together? Did they grow up like a Plant? Or is not the whole Combination the Work of the Mind? And is not this equally true, whether a Man framed this Idea, before the Crime was committed, or afterwards? And may not the same clear and certain Truths be affirmed of it?

Again, Mr. Locke having said that "abstract, complex Ideas, with Names to them, are Essence of the Sorts or Species of Things; and that these Essences are supposed to remain steadily the same, whatever Mutations the particular Substances are liable to, which cannot be true of the real Constitutions of Things, which begin and perish with them; he observes, that by this means the Essence of a Species rests safe and entire, without the Existence of so much as one Individual of that kind. For were there now, says he, no Circle existing any where in the World (as perhaps, that Figure exists not anywhere exactly marked out) yet the Idea annexed to that Name, would not cease to be what it is; nor cease to be as a Pattern, to determine which of the particular Figures we meet with, have, or

* B. III. C. 5. § 5. "have
have not a Right to the Name Circle; and "so to shew, which of them, by having that "Essence, was of that Species." Whence now can arise any Danger to this Figure, or any of its Properties, from what Mr. Locke has said? And if he has not dealt worse by any other mathematical Idea, it is submitted to the Mathematicians, what just Cause of Complaint Mr. Locke has given? Besides, does not this Gentleman himself maintain, that Things which have only an Ideal Existed have their Essence or radical Properties? "The chief and radical Property, "says he, is the Essence of any thing in Idea, "though the Thing should not exist, nor have "any internal, unknown Constitution." But tho' its Constitution be not unknown, yet if there be not a Foundation in the very Nature of that Thing for such a Property, what can it be the radical Property of; from whence does it proceed; or on what does it depend? But to return to Mr. Locke: It may be farther objected, that he not only affirms "those Ideas, which he "calls mixed Modes, such as Sacrilege, Parricide, "and the like, to be Creatures of the Under- "standing, but he maintains that the Mind pro- "ceeds very arbitrarily in framing such Ideas." He really does so; but still, I hope, there is no manner of Danger.

**The Mind indeed in making this Sort of "Ideas," is not confined, as in the Case of simple "Ideas, where it has no Power to make any "One: Nor is it here obliged to examine them "by the real Existence of Things, as it does "in the complex Ideas of Substances; but mak-

* B. III. C. 3. § 19. See also § 17.
‡ B. III. C. 5. § 1—6.


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"ing Use of what Ideas it had before, it choose "a certain Number, gives them Connexion, and "ties them together by a Name." This seems to be all the Disposing Power Mr. Locke has given the Mind in framing this sort of Ideas. And as a farther Check upon this Power, he has enter'd a Caveat, that "they should not be made "at Random, or jumbled together without any "Reason at all: But that they should be always "suiated to the End, for which abstract Ideas are "made; and that is for the Convenience of "Communication, which is the chief End of "Language †." So that if the Mind keeps up to the Rules, we shall be safe enough, nor- withstanding all her Power: If she does not, Mr. Locke can hardly, in Reason, be blamed for it.

However, it may still be urged, that all this will signify nothing; for if, according to Mr. Locke's Definition, all our moral and mathematical Ideas have only a nominal Essence; the Mind may compound her Ideas as she pleases; but Things of a fixed and immutable Nature, will have no real Essence at all: And if this Supposition be not of bad Consequence both in Philosophy and Practice, nothing can. — Let it be so. However, before Sentence is past, let us, according to the equitable Rule in Law, bear the other Side.

Does not Mr. Locke maintain, that "the "real and nominal Essence of Modes (of mathe- "matical Ideas, for instance) are always the same? "That a Figure including a Space between three "Lines, is the real as well as nominal Essence

* B. III. C. 5. § 2, 3, 4.
† §7.

"of
of a Triangle; it being not only the abstract Idea, to which the general Name is annexed, but the very Essentia, or Being of the Thing itself; that Foundation, from which all its Properties flow, and to which they are all inseparably annexed*. What is here call'd the very Essentia, or Being, Mr. Locke elsewhere calls the formal Constitution, or Essence of a Triangle. And this he observes lies open to our Sense; which the formal Constitution [or real Essence] of a Substance does not †.

As to our moral Ideas; does he not maintain, that "the true and only Measure of Virtue, is the "Rule preferred by God"? that Morality is capable of Demonstration; and that the precise real "Essence of the Things moral Words stand for, "may be perfectly known**? That the Measures of Right and Wrong may be made out by "necessary Consequences, as incontestable as those "in Mathematicks‖? And that the Ideas that "Ethicks are conversant about, are all real "Essences? Does not Mr. Locke, I say, maintain all this? Beyond the least Controversy, he most evidently does. What Injury has he then done to any of our moral or mathematical Ideas? Or how can it be affirm'd, that All of them, according to his Definition, have only nominal Essences? Good-nature inclines one to be in pain for the Man, who has ventured to affirm it.

But proceed we now to fresh Articles of Indictment.

"I cannot help being concern'd, says our "Author, to find some great and learned Men

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"taking the wrong Side of ambiguous Appearances, "and falling in with the sceptical Notions of "the World, by infatuating that the Soul owes "the Perfection of rational Thinking to the Body; "and this in order to maintain another Hypoth-
"esis of no very great Consequence in itself, "tho' it were true in this State of Union; viz. "that the Soul thinks not always; which yet is "not easily to be proved, even though the "Activity of Spirit be clog'd with dead Matter, "and is certainly false in a State of Separation."

The Passage here refer'd to in Mr. Locke, is as follows:—

"'Tis true, we have sometimes Instances of "Perception, whilst we are asleep, and retain "the Memory of those Thoughts: But how ex-
"travagant and incoherent for the most part "they are; how little conformable to the Per-
"fection and Order of a rational Being, those "who are acquainted with Dreams, need not "be told. This I would willingly be satisfied "in, whether the Soul, when it thinks thus a-
"part, and as it were, separate from the Body, "acts less rationally, than when conjointly with it, "or no. If its separate Thoughts be less ratio-
"nal, then these Men must say, that the Soul "owes the Perfection of rational Thinking to "the Body: If it does not, 'tis a Wonder that "our Dreams should be, for the most part, so "frivolous and irrational; and that the Soul "should retain none of its more rational Solilo-
"quies and Meditations.†" Upon this, our "Author thus expresses himself:


I 2 "We
"We shall afterward see, who in this Place ascribes the Perfection of rational Thinking to the Body; however here is a broad Hint for material Souls. What is for the most part only, is not always: That Side ought to have been considered also. I hope it will appear, that the most incoherent of our Dreams is an Appearance far above Matter, or any Power Matter can be endowed with; and that, upon a narrow Examination, the Actions properly of the Soul, in dreaming, will not be found so irrational, as is here presumed, and generally conceived."

As this Gentleman here pretty broadly intimates, who is to be charged with ascribing the Perfection of rational Thinking to the Body; so in other Places, perhaps for the better illustrating Mr. Locke’s Opinion, we read this Charge with a little Variation. Thus in one Place,—

"If the Soul were indebted to Matter for the Perfection of rational Thinking, &c. †.

In another, —— “It is very inaccurate, to ascribe all the wild Representations, that are involuntarily forced upon the Soul, to the Soul itself, and then insinuate that it owes the Perfection of rational Thinking to Matter. In a third, —— “We are injurious in degrading the Nature of our Souls all manner of Ways. We would have the Souls material: If it be not, yet we would ascribe the Perfection of rational Thinking to Matter."

And elsewhere having told us that Mr. Locke’s Representation of the Appearance of Sleep and Dreaming was unjust and inaccurate, he thus proceeds: —— “This Phenomenon of Sleep and Dreaming therefore, which hath been made use of to exalt the Nature of Matter, and depress the Perfection of the Soul, rightly considered, shews the very contrary."

How exalted a Notion Mr. Locke had of the Nature of Matter; and how inclined he was to depress the Perfection of the Soul, have been fet, I presume, in a very clear and impartial Light. But now, tho’ Mr. Locke in the Section just refer’d to, be only considering what must be allow’d by those, who grant the separate Thoughts of the Soul to be less rational; yet let us suppose he was of Opinion, that a Man generally thinks more rationally awake than asleep: And that a right Disposition of the Body was necessary, in this present State, to the Perfection of rational Thinking. If this be suppose’d; what can, by the common Rules of reasoning (not to mention Candor or Humanity) be infer’d from hence? And that this is the whole, which Mr. Locke, with any Shadow of Reason, can be charg’d with, I appeal to every Man, who is able to read him without Passion or Prejudice. The ingenious Author, indeed, has in this Section found a broad Hint for material Souls. Perhaps some Readers would as soon have found a broad Hint for the Longitude. But so dangerous was it for Mr. Locke to affirm, that our sleeping Thoughts are, for the most part, extravagant: and our Dreams, for the most part, frivolous and irrational! I should be glad to know, whether this Gentleman would esteem it a Complement, to suppose his learned Piece was the Production of


...
his sleeping Thoughts? and if he would not; what might be the Reason?

But then it is observed, that "what is for the most part only, is not always: And that this Side ought to have been considered also." Whether Mr. Locke did not think his Subject required a more elaborate Differtation upon Dreaming; or whether he was unable or unwilling to engage in such a Task; yet it may charitably be hoped, there was no malicious Design in that Omission. And besides, since he has by this means given our learned Objector a very fair Opportunity of amply supplying* his Defects; there seems the les Reason for this Gentleman to be so greatly displeas'd with him. But now, notwithstanding our Author has here very plainly intimated, that Mr. Locke is the Man, who has offered the Perfection of rational Thinking to the Body; yet elsewhere he speaks a little doubtfully; as for Instance,

"Mr. Locke seems to favour the Opinion of those, who ascribe the Perfection of rational Thinking to the Matter of the Body;" Or, as he afterwards expresses it, — to the "right Disposition of that Matter." However, whether Mr. Locke seems only to favour such an Opinion, as it is mention'd in one Place; or whether Mr. Locke makes it appear to be his own Opinion, as this Gentleman thinks, in another; it may possibly be some Confusion to Mr. Locke's Friends, to understand, that this Opinion is capable of "one Meaning, that is consistent enough with the Immateriality and rational Nature of the Soul." And that "it is no Reproach


upon the rational Soul to say, that the Perfection of rational Thinking depends on the Matter of the Body, as an impeding or obftrumenting Cause." I say, perhaps, here Mr. Locke's Friends may take Courage, and fancy that all is safe enough. But alas! they are utterly mistaken; and their Hopes vanish the very Instant they are conceive'd! For our Author thus immediately adds,

"But that the Perfection of rational Thinking should depend upon the Matter of the Body, as a promoting or effecting Cause (which is indeed the true Meaning intended in the Objection) is a direct Contradiction." This is that other Meaning, which he had before told us, was artfully shuffled in, under Colour of the former.

'Tis true indeed, that in this last Place, none are mention'd, but the modern Sceptic: And in the former, neither Sceptic, nor any other Person. However, since the Opinion itself is charged upon Mr. Locke; since he is taxed with giving, by this very means, a broad Hint for material Souls; and since no Exception is made in relation to him; it is therefore humbly enquired, whether Mr. Locke is to be understood as a Party concern'd with the modern Sceptic, in artfully shuffling in this contradictory Meaning? If he be not; — Whether our Author has not left him (I hope altogether undesignedly) very much expos'd to the undeserved Censure of certain Readers? But if Mr. Locke is to be charg'd either with artfully shuffling in, or at least with holding this direct Contradiction; then it is sub-

mitted, whether our Author can assign any better Reasons for this Compliment upon Mr. Locke, than merely the two following:—First, it is a direct Contradiction, and therefore the more likely to be Mr. Locke's Meaning. And secondly, there could not otherwise have been a broad Hint for material Souls. But now granting that it is the modern Sceptic only, who has fustified with regard to the Meaning of that Proposition; yet what will become of Mr. Locke, if he has been guilty of fustifying over the Oodiousness of an Infusion upon Others? But first let us view the Foundation of this Charge.

"This, says Mr. Locke, I would willingly be satisfied in, whether the Soul, when it thinks thus apart, and as it were, separate from the Body, acts less rationally, than when conjointly with it, or no. If its separate Thoughts be less rational, then these Men must say, that the Soul owes the Perfection of rational Thinking to the Body: If it does not, 'tis a Wonder that our Dreams should be, for the most part, so frivolous and irrational; and that the Soul should retain none of its more rational Soliloquies and Meditations."

Our Author having quoted thus much out of Mr. Locke, excepting the last Paragraph, he raises the following Observations:—"Here this Absurdity is first made a Consequence of what these Men say; and immediately it is furtmized, that the Quality of our Dreams furew this Absurdity to be Fact. This is really a strange Way of proceeding, to fustify over the Oodiousness of an Infusion upon Others; v. B. II. C. 1. § 16.

"and in cafe they should disown it, and that Circumstance from which he would infer it, (viz. that the Soul thinks without being conscious of it) to endeavour to prove it, by an Appearance, which he has ready at hand."

In answer to this, I desire it may be observ'd, that Mr. Locke is there manifestly confidering the Nature of this Supposition, viz. that the Soul may think separately and apart from the Body. "Perhaps, says Mr. Locke, it will be said, "—that in the Thinking of the Soul, which is not perceived in a sleeping Man, there the Soul thinks apart," &c. "Upon this Hypothetical, Mr. Locke tells us, the Thoughts of a sleeping Man ought to be most rational."

However he proceeds to enquire in the following Section, whether this will be admitted, or not. If it be not; or, in Mr. Locke's Words, if the Soul's separate Thoughts be less rational, then, says he, it must be allowed by those (who maintain that Supposition) that the Soul owes the Perfection of rational Thinking to the Body. But if on the other hand, it should be answer'd, that these separate Thoughts are more rational, and that therefore such Perfection is not owing to the Body, Mr. Locke replies, that if these separate Thoughts are more rational, 'tis a Wonder, the Soul retains none of them; and that our Dreams should generally be so frivolous and irrational. —It is submitted, whether this be not really the Cafe, and whether Mr. Locke's Reasoning be not levell'd at an Hypothetical, which makes the Soul to think by itself, and in which the sleeping Man partakes.

* Vol. II. p. 186, 187. " B. II. C. 1. § 15. † See the Title to that Section; tho' I think that Title is misplaced, and belongs to Sect. 16.
not. Mr. Locke is evidently considering what Difficulties attend that Hypothesis; and observes that some Consequences must follow from it, which either the Espousters of it would not care to admit, or which would not readily be admitted by others. And is anything more usual or more innocent, than to argue upon a Supposition of what might possibly be offered; or to consider what might be propounded either for, or against an Hypothesis?

But what a frightful Business has this Gentleman made of it? Here is an Absurdity surmised to be False; a strange Way of proceeding! the Odiousness of an Insinuation flouffled over upon others; and in case they should disown it, Mr. Locke would infer it from that very Circumstance, which he all along opposes; viz. that the Soul thinks without being conscious of it *. This Circumstance however was to prove, that the Soul owes the Perfection of rational Thinking to the Body! No one, I believe, besides Mr. Locke, could have thought of such a Proof! But what if these Men had deny'd both Circumstance and Inference? why, as to the latter, he was fill provided for them; he had an Appearance ready at hand, in order to prove it. Whether he had any thing at hand, to prove the former, viz. that Circumstance, our Author says not. However thus far Mr. Locke's black Designs and Intentions are unravell'd! And moreover, "these Men deny that the Soul thinks less or more rationally, without being conscious of it, and therefore any Consequence of such a Position †."

One would be glad to know, by what means, our Author came here so well acquainted with these Men, since, two or three hundred Pages before, he seems to know nothing at all of them. "It were, says he, to be wished [Mr. Locke] had told us, what Author it is that afferts, that the Soul in a sleeping Man thinks, without being conscious of it." So that in one Place, he is utterly at a Los to determine whom Mr. Locke could mean, and in another, he affurts us,—they deny any such Thing. Perhaps some may wonder, that we were not directed to those particular Authors, who deny what Mr. Locke infinicates of them, since here was a fine Opportunity offered, of convicting that Gentleman of flouffing over his Insinuations upon Others. But possibly our Author was a little tender; and did not care to prefs Matters too far. He does indeed immediately after, demand with an Air of Triumph, ""But who is it here that appeals to the Frivolousness and Irrationality of our Dreams to shew, that the Soul owes the Perfection of rational Thinking to the Body?"

But what if Mr. Locke should appeal to these, only to shew the Precariousness of an Hypothesis, which separates the sleeping Man from the thinking Soul? Or granting he appeals to these, to shew that a right Disposition of the Body is necessary, during its present Union with the Soul, to the Perfection of rational Thinking;—Pray what is there in all this, that deserves so much severe Treatment? Again, "Here, "[Mr. Locke] says our Author, supposes that the Soul itself produces all it hears and see's in "Sleep, that it thinks apart and separately at "that time, and excerts the utmost Perfection it

* B. II. C. 1. § 11. See also § 10, 12, 19. † Vol. II. p. 187.
"is capable of, when destitute of the Help of the Body. How unjust and inaccurate a Representation of the Appearance is this?"

If the Reader should find upon Enquiry, that the Soul thinking apart and separately, is the very Supposition, which Mr. Locke himself opposes†; he may possibly be of Opinion, that the Terms unjust and inaccurate, are here introduced a little unluckily.

Indeed this Gentleman is there upon a very favourite Hypothesis, which is to account for the Nature of our Dreams; and therefore if he appears more out of Temper with what comes in his Way, than he might otherwise do, it is the more excusable. Authors, in such Circumstances, are generally impatient of Contradiction. And hence, I presume, it happen'd, that the immortal Cicero is pretty sharply corrected by him. A short Digression in behalf of that great Man, I believe the learned Reader will very easily excuse.

"It is known, says our Author, that Cicero was professedly an Academic, and that he wrote designedly in his Treatise de Divinatione, against this very Conclusion which I maintain, and endeavour'd to account for the Appearance of Dreaming, the same way, as is done here in the Objection." After this he proceeds to the Dream of Cicero, as it is related by his Brother Quintus, who manages the opposite Side of the Question; and who, at the Conclusion, observes that Cicero had himself own'd, that nothing could be more Divine than that Dream.‡

"But what does Cicero answer, says our Author to


"this particular Instance?" Mibi (says he) Temporis illius multum in Anima Marius verfabatur, recordantur, quam ille gravem suam Caesum magno Anima, quam confabili subflet. Hanc credo Caesam de illo fiamiandi subisse." Upon which our Author thus expostulates, — "What a poor unsatisfying Shift is this! Had he not Camillus and Scipio Africanus also in his Mind? why not have dreamed of thefe?" And it is afterwards left to be determined by others, how far Cicero's Speech of Democritus, is applicable to Cicero himself, — Nec cognovi quemquam qui majori Autoritate nibil dicere. But now after all, it is not impossible, but that great Philosopher might have the fame Thoughts of his Dream, even when he assign'd this Reason of it to Quintus, which he really had at the Time he mention'd it in a private Conversation.

"If we seek for Cicero's true Sentiments (says a very learned Critic) it must not be in his Disputes against others, where he had Licence to lay any thing for Opposition Sake: But in the Books where he dogmatizes himself; where allowing for the Word Probable, you have all the Spirit and Marrow of the Platonic, Peripatetic, and Stoic Systems; I mean his Books De Officis, Tusculanae, De Amicitia, De Senectute, De Legibus; in which, and in the Remains of others now lost, he declares for the Being and Providence of God, for the Immortality of the Soul, for every Point that approaches to Christianity.+++"


This
This very learned Writer had before observ'd, "that there's a vast Difference in the Manner of "Dispute, that's exhibited in the Tusculanae, "from what appears in Academicis, De Finibus, "De Naturâ Deorum, and De Divinatâone. In "the latter no Man concedes; in the Tusculana, "no Man refits." So that notwithstanding Cicerón might attribute his Dream to quite another Cause, when it happen'd, than does now in his "Academical Philosophy, as our Author conjectures †; yet if the "Academic Objections be the "most unlikely Place where to find his real "Sentiments, and if Cicerón there only uses the "Privilege of an Academic, it speaks not "what he really believ'd, but what serv'd the "present Turn ‡; it may be submitted, whether the ingenious Author has not condemn'd, without sufficient Cause, one of the greatest "Men of all Antiquity! He afterwards takes notice, that it has been long since observ'd of this "great Man, that his "Academical Writings "are at Variance with his other Works, and "that he may be confus'd out of himself, and in "his own Words." But if our Author had recollected how this happen'd, and had made use of that excellent Critic's Observations for finding out Cicerón's real Sentiments, he might perhaps have spare'd his Remarks with regard to the "Contradiction, between what is advanced in the second Book De Legibus, and in the Treatie De Divinatâone, †; as well as omitted his Censures on a Part of the fourth Book of the "Academical Questions ‡. In short, if he had consider'd Cicerón in this View, I presume he would have found him, not only a Great, but a "Conscientious Writer; and that there was very little Reason to be so angry with him. — Indeed in the Place last mention'd, our Author suggests that Cicerón is guilty of a "Contradiction, even admitting the famous "Academical Principle; for Cicerón having said, that "Strato had reliev'd "him from much Terror, when he taught that "God neither made, nor took care of the "World," the ingenious Author thus remarks, —It is "true, a little after [Cicerón] endeavour'd to bring "himself off, by the great "Academical Principle, "saying, "he neither affect'd to Strato, who "deny'd a God, nor to Lucullus, who affect'd one. "But this seems somewhat contradictory to his "being reliev'd of his Fears." Just as contradictory, as that should sile with Strato, in Opposition to Lucullus, and then declare that he affect'd to neither: But is it to be wonder'd at, that whilst he seems to side with Strato, he should affix some Reason, or other for it? But tho' whilst he is taking the Part of Strato, he tells us that Strato had reliev'd him from much Terror; yet sure this could not prevent him the Liberty of an Academic; that is of differing afterwards both from Strato and Lucullus. Had he "said indeed, that he met with this "Relief from the Former, even whilst he "differed from him; this had been an Absurdity, which no "Academical Principle could have excus'd: Whereas occasionally to speak both for and against every Thing, and every "Philosopher, was the Privilege of that Section, and what may easily be accounted for,

* Ibid. p. 73. † Vol. II. p. 56. ‡ The Remarks &c. p. 79, 80. † Vol. II. p. 77, 78. ‡ P. 77. ** P. 74, 75.
upon that Principle, without making any hard Reflections upon such a Writer as Cicero.

But to return to Mr. Locke:— Our Author in the following Instance, seems to introduce that Gentleman, merely to pay him a Civility.—

"It is true, says he, Voyages and Books of Travels tell us of several Nations, in different Parts of the World, who have no Sort of Religion, no Name, nor Notion of any super-

"Being: But if this be so, as Mr. Locke would have us believe, it seems the Inhabitants of these Countries never dream."— With Submission to this learn'd Writer, one would rather think they were always in a Dream. However he gives the following Reason for this Opinion,—

"Since we can scarce conceive that this single "Phenomenon should not be enough to kindle "up the Notion of some Religion or other in "the Minds of Men, though we could suppose "all Religion once entirely lost in the World."

——— If Men were to lose all Religion, with their Eyes open; it is greatly to be feared, they would hardly recover it, when their Eyes were shut.——— "However, the Matter of Fact it-"self begins now to appear false; and these "Monsters gradually evaporish, as the Countries "they were said to be in, are more reformed to, "and become better known. Nature seems to "be every where of a Piece with herself."

What a Pleasure must every good Man receive, when he reflects that there are no longer any, but who have felt after, and found out God; none, but who from the visible Works of Creation and Providence, have seen and understood the eternal

* Vol. II. p. 116. in the Notes. Power

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Power and Godhead! Nature seems to be every where of a Piece with herself! If we ask, whether Nature has always been thus? our Author does not acquaint us: Or if we enquire, how long? he is likewise silent. If any should be so impertinent as to demand his Vouchers; it may be answer'd, that since there are only Mr. Locke's Vouchers on the other side, such as Publick Ministers; Private Gentlemen; those very Mifionaries of China, who are the great Encounters of the Chinese; and one Divine, who was living when Mr. Locke wrote †; I say it may be answer'd, that since Mr. Locke has no other Vouchers, there was no necessity for our Author to produce any, in order to confront their Authority. It was abundantly sufficient to acquaint the Reader, that Mr. Locke would have us believe there were such Monsters; and that the Matter of Fact now appears to be false. It is true, the learned Bishop of Worcester, in his Reply to Mr. Locke, does himself acknowledge, that "by the best "Accounts both of the Cafres of Soldania, and "the Caigua of Paraguay, They are a People "so frangely bereft of common Sense, that "they can hardly be reckon'd among Man- "kind.*" However, by our Author's Report it appears that his Lordship's best Accounts, were in Truth and Reality but very bad ones.

But, suppose they were so, was it criminal in that learned Prelate, to believe the false Accounts of some Travellers? Most certainly it was not. This could be a Crime in none but Mr. Locke only.

† Hum. Und. B. I. C. 4. § 8. Or the fifth Edition of the Es-

fay, p. 38—40. * His Lordship's Answer to Mr. Locke's first Letter, p. 90.
"The last Objection, says our Author, I shall mention, is an Infiniation, that our Dreams are no more than the Thoughts and Business of the Day recurring: Or which it may be suppos'd the Soul itself some Way or other returns, without the Interposition of such a Cause* as is here assign'd. Mr. Locke says, 'The Dreams of sleeping Men are, as I take it, all made up of the waking Man's Ideas, though for the most Part oddly put together.'" "Lucretius says only ere and plerumque."

And can this Gentleman then get leave of himself to imagine, that Mr. Locke really suppos'd, that all the Dreams of Lawyers related to pleading of Causes; all the Dreams of Generals were made up of Battles; and that Mariners dreamt only of Storms and Tempests? If he did not imagine this, why is Mr. Locke here oppos'd to Lucretius? And the ere and plerumque of the one, set in Opposition to all the Dreams of the other? Or why is the Particle all put in Italics, to render it the more remarkable? But if this be his Meaning, as it seems pretty plain; I would define any Man who is not in a Dream himself, only to examine the Paffage refer'd to; and he will easily determine whether Mr. Locke and Lu-

* The learned Writer here means the Agency of other Spirits. See his Essay on Dreaming.
† Hum. Und. B. II. C 1 § 17.
‡ Ex quois quisque fieri studio devincentius addiderit,——
In Somnis eadem plerumque cidenem obire;
Causticis Caustis agere, & composere Leges,
Inductores fugare, ac Prolis obire;
Nautae contra trium cum Venti cernere bellum,
Non agere loc autem, &c.

L. IV. from Ver. 959 to 982
See our Author Vol. II. p. 197, 198.
Even what he mentions of Lucullus*, who
dreamt of one Autolycus, will not do. For tho’
Lucullus had never heard of that particular Name
before; was it not however as much an Idea of Sen-
sation, as Lucullus itself? It was indeed a strange
and new Sound to Lucullus, but does not Mr. Locke
cy, that our Ideas in Sleep (whether of Sound,
or Colour, or Figure, it matters not) are for the
most part oddly put together? But still, since the
Name and History of Autolycus were unknown
to Lucullus, when he dreamt of him, our Au-
thor demands, “can it be said, that any of his
‘waking Thoughts had suggested [these Things]
to him”?

Pray, where does Mr. Locke suggest any Thing
like it? —— “We are placed, says our Author
himself, in Circumstances every Night, and
see Things which for the Newness and Strange-
ness of them, we are surprized how they could
enter our Fancy.” That is, I presume, our
Ideas are put into a new and strange Dress. But
how much may this differ from our Ideas being
oddly put together? However, “This Observation
of Mr. Locke’s it seems, is so far from being
exact, that if he had made just the contrary
Observation, it would have been equally true:
which is remarkable enough in a Man of his
Accuracy and Judgment.”

It is undoubtedly remarkable enough, that a
Man of such Accuracy and Judgment, should be
for ever blundering in so egregious a Manner!

But again, “How could the Soul, upon Mr.
Locke’s own Principles, form itself in Sleep a
Scene of our waking Actions, and Thoughts,

* Ibid. p. 200. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid. § Ibid.

and

“...and the Man be still ignorant of it, without
being two distinct Persons*?”

This surely can never be design’d for Mr. Locke:
Since it is Word for Word, one of his
Objections against the Soul’s thinking apart, with-
out the Privy or Knowledge of the sleeping Man.
Mr. Locke speaking of that Hypothesis, he thus
expresses himself, —— “Not to mention again
the Absurdity of two distinct Persons, which
follows from this Supposition, &c.†.”

But yet if this Passage be not design’d as an
Argument against Mr. Locke, it will be exceed-
ingly difficult so much as to guess, whom it can
belong to. For it is preceded by three or four
Pages, which contain Objections against Mr.
Locke only; without the least Notice taken of
any other Antagonist. And if it is really le-
vell’d at him, the Question will be, whether
our Author is not a little unfortunate in attacking
Mr. Locke, upon what he calls Mr. Locke’s
own Principles?

But now, before we proceed to the other Point
in Controversy, that is, whether the Soul always
thinks, or not; it may not be amiss, first, to con-
sider, what Mr. Locke means by Thinking.

“Perception,” says Mr. Locke, is by some cal-
led Thinking in general. Though Thinking in
the Propriety of the English Tongue, signifies
that Sort of Operation of the Mind about its
Ideas, wherein the Mind is Active; where it with
some Degree of voluntary Attention, considers
any thing: For in bare, naked Perception,
the Mind is, for the most part, only passive;
and what it perceives, it cannot avoid perceiv-

* Vol. II. p 201. † B II. C. 1. § 15. See also § 11, 12, 19
“The Reason, says our Author, why it is improper to refer to Experience in this Case, will appear immediately. And in the mean while, he thus animadverts on some other Parts of this Section. —— "With Submission to so great a Name, there is this material Difference, Motion is no more the Action of Matter than Rest is; it is equally inactive in both, as hath been shewn." With Submission to this learned Objector, Mr. Locke has himself shewn long ago, that the Motion of Body is rather a Passion than an Action in it; and that there never had been any Motion, without a more Powerful Being than Matter. And elsewhere he affirms, that "two Bodies, placed by one another at Rest, will never afford us the Idea of a Power in the one "to move the other, but by a borrowed Motion." So that now we know Mr. Locke's Meaning, I hope the Motion of the Body may be understood in a very inoffensive and Philosophical Sense. But still it is observed, that Matter stands in need of an external Cause to "put it into Motion, or bring it to Rest again; "but the Soul doth not want an external Mover to let it a Thinking. And does not Mr. Locke, every where maintain the same Thing? Or when he affirms "that we find in ourselves a "Power to begin or forbear; continue or end "several Actions of our Minds, and Motions "of our Bodies, barely by a Thought. When he makes "Thinking and Motivity to be

to all, as well as the Body frequently ceases to be acted upon.

However, "It will not follow, says our Author, that every Thing is separable from Substance, which is not this real internal Constitution, as [Mr. Locke] seems to take for granted."

Because Mr. Locke supposes, that if Thinking be only an Operation of the Soul, such Operation may be sometimes suspended, without any Injury to that thinking Substance; therefore Mr. Locke seems to take for granted, that Divisibility, Figure and Magnitude (as we shall see immediately) are separate from Matter!

This seems so plain to the ingenious Author, that he has it over again, some Pages from hence, as we shall have Occasion to observe hereafter. — But he thus proceeds, — "The Properties that immediately flow from the internal Constitution of Things, are as inseparable from them, as that Constitution itself, and we can as little conceive the Thing without these Properties, as without that Constitution. Divisibility, Figure, Magnitude, are not the internal Constitution of Matter, but Properties necessarily flowing from it; and we can as little conceive Matter without these, as without its own internal Constitution; that is, we can as little conceive it without these, as without Substance. This must be so, for it is by these that we conceive it as all to be a Substance, or to have an internal, unknown Constitution. And for a like Reason, Activity and Perceptivity, by which

* B.II. C. 23. § 18.  
† § 28.  
‡ Vol. I. p. 327.
Powers alone we discover that there is a Sub-
stance different from Matter, and which is the 
necessary Subject of their Inception, must be 
in the Mind, even previous to the internal 
unknown Constitution of that Substance; as 
neceffarily as it, and with much more Clear-
ness than an unknown Thing can be. If it were 
pardonable to run fo high, I might fay, that 
thofe very Powers of Activity, and Percep-
tivity, which are not the internal, unknown 
Constitution of Spiritual Substance, are yet 
inseparable from the necessarily existing Spirit ;
and the constant Exercise of them also; as 
Mr. Locke obferves, in the Place laft quoted 
from him *.

But now unless it follow from all this, that 
actual Thinking is as essential to the Soul, as Magni-
itude is to Matter, or as a Power of Thinking 
is to a Thinking Substance, the Point in Contro-
versy seems to be juft where it was. Matter 
without Figure or Magnitude; and a Thinking Sub-
stance without a Power of Thinking, are diret-
ty contradictory Ideas. But will this Gentleman 
fay, it is a Contradiction to fuppofe, that the 
actual Exercise of the active Powers of the Soul, 
may be sometimes suspended? He certainly ap-
pears, in fome Places, to be of a different Opin-
ion. —— "When we are, fays he, fick, or 
heavy with Sleep, or Fatigue, it becomes 
eafey to attain from Action of the Body, or 
Mind; and only then †." Again, "It is 
only the Indifpofition of the Body, that can 
interrupt the Exercise of this Power [ of 
"Thinking"] at any time ‡." Elsewhere he thus

expresses himself. —— "It hath been fhewn be-
fore that the Soul would never ceafe to exert 
its Activity upon a rightly disposed Body;
unless fome Defect and Want of Reparation 
in the Body, forced this Principle of Life and 
Action to defilt, and leave the material Or-
gan 'till the Indifpofition under which it la-
bours be repaired." In another place, 
since Sleep is a State in which the Faculties 
of the Soul are obftructed, or impeded, by 
the Indifpofition of the Matter of the Body, 
&c. ‡." —— And again. —— "If the Pow-
ners of the Soul were not impeded in Sleep, 
that State would not differ from being awake, 
except in the Indifpofition of the Body †." ——
It is true, our Author tells us, that "the Soul 
not thinking incessantly has been often fuppofed 
to avoid unneceffary Debates in improper 
Places.‖ But whether the Passages juft 
quoted from this Author, are fome of thofe Suppofitions that are to paus for Nothing we fhall 
better difcover hereafter. But I beg leave he 
to take Notice, that this Gentleman had before 
observ'd, "that they who placed the Essence of 
the Soul in Thinking, rather exprifed their 
Meaning unwarily, than had fälle Concepti-
ons of the Nature of it ‡.″ And that "if they 
had made a Diftinction between Activity [that 
is, a Power of acting ‡] and real Action; 
— no body could have taken Exception to 
their Opinion † ‡.

If thefe Writers, whoever they were, made no Diftinction between Power and the actual Exer-


expresses
tion of it, we are not to wonder, if they expressed their Meaning unusually. Had they made the Distinction, which this Gentleman allows they ought to have made; and only maintaine'd with him, that "it is contradictory that the Soul should at any time, even while united to the Body, be without the Power of Action," it is submitted, whether they would have met with the least Opposition from Mr. Locke? But it is still urged — "This farther may be said for those, who place the Nature of the Soul in Thinking, and suppose it to think incessantly (taking Thinking in the Sense of being always percipient of some Idea or other) that it is impossible to shew the contrary, even in this State of Union with the Body; though it hath been here allowed and often supposed, to avoid unnecessary Debates in improper Places."

But now, as what this Gentleman here tells us has been often supposed, to avoid unnecessary Debates in improper Places, seems only to relate to Thinking, underlaid in the Sense of being Percipient; it may well be presumed he had no Design to revoke any Thing he had advanced, about the Action of the Soul being sometimes impeded or interrupted; — And if this be supposed, how small must the Difference appear between him and Mr. Locke? The one imagines there is no Necessity for the Soul to be always thinking; that is, always in Action: And the other affirms, that in certain Circumstances, the Action of the Soul may be interrupted, obstructed or impeded. Tho' whether this Agreement be

*P 324. † Vol. p 330.

in Appearance only, or not, will once more fall under Consideration. But our Author thus proceeds — "Who can say that ever he found himself in a State of Unconsciousness, or when there was no Idea at all subsisting in his Mind?" To the same Purpofe he had before ask'd, "who ever surpriz'd himself at any time, either asleep or awake, imperricipt or in a State of pure Inaction; or was he sure he was, for the leaft possible Time, in such a State?" It may possibly be said, that this is only asking, whether a Man ever found himself percipient and imperricipt at the same Time? And truly the ingenious Author himself seems to have much the same Opinion of it, since he immediately adds, — "Indeed it is contradictory that any Man should so surprize himself, imperricipt to wit, of all Things, with respect to the present Time: For he is conscious by Supposition, and reflecting upon an unconscious State. And as to the past Time, he cannot have any Memory of such a State: For whether ever such a State was, or was not, it is either Way a Contradiction that he should remember it; and he cannot bring an Argument for it, from his not remembering of it." Mr. Locke seems only to proceed upon this Supposition, that if his Mind "was consciously employed for several Hours, during Sleep, it would be likely he should remember something of it, the infant he walked."

I durst say he never once dreamt, that a Man could either forget and remember at the same Time, or could remember that, which was never once present to his Thoughts. But our Author thus

* P. 331. † P. 271. Notes. ‡ P. 331. || B.II. C. 1, 9 13, 14, 18.

continues
continues his Argument,

"If a Man came through a dark Room, he
may be certain there was no Light there; for
his Eyes were open, and he missed the Light:
But if a Man pass an Hour of unconscious
Existence after Night, there is a wide Differ-
ence.” —

Whoever questioned it? — “He did not per-
ceive an Absence of Consciousness then;” —
It would be strange if he did. — “Nor can
he now; since he could do it but by re-
membrance. He hath not two distinct Con-
sciousnesses, one to be extinguished, and anot-
ther remaining to perceive the Absence of the
first.” Most certainly he hath not; nor has
Mr. Locke any where suggested the contrary.

Again, “it is easy, says our Author, for a
Man to confess, that he hath one of those dull
Souls, that doth not always perceive Ideas;” —
But I beg Leave to observe, that this Mo-
del, which is designed to pass for an Ar-
gment, is somewhat inaccurate; for he confesses
a Thing for certain, which he can never be
certain of;”

Poor Mr. Locke! even his very Model, when
it appears in the Form of an Argument, is found
to be inaccurate! the Reason here assign’d for
this Charge of Inaccuracy, is afterwards further
enlarged upon. But first, this Gentleman ob-
erves, that “it is not in the Power of the Soul
to become imperceptible of Ideas at Pleasure,
and [that] were the Thing effected, it would
be the Sign of an ill-disposed Body, and not
of the Dullness of the Soul.”

Who it is that supposes it to be in the Power
of the Soul to become imperceptible of Ideas at Plea-

* P. 331. † B. II. C. I. § 10. ‡ P. 532, Bid
Our Author has very rightly observed, that "it is absurd to say, we forget or remember our Unconsciousness." If it be enquired, who it is that is guilty of all this Nonse, why, since Mr. Locke has appeal'd to Experience, where there is an utter Negation of all Experience: Where there is no Matter of Fact to be testified to: and where Experience is not applicable; the Honour of it, I presume, belongs to him. But has not our Author himself appeal'd to Experience in much the same Case with Mr. Locke? For having told us, how far the Soul may remit its Activity in Thinking, does he not say, that Experience confirms this? 'Tis true he does; but then it certainly is with proper Caution, for he immediately adds, "— as far as we can have Experience," And therefore since Mr. Locke has not thus guarded his Words; how do we know, but he appeals to Experience even much farther, than we can have Experience? However let us hear Mr. Locke as to the Passage last cited from him,—

"We know certainly by Experience, that we sometimes think, and thence draw this infallible Consequence, that there is something in us, that has a Power to think: But whether that Substance perpetually thinks, or no, we can be no farther assured, than Experience informs us. —'Tis doubted whether I thought all last Night, or no; the Question being about a Matter of Fact, 'tis begging it, to bring as a Proof for it, an Hypothesis,

*Ibid. in the Notes† Vol. I. p. 344.

which is the very Thing in Dispute; by which one may prove any thing*."

The learned Reader will now judge, whether Sleeping without Thinking may most properly be called a Matter of Fact, or a Matter of Not-Fact. Whether Mr. Locke could be capable of any thing so extravagantly absurd, as to appeal to Experience, where no Experience can be had; and whether the ingenious Author could have exerted himself more, in case Mr. Locke had appeal'd to the Experience and Observations of Mankind, even during their supposed unconscious State.

But now, notwithstanding it would be ridiculous to infer, that a Man was never conscious of any particular Action or Thought, either sleeping or waking, because he has now no present Consciousness of it; yet perhaps it may be a Question, whether our Author himslef might not think even this Negative Proof to have its Weight in some particular Cases. Suppose then, for instance, that this Gentleman was examined, whether for several Nights last past, he has not been conscious in his Sleep, of a generous Concern for the cruel Usage, which the Memory of Mr. Locke has met with. Let us suppose him to answer, that, to the best of his Remembrance, Mr. Locke never employ'd any of his sleeping Moments; and that, as far as he can recollect, he never had any Dream or Vision relating to that Gentleman. All this may be very true; but what Satisfaction can it give, as to the Point enquired after? For Mr. Locke, might notwithstanding, have engross'd our Author's whole last

*B. I. C. I. § 10.

N Night's
Night's Thoughts. His Want of Conscience is now, is no Proof he had no Conscience then: He has indeed no Memory of such Conscience, and this Want of Memory is all he experiences; but this doth not infer that he had no Conscience at the Time in Question. So that, for any thing he can be sure of, Mr. Locke may often have taken up his sleeping Hours, and have made him his most humble Acknowledgments for all the Favours he had received from him.

It is true, our Author can be as sure this never happen'd, as he can be sure he never did any thing, of which he has not the least Conscience; because the Foundation of his Assurance is the same in both Cases; and that is, the Want of present Conscience. But then we have seen, that there is no depending upon this; which is only Experience of having no Memory of past Conscience. And besides, there is certainly a great deal of our past Conscience, which we retain no Memory of afterward. It is, as this Gentleman observeth, a particular Mark of our finite and imperfect Natures, that we cannot become conscious of all our past Conscience at Pleasure."

Tho' after all, whether our Author can be persuaded he was ever conscious of such a Scene, may possibly admit of some doubt. — However, he thus continues to prefs Mr. Locke, — "No Man, says he, at Night would infer, that he was not in a State of Conscience and Thinking at such a certain Minute about twelve a-Clock of the Day, because now perhaps he hath no Memory what particular Thought he had at that Minute. And it is no better Argument, considered in itself, that a Man was not conscious at such a Minute, in his Sleep, because next Morning he hath no Memory of what Ideas were in his Mind then." — I readily agree with this learned Writer, that one of these Arguments is no better than the other; for indeed, if Day be changed into Night, there can appear no Difference between them. But possibly it may be here objected, that Mr. Locke's Argument is not flatly right. That he no where talks of a single Minute, or supposes it improbable that a Man should forget what he was thinking on, at such a Minute either of Day or Night. But that he sometimes mentions four Hours; sometimes several Hours; and sometimes a long while together, and esteems it to be unlikely that the Mind should be consciously employ'd all that time, and yet be able to recollect Nothing the Moment after. However, as four Hours are a pretty large Portion of Time, for a Man to be thus employed to no Purpose; and as several Hours, and a long while, are very indeterminate Quantities; perhaps our Author, for the greater Exactness, or for some other Reason, chose to reduce the latter to a greater Certainty, and to bring the former within a much narrower Compass.

But Mr. Locke has still more to answer for. "If the Soul, says Mr. Locke, doth think in a Sleep Man, without being conscious of it, I ask, whether, during such Thinking, it has any Pleasure or Pain, or be capable of Happiness or Misery? I am sure the Man is not, for..."

** Ibid. 335. ¹ B.II. C. 1. § 13. ² § 14. ³§18.
no more than the Bed or Earth he lies on.—

Or if it be possible, that the Soul can, whilst
the Body is sleeping, have its Thinking,
Enjoyments, and Concerns, its Pleasure, or
Pain apart, which the Man is not conscious
of, nor partakes in: it is certain that Socrates
asleep, and Socrates awake, is not the same
Person: But his Soul when he sleeps, and So-

ocrates the Man, consisting of Body and Soul
when he is waking, are two Persons*." And
in the following Section, he maintains, that
they make the Soul and the Man two Persons,
who make the Soul think apart, what the
Man is not conscious of;" Just as Caesar and
Pellux would be two Persons, upon a Supposition that only one Soul should actuate both Bodies by turns†. Upon Occasion of these two Sections, in which Mr. Locke endeavours to shew how groundless a Supposition it is, either that the Soul should think without being conscious of it; or that it should have its Enjoyments, without the Knowledge of the Man, our Author thus expresseth himself,— "It were
to be wished that he had told us, what Author
it is that affords, that the Soul in a sleeping
Man thinks, without being conscious of it;
upon which he asks the Question, whether,
during such Thinking, it has any Pleasure,
or Pain, or be capable of Happiness or Misery?
and adds, I am sure the Man is not, no more
than the Bed or Earth be lies on. Because it is
strange, if any Man put him to the Trouble
of confuting this Contradiction, with the Sup-
position of Caesar and Pellux, Socrates and

* B. II. C. i. § 11. † § 12.

"Plato. The Position his Adversaries main-
"tain, infers no such Contradiction; nor justi-
"fies another to infer it for them."

The learned Reader may easily judge how
very properly this Gentleman here replies to
Mr. Locke. But perhaps, if our Author had
known what Person it is, who affords, that the
Soul thinks in a sleeping Man, without being con-
scious of it, he might have returned Mr. Locke
a more compleat and satisfactory Answer.
Indeed it must be own'd, that if the Position of
Mr. Locke's Adversaries infers no Contradiction,
it cannot justify Mr. Locke to infer it for them.
But as it is not easy to say, what that Position
may infer, or how far Mr. Locke can be ju-
itized, without knowing what the Position
is; so it is pity this Gentleman would not fa-
vour us with a Sight of it. However, as Mr.
Locke has here made a false Inference for his
Adversaries; so in another Place, he doth
not represent the Objection right‡. If we turn to
the Section refer'd to, we meet with these
Words,— "'Twill perhaps be said, that the
"Soul thinks, even in the soundest Sleep, but the
"Memory retains it not."— Can any one now
discover what Objection is here represented wrong?
May not This be said? or does Mr. Locke affirm
anything more? But, alas, this is only the
Dwarf before the Giant.

"We are, says our Author, by no Means
justified in Philosophy, to draw weighty In-
ferences, such as that the Perfection of ratio-
nal Thinking may depend upon Matter, or
that the Soul may owe its Perceptivity and Life,

* P. 333, 334. † B. II. C. i. § 14. ‡ P. 336, in the
Notes.
to that dead Substance; I say, we are by no means justified in drawing such weighty Inferences from a perplexed and dark Phenomenon, without narrowly examining the Nature and Circumstances of it, as far as they are accessible to us.*

Some Readers would be glad to know, how far that Man is justified either in Philosophy, or Humanity, who can draw an Inference, which deeply wounds his Neighbour's Character, not from a perplexed and dark State of Things; but in defiance of the clearest and most evident Proofs, that his Neighbour is altogether innocent? Indeed as our Author has kept pretty well up to his first setting out; so, if a poetical justification is sufficient, I really think he is entitled to it.

--- servetur ad imum
Qualis ab incepto proceperit, et ibi confl except.
Hor.de Art. Poet. v. 126, &c.

But he thus proceeds. --- "It is not to be dissembled by Mr. Locke's greatest Admirers, that his Method of Reasoning all along on this Subject, tends to lead weak and sceptical Men, to make these Inferences; not to say that he points out the Way to them, by hinting "broadly at those Inferences himself." The Gentleman who can get Leave of himself to infirnate, that Mr. Locke has broadly hinted, that the Soul may owe its Perceptivity and Life to dead Matter, in express Contradiction to what he constantly maintaine'd, need not scruple telling Mr. Locke's Admirers, whatever he pleases; nor will those Admirers I believe be much surprized at it.

This Author has, in another Place well observed, that "it is easy to hoist our Sails, but uncertain whether the Winds and Waves may carry us." And truly such Sailing may happen to be the more dangerous; since we are informed by a learned Writer, that Mr. Locke would sometimes divert himself with setting Traps to catch the Hominis ad sepulchrum paratos. But whether our Author be one of those, or not, who are somewhat inclined to pick Quarrels with that Gentleman, the judicious Reader must determine for himself. Be this as it will, the Sails of this ingenious Author are still up, and Mr. Locke is closely purfued.

"It looks, says this Gentleman, as if he not only thought it possible that Matter might think, but true that the Soul was really Matter. Pray let us attend to the Paffage, from whence our Author has made this wonderful Discovery. "I grant," says Mr. Locke, that the "Soul in a waking Man is never without Thought, because it is the Condition of being awake." I presume that the being awake, and constantly thinking when awake, are, according to Mr. Locke, two Affections of Matter, and consequently here is another broad Hint for material Souls! But then Mr. Locke adds, --- whether sleeping without Dreaming be not an Affection of the whole Man, Mind as well as Body, may be worth a waking Man's Consideration." Now if our Author had only said, that this looks as if the Soul was Matter; this would merely have pointed out a Conclusi---

* P. 328. † P. 338, 339. ‡ See the Vindication of Mr. Locke, p. 2—7.

--- Geometry no Friend to Infidelity, p. 82. † P. 339. || B. II. C. 1. § 11. ‡ Ibid. quence
quence of Mr. Locke's Supposition, which possibly he was not aware of; but to affirm, it looks as if Mr. Locke thought that true, which he has manifestly declared he believed was false; this, I may venture to say, is a Piece of Civility, which few Men of Politeness would offer to any but Mr. Locke. Besides we have this further Remark, — "then it seems separate Souls may sleep." Ibid. It is submitted to any Person who is thoroughly awake, whether Mr. Locke be there speaking one Word of separate Souls; but only of the whole Man, the whole Compound of Soul and Body united in their present State? He mentions not one Syllable of separate Souls, or of Immaterial Being [in general] which is still worse.

But where is the Offence, either against Religion or Philosophy, to suppose the Soul liable even to many Inconveniences, whilst united to the Body, and confined to a Prison; to which it will not be subject when delivered from that Prison? Does not our Author himself maintain — "It is certain that Sleep binders and deadens the active Power of the Soul." And elsewhere, — "It is true, we know that in a State of Separation the Soul must be freed from all Restraint and Impediment, because Union to Matter limits and confines it." But Mr. Locke having said, that to be "always Thinking, always in Action, is perhaps the Privilege of the Infinite Author and Preverter of Things, who never slumbers nor sleeps," our Author observes, that "God differs from his Creatures in higher Prerogatives, than that he doth not slumber nor sleep.""

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Therefore I suppose, he cannot differ from them in this! In another Place, Mr. Locke having observed that the Attention of the Mind in Thinking, admits of various Degrees; and that the Mind is sometimes very intent, at others, very remiss; he only infers it is "probable that Thinking is the Action, and not the Essence of the Soul. Since the Operations of Agents will easily admit of Intention, and Remissness; but the Essences of Things are not conceived capable of any such Variation.""

Our Author tells us here, that "this Argument is indeed specious at first View, and yet it is a very equivocal Argument, and concludes different Ways, according to the different Acceptation of the Word Essence. Mr. Locke grants that Thinking is Action, and supposes Essence to be the internal, unknown Constitution of Things, whereon their disagreeable Qualities depend. Now that Thinking or Action, which is a known Property of the Soul, should be the internal, unknown Constitution of the Soul, is a Contradiction; and proving the contrary, is proving what was never denied."

But now, notwithstanding this peremptory Declaration, in which Mr. Locke appears as a most solemn Trifler, and is charged with using a very equivocal Argument; if there should happen to be some Philosophers, who esteem actual Thinking to be the very Essence, and the whole Substance of the Soul. Then the proving the contrary, is not proving what was never denied.

"Conscious Activity, says an ingenious Writer,

* B. II. C. 19. § 3.  † P. 341, 342.
It is impossible for Mr. Locke to please this Gentleman with regard to Essence. One while he explains it by a Word, that rather imports the actual Existence of a Thing, than its internal Constitution: at another, the internal Constitution of a Thing is not the genuine Acceptation of the Word Essence. Had Mr. Locke been so happy, as to hit upon Radical Properties, how much Trouble had he saved this ingenious Author? However, "from this we may see the Fallacy of Mr. Locke's Argument: He makes Essence the "internal, unknown Constitution of Things; "and because it is contradictory that thought "should be of the Essence of the Soul in this "Sense, he infers it is not of the Essence of the "Soul in the other Sense, or so as to be insepara-"ble from it.""

That Mr. Lock infers this, for this Reason, wants nothing but Proof. Again, Mr. Locke, in his Way of arguing "takes it for granted, "that if a Property doth not enter into the in-"ternal, unknown Constitution of a Substance, "it is separable from that Substance; which still "was the main Point to be proved; for, as has "been remarked [N. 22.] a Property which ne-"cessarily flows from the internal Constitution "of any Substance, must as necessarily belong "to it, as that Constitution itself.""

Some of this Sort of Properties, our Author had before mentioned, such as Divisibility, Fi-"gure, and Magnitude. These evidently are the Properties, which Mr. Locke seems to take for granted are separable from Substance. If we de-"mand, in what Part of his Works? We are, I
prefume, to look for it in his Way of arguing. This has been considered before. But in the same Place, perhaps, this Gentleman has also found Mr. Locke's Inference, to wit, that Thinking is not of the Essence of the Soul, in one Sense; because it is contradictory it should be so, in another. — All Readers are not born to make the same happy Discoveries. But now, if Thinking be as necessary to the Soul, as Divisibility, Figure, or Magnitude is to the Body; How comes it, that an active Being, a thinking Being, and a free Being, are synonymous Terms? Surely Action and Freedom and necessary Properties, are not likewise synonymous! Indeed the Truth is, Thinking does not seem to stand every where in this Writer, for the same Idea. Its Meaning varies according to different Occasions. Sometimes it is needful that Thinking and Freedom should be the same. At N° 23, p. 230, he speaks of Thinking in the Sense of being percipient of some Idea or other. At the Beginning of his N° 24, it takes up both the Action and Perception of the Soul. At N° 25, he supposes Thinking to be Action, and a known Property of the Soul; and before he finishes that Number, Thinking seems to be dwindled into a mere necessary Perception.

At N° 26, it is a necessary Property, belonging to the Essence of the Soul; and this he endeavours to illustrate in the following Manner.

"Figure, says our Author, is but a Property of Matter, and a variable Property; for it may be changed in the same individual Quantity; yet this variable Property invariably and inseparably belongs to Matter. So Thinking

* Vol. I. p. 203. in the Notes. † P. 345.

"(allowing it a variable Property) may invariably belong to the Soul.

That Thinking, whether it be call'd Essence, Property, or Action, is certainly variable, I believe no Man ever questioned, that could but look into his own Mind. And that it may, in some Degree or other, invariably [or incessantly] belong to the Soul, is no inconceivable Supposition. But whether what is here advanced in relation to Figure, will solve Mr. Locke's Objection, the learned Reader must determine. "The Operations of Agents, says Mr. Locke, will easily admit of Intention and Remission; but the "Essences of Things are not conceived capable of any such Variation." However our Author has found an inseparable Property, which is capable of Variation. I hope Figure is not a radical Property: Since radical Properties, I think, have already been pronounced invariable.

"Essence, we have been told, is the chief, and "radical Property of a Thing, or all the Properties of it. And the Essence or Nature of Things

"is invariable.

And yet, if it be not as radical a Property as Thinking, what is it here brought for? But be this as it will; of what Variation is Figure capable? Is it capable of Intention and Remission? Is a Triangle a more intense Figure, than a Square? Or what other Variation is Mr. Locke speaking of? He does not say, that the inseparable Properties of Things are not conceived capable of any Variation. He knew certainly that the same individual Quantity of Paffe or Wax, in any Shape, or Figure whatever, might be varied into a Triangle, a Square, or a Circle. But he says, that

the Essences of Things (or if this Gentleman likes it better, the essential or inseparable Properties of them) are not conceived capable of any such Variation. And what can this relate to, but Intention and Remission? Or what Analogy is there between these, and the Figure of Body? But our Author tells us, "it is only the Exercise of the Power, not the Power itself, which is subject to the Variation of being intended or remitted. This doth not make the Power itself separable from the Soul." Who in the Name of Wonder ever said it did? When Mr. Locke mentions the Action or Operation of the Soul, are we to understand by these, the Power, or the Exercise of that Power? However, even "the Exercise itself of this Power is not separable," says our Author, from "free or active Beings, since, as hath been shown [No. 8.] such Beings are not free to act, or utterly to abstain from all Action, but to do this or that Action by a Preference." I presume this Gentleman will allow, that as far as any Being is not free to act, so far he is no free Being: Otherwise Freedom and Necessity will, in some Cases, be just the same Thing.

Again, "Life itself," says our Author, consists in being percipient, in this we are necessary. And if we are percipient, we must have Perceptions, by the Terms. Thus it is very conceivable that the Soul should remit its Activity in Thinking, through all Degrees, till at length it can remit no farther, and finds itself necessary in having some Perception or other."

Well then, the Soul may remit its Activity in Thinking, till it finds itself only in such a

necessary percipient State, as Life itself consists in. That is, according to this Gentleman's former Definitions, till it finds itself in a State of not thinking. For does not thinking imply active Perception, or Activity joined with Perceptivity? Is not thinking the same as action? Does not thinking imply the turning the perceptive Capacity from one Perception to another, by an Act of the Will? Is not the Want of such a Power, the very Reason why Brutes are not suffer'd to be thinking Creatures, tho' they are allow'd to have Perceptions? And therefore how can the Soul be said to think, when it has remitted its Activity in Thinking, through all Degrees, and has nothing remaining but those necessary Perceptions, in which the very Life of the Soul consists? However let this Gentleman have his Liberty. Let him sometimes use the Word for Action, or active Perception, and let it be synonymous with Freedom; especially when Brutes are not suffer'd to think. And at other Times, let the Word stand for necessary Perceptions, or be synonymous with necessary Property; yet, if by thinking Mr. Locke principally means "that Sort of Operation of the Mind about its Ideas, where the Mind is active;" as his own Words manifestly imply. It is then submitted, whether our Author does not here acknowledge, that the Soul may so far remit its Activity in Thinking, till, in one chief Sense of the Word, it really thinks no longer?

It is true indeed, that two or three Pages beyond this he thus expresses himself, ———

* P. 190. † P. 344. ‡ P. 345. 

P. 345. † P. 346. ‡ P. 344.
"The Soul may slacken and remit its Activity more and more, to a certain Degree, till it can go no farther upon the Side of Inactivity: But still it must have some Perception or other in View. And when we have come this Length, if we would endeavour to keep this one solitary Perception, still in view, and be no farther active, we shall find a prodigious Difficulty in it, or to speak more truly, it is impossible with all the Care and Attention we can bestow. Now doth not this shew us, that when we would endeavour to be inactive beyond a certain Degree, we encrease the Activity by that very Endeavour?"

If it should be now said, that this Gentleman has been entirely misunderstood; and that, he supposes it impossible for the Soul to be one Moment inactive; but that, let it remit as much as it can, it must however be perpetually varying its Ideas. And that the Soul can no more fulfill the Exercise of its active Powers, in this respect, than it can prevent its passive Perceptions; and that all he has said about the Thinking or Action of the Soul being interrupted, impeded, or obstructed, must be understood in a Sense perfectly consistent with the incessant Action and Operation of it:—If this be really so, the Question then is, whether our Author has expressed himself altogether so clearly as might well have been expected from so good a Writer? But however, let his Meaning be what it will; let it be allowed that he has demonstrated the incessant Thinking of the Soul, either in one Sense, or in every Sense whatever; yet what has our Author done by this Demonstration? Why, after various Toil and Labour; after treating a great and worthy Man, as no Man could wish to be treated himself, and as few good Men would ever choose to treat others;—he has proved the Mistake of a certain Hypothecis, which, according to his own Confession, is of no very great Consequence in itself*!

Upon the whole, it is refer’d to the Judgment of every dispassionate Reader, whether, if this learned Author had been less liberal of his Criticisms upon Mr. Locke, he would have much diminished the intrinsic Value of his own excellent Book? And withal, whether this Gentleman did not design to be understood with some Exception, when he affirms in so many Words, that "we never had a disinterested Examiner of other Men’s Notions †?"

* P. 320.  † P. 634, in the Notes.
"seem to exclude and abandon any general Notion of Substance, as another real, phytical distinct Being, provided to support all its real, or supposed Accidentsl or Qualities, and seems to banter it by the Indian's unknown something, which supports the Tortoise, which supports the Elephant, which supports the World; yet he too often represents this Notion of Substance as some real unknown Thing or Being, which holds the Properties in Union, and which is different from all those Things, which he calls Qualities or Properties, and which supports them all in Existence; tho' he owns, we know it not, and have no Idea of it: And thus he seems to build again, and maintain the very Notion which he before destroyed.* And elsewhere, "thus we see he maintains his Notion of a general Substance, which he had before ridiculed †."

Most certain it is, that Mr. Locke frequently affirms, the Substance of Things is unknown to us. And he justly ridicules all Pretences towards clearing up the Mystery, by saying it is that, which supports Accidents: Since this leaves us as much in the dark, as the Indian's unknown something, which supports the Tortoise. But where is the Inconsistency between this, and maintaining that there must be a Substance for the Support of Qualities or Properties; — that this Substance, tho' unknown, is distinct from such Qualities, and that they cannot subsist without it?"
Mr. Locke had been before charged, with almost discarding Substance out of the World: But let us just hear what he says for himself. Having quoted several Passages out of his own Essay, he thus remarks, "these, and the like Fashions of speaking intimate, that the Substance is supposed always something, besides the Extension, Figure, Solidity, Motion, Thinking, or other observable Idea, though we know not what it is." Again, "as long as there is any simple Idea, or sensible Quality left, according to my Way of arguing, Substance cannot be discarded, because all simple Ideas, all sensible Qualities, carry with them a Supposition of a Substratum to exist in, and of a Substance wherein they inhere." Moreover, it having been objected, that his Simile about the Elephant and Tortoise was to ridicule the Notion of Substance, and the European Philosophers for ascertaining it, Mr. Locke refers to the very Section, on which the Charge is founded, to prove he had no such Intention: But says, those Passages were "to shew, that though Substance did support Accidents, yet Philosophers, who had found such a Support necessary, had no more a clear Idea of what that Support was, than the Indian had of that, which supported his Tortoise, tho' sure he was, it was something.*

So that now supposing, that Mr. Locke had at first so express'd his Sentiments, in relation to Substance, that it might be thought, he really design'd to ridicule the Notion of it, or discard its very Being out of the World; yet after he has so clearly told us his Meaning, and that he had no such Design; — what could possibly induce an ingenious Gentleman to repeat a stale Objection, which Mr. Locke himself, had long since answered? But the Doctor further observes, that "if the Substance of Body, and the Substance of Mind be so much unknown, then the Substance of Body may be the same with the Substance of Mind, for ought we know to the contrary. If we know nothing of this Substance, but that it is something that subsists by itself, and upholds and unites Properties, how can we tell but that the very same individual Substance, may be the Substratum, or Subject both of solid Extension with all its Modes, and of Thinking with all its Modes, and may unite the Modes, or Properties of Body and Mind together?"

Again, "If this Substance or Substratum be so unknown a Thing, as Mr. Locke supposes, how can I deny any thing concerning it? or at least how can I be sure that God and the material World have not one common Substance?"

But now, if it can be demonstrat'd, as it certainly may, and as this Gentleman affirms it has been, by many learned Writers, that Matter cannot think; does it not evidently follow, that Thinking can only be the proper Attribute of an immaterial Being? And therefore tho' we should never know the very Substances of Things themselves; yet we may be abundantly assured, from their well known Properties, that the Substance of Body, is not the same with the Sub-

* P. 61. † P. 65. ‡ P. 115. He mentions particularly Dr. Clarke, Dr. Bentley, Mr. Grove, and Mr. Dittin.
flance of Mind; and that God and the material World, neither have, nor can have, one common Substance. And besides, these Things have been fairly demonstrated by those very Men, who acknowledged their Ignorance, as to what the inmost Nature of Substance might be*. Indeed, if the very Substance of Spirit, was a Power of Thinking always in Act, as this Gentleman maintains, and if Nothing remained of the Soul, when it ceased to think †, the attempting to prove that the Substance of Body was not the Substance of Mind, would be only proving that actual Thinking, and a marble Statue were different Things. Nor would there, one might hope, be much Difficulty in convincing Men, that these Things were not the same.

But since the Generality of Men have been accustomed to suppose, that Powers and Properties are one Thing, and Substance another: And since, if there really be a Substance distinct from all such Powers and Properties, the inmost Nature of it seems to be conceal’d from us; it may therefore be submitted, whether demonstrably proving that Thought and Consciences cannot arise from a material System, be not a rational Method to convince Men, that Thinking is by no Means a Mode of Matter?

However it is still urged, that upon Mr. Locke’s Hypothesis, “our own Souls may be ‘material Beings, for ought we know, and ‘consequently indivisible and mortal’ ‡.”

* As to the latter, see Hum. Und. B. IV. C. 10. And as to both, see Dr. Clarke’s first Vol. of Boyle’s Lectures, and Preface to the second. And to mention no other, see the Author of An Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul. What he thinks of our Knowledge of Substance, see Vol. 1. p. 323, 324, in the Notes, and p. 328. † P. 52. 116. ‡ P. 62.

I presume it has been shewn *, that Mr. Locke very firmly believed both the Indivisibility and Immortality of the Soul. It is true, the Doctor here only mentions the Consequence of that, which Mr. Locke supposes might be effected by Omnipotence. But will this Gentleman maintain, that the Soul, upon his own Hypothesis, is severer of Immortality, than upon that, which Mr. Locke mentions? Tho’ even this, ’tis evident, he mentions only as a bare Possibility, and not as his own Opinion †. However, will the Doctor’s Hypothesis better secure the Soul, than Mr. Locke’s, from the Power of that Being who created it? Or can he think of any firmer Basis, to rest the Immortality of the Soul upon, than the Veracity, the Power, the Goodness and Justice of God?

The learned Author of An Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul, whose Zcel for Mr. Locke has been already considered, not only acknowledges, that Mr. Locke “allows the Soul “is Immortal.” But tells us, that “Mr. Locke “hath well observed, that they are different Con-“siderations, that prove the Soul immortal and “immortal.” And tho’ that Author be as strenuous an Assertor of the Soul’s Immortality, as ever wrote in Defence of it; yet he supposes, he has shewn the Folly of those, “who, to prove “the Soul mortal, think it enough, if it were “shewn material.”

How far the ingenious Dr. Watts may give into this Opinion, which is here condemn’d; and how far he may be wrong, in so doing, the learned Reader must determine.

But now, tho’ the Doctor does not mistake Mr. Locke’s Meaning about the Mobility of Spirits, as the learned Author, just mentioned, certainly does; yet he will not allow that Mobility belongs to them. He supposes that Spirits are neither extended, nor have any Relation to Place. That they do not properly exist or reside anywhere; but that it may be philosophically said, they exist or reside no where. It is therefore no Wonder, he will not allow them a Power to move themselves from one Place to another. For it is certain, as he observes, that “if Mobility be ascribed to Spirits, or a Power to change their Place, then it necessarily follows that they are in a Place.” Whereas on the contrary, if they are properly in no Place, or no where, it really seems impossible that they should move any where.

The ingenious Author says a great deal to support his Opinion; but I with his Metaphysics are not too absurdist for the Generality of Readers. For tho’ the Doctor tells us, that “Spirits properly belong to another Rank of Natures, another World of Beings, which require only Activity and Consciousness, and do not require any proper Situation to be given them, any Space to possess, or Place to exist or reside in.” yet how is it possible to conceive (for me I am sure it is not) that any real Being should be active and conscious, without being active and conscious somewhere? He says indeed, that “tho’ a Body cannot be without Being somewhere; yet a Spirit, which is a conscious active Power, may have a real Existence, and yet have no proper

* See his Essays, p. 132, 147. † P. 296. ‡ P. 161.

Place;
The Reader will judge, from what has been before observ’d on Dr. Butler’s Dissertation, whether it be not a just Remark of Mr. Locke, that the chief Difficulty arises from Names ill used.

As to Mr. Locke’s growing bold, tho’ it may found a little harsh to some Readers; yet I durst say the Doctor meant nothing worse, than valiant or courageous. In which Senec, Virgil seems to use audax and audientor*, and Homer, ἀναμνήσθω†.

But Mr. Locke is of opinion, that Spirits, as well as Bodies, “must each of them exclude “any of the same Kind, out of the same Place; “Because otherwise the Notions and Names of “Identity and Diversity would be in vain, and “there could be no such Distinction of Substances, “or any thing else, one from another.” Upon which the Doctor observes, that this “is not “only opposed by the vulgar Philosophers, “who suppose a thousand Minds may be in the “same ubi, but ‘tis very disagreeable also with “the juster Notion of a Mind, which being not “extended and having no relation to Place, “can neither be said to admit, or exclude Fellow “Minds from the same Place.”

As it is impossible that Fellow Minds should admit or exclude one another from the same Place, which never were in any Place; So it must be allow’d that Mr. Locke’s Language is not exactly suited to the Doctor’s Hypothesis.

But it is much this Author should oppose the vulgar Philosophers, as he calls them, to Mr. Locke: Since having himself deprived Spirits even of their ubi, which has been allotted them by several, as a more becoming Habitation than

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*Locus; — moreover, having himself finiled at the Definition which is made between these two Names; and withal having plainly intimated that Spirits can be in neither, but they must be circumscribed*, in express Contradiction to the Doctrine of the Schools, viz. that a Spirit is only definitio in loco; I say, for these Reasons, he might have been silent on this Head; since he lies equally exposed with Mr. Locke to the Centrefire and Difpleasure of those Gentlemen.

However the Doctor thus proceeds, — “If “Minds were extended, why may not two created Minds be in the same Place, and penetrate each other, as well as [Mr. Locke] supposes God, the infinite Mind, to penetrate all “Minds, and all Bodies whatsoever? Must God “be the same with all Minds, because he penetrates all Minds? If a Spirit be never so little “denser than Space, ’tis Matter; and if Spirits “be no denser than Spaces, why may they not “penetrate each other, as well as both Space “and Spirit are supposed to penetrate Matter? “I thought it had been a peculiar Property of “Matter to be impenetrable by a Being of its “own kind. What? is Spirit, impenetrable “by Spirit too? Can a Spirit penetrate the “grossest Matter, and yet not penetrate that “thin Extension of a fellow Spirit, which is “finer than the most refined Matter, and as te-“nuous and unfold as Space itself, as mere “Empetines?†”

What a strange Metaphysician was Mr. Locke! He makes a manifest Difference between the infinite Spirit penetrating every Substance; and one finite Spirit penetrating another! That is, he sup-

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*P. 147, 148. † P. 296.
poses that the *Omnipresence* of the Eternal and Unchangeable Creator, can occasion no Doubt concerning his *Identity*: Whereas if *finite* Spirits did not *exclude* each other out of the fame "Place, he thinks the Notions and Names of "Identity and Diversty would be in vain, and "there could be no such Distinction of Sub-*stances*." Let the learned Reader judge of his Mistake. The Doctor indeed seems greatly sur-
prized, that Mr. *Locke* should not allow an ex-
tended, *finite* Spirit to be *penetrable* by another; a Being as *unsolid* as *Space* itself: That is, if I rightly understand the Doctor, as *unsolid*, as just *Nothing* at all.

But has not Mr. *Locke* given a Reason, why every *finite* Spirit should have a *Place* peculiar to itself?

However to this the Doctor replies, "that e-
"very Spirit is sufficiently distinguishing'd from all others, by its particular Cognitions, and Con-
"sciouness."*  

Let us first suppose, that all the *finite* Spirits in the Universe were extended, and that a thou-
sand of them penetrated each others *Substant*; and were thus in the Language of the *School-men* in the fame *ubi*. Now, notwithstanding each would have a Consciouness of its own, and so be sensible of its particular Existence, Pains, or Pleasures; it may be ask'd, whether any one of them could distinguishing its *own* Substant from that of another? Or whether any other *finite* Spirit whatever could thus distinguishing? And consequently whether, as Mr. *Locke* supposes, "the "Notions and Names of *Identity* and Diversty "would not be in vain," in such a *tumble* of Sub-

* *B. II. C. 27. § 2. † *Step. 40. 116. ‡ *P. 296.

stances? Two Drops of Water, or two Glo-
bules of Quicksilver, would, I think, be full as *differable* from each other, after they were in-
corporated, as ten thousand Spirits, who had penetrated each others *Dimensions*. And there-
fore it is submitted, whether for a proper *Di-
finition of Substances* of the fame kind, a *Di-
finition of Place* be not absolutely necessary?

But now supposing these Beings to be unex-
tended*, and that a *Power of Thinking* is the very *Substance* of *Spirit*, † it would then be an odd kind of Jargon, to talk of one Spirits *Power of Thinking* penetrated by the *Power of Thinking* of another. So that notwithstanding this Author seems to plead so strenously for the *Penetrability* of Spirits, 'tis plain that his own *Hypotheos* will not admit of it, any more than Mr. *Locke*; tho' he was willing to shew what Arguments might be brought against that Gentleman. Indeed there is this Difference between the two Hypo-
thetes, that, whilst the one will not admit fellow Minds into the fame *Place*, the other will neither admit or exclude them †.

The Dr. next proceeds to observe, that Mr. *Locke" makes the Identity of Vegetable and Animal Beings, to consist in a Participation of "the fame continued Life by constantly fleeting "Particles of Matter in Succession vitally united "to the fame organized Body ‡." Here, says this Gentleman, "I ask Leave to remark, first, "perhaps it would be too hard to ask this Au-
"thor** to explain with great Exactness what "he means here by Life and *vitality*; the fame

* P. 296. † P. 116. ‡ P. 296. § B. II. C. 27. § 4. ¶ 6. ** The Doctor here takes Notice, that Mr. *Locke* was living, when this was wrote.
"Life in a Plant cannot signify the same Juice, or nutritive Particles; for it may be transplanted from Clay to Chalk, or from a Bed of Earth to a Bottle of Water, and still 'tis the same Plant. Nor can Life mean the same Tubes, or the same Channels betwixt the Fibres, for they may by Degrees be obstructed, and new ones found or formed, till the old are narrowed, withered, and grown impervious to the Juice. Nor can Life mean the same Method of Motion of that Juice thro' the Plant; for if you bend the Head of a Plant down to the Earth, and let its Top take Root, as may be done to Vines or Brambles, then cut off the old Stalk near its first Root, and the Passage of the nourishing Juice will be just contrary, and yet perhaps 'tis the same Plant still. I would ask further, when the Graft of a Pearmain has grown three Months, or seven Years, upon the Stock of a Crab, is it the same Tree? Has it the same Life, or has it not?"?

I beg Leave here first to observe, that since we are not so happy as to have Mr. Locke's Explanation of his own Meaning, we can only guess at it. Tho' I will venture to believe, he would have found no manner of Difficulty in explaining himself, even with great Exactness——But now, whatever Plant or Tree is capable of receiving Nourishment, whether from Clay, or Water, or each of them alternately; let the old Tubes or Channels wither, and new ones be formed; or let the Nourishment such Tree receives, be distributed in any manner or Direction whatever; yet whilst such Nourishment was continued, would not that Tree be said to have a vegetable Life? And whilst such Life was not interrupted by any Accident, might it not be said to be the same Life? And whatever was so united to that Tree, as to partake of that common Life with it, might not this be said to be vitally united?*

And therefore, whether the Pearmain growing upon the Stock of a Crab, be esteem'd one and the same Tree, or not (in either of which Views, it may appear to different Men, according to their several Ideas† of a Tree) yet whilst the Graft and Stock are so united, as to partake of one common Life, might they not be said to have the same Life, as much as any other Tree, and its Branches?

The ingenious Author thus proceeds,——

"I might say the like concerning the Life of Animals. It can't be the same Blood, that is the same Life; for in a few Months perhaps, we have few of the same Particles of Blood as before; however by Dr. Low's Experiment of Transfusion, it may be all changed in an Hour. Nor can the same Veins, or Vessels, make the same Life, for they are the same when the Animal is dead, or they may be changed in Life-time. Nor is it the same Motion of the Blood and Juices, that makes the same Life; for individual Motion can't be communicated to successive Parts of Matter, since 'tis perishing every Moment, as [Mr. Locke's] second Section affirms us."

Whatever that may consist in, which is call'd Animal Life, whether in a certain Motion from

† Ibd. § 28, 29. 
‡ P. 298.
within, as Mr. Locke supposes; or only in the
Heat of the Heart, as the famous Des Cartes
maintains; or howsoever it is kindled up by
the Great Author of Nature; yet as long as any
Creature enjoyed such Life without Interruption,
the'st it be communicated to constantly fleeting Particles; the Blood, the Vessels, and the Motion
of the Fluids undergo never so many Alterations;
yet whilst such Life is enjoy'd by the same Animal
without Interruption, might it not be call'd
the same continued Life?

But "If a Tree, or Animal, says the Doctor be
dead for some time, and by Almighty Power
new Life and vital Motion be given to the
same Matter, 'tis a different Life, according
to [Mr. Locke.] for 'tis not the same continued
Life, yet it seems to be the same Plant,
and the same Animal."

If anything so extraordinary should have hap-
pened, let us suppose Mr. Locke would have call'd
one the same Plant, and the other the same Animal, restored to Life. If we suppose this,
would it not be remarkable a Case any way injure
his general Description either of vegetable or animal
Identity?

However the Doctor afterwards approves of
what Mr. Locke supposes it necessary to constitute
the same Man, and then proceeds to consider
what is said of Personal Identity; but first he
makes the following Quotation out of Mr. Locke,
"A Person is a thinking intelligent Being,
which has Reason and Reflection, and can
consider itself as itself, the same thinking
Thing in different Times and Places; which

* B. II. C. 27. § 5. † Lett. 67. p. 338. ‡ B. II.

it does only by that Consciouness, which is in-
separable from Thinking." "Now I ques-
tion, says Dr. Watts, whether we may so ea-
sily agree with him in this, as a sufficient Ac-
count of what a Person is.

"Let us consider a little. The Words Self,
and Consciouness of Self refer only to the Pron-
noun I; but are not the Pronouns Thou and
He personal Pronouns as well as I?"

Beyond all Controversy they are; but what
then? Can either Thou or He judge of another
Man's Consciouness? If they cannot, what sig-
nifies their being personal Pronouns? — But the
Doctor thus proceeds, — supposes Armando
has slain his Neighbour in the Sight of Martys
and Criton, and should be seiz'd with such a
Loss of Memory afterwards, or such Distra-
ction, as to blot out the Consciouness of
this Action from the Mind. Armando then
would say, it was not I, but may not Martys
and Criton still charge him, Thou art the Mur-
derer? May they not justly say, that He is
guilty, and He should be put to Death? Are
they not as good Judges of the same Person,
as Armando is himself?"

If the Doctor uses Person here in Mr. Locke's
Sense, the Question then is, — are they not
as well acquainted with Armando's Consciouness,
as he is himself? But if Person signifies any thing
else; how does this Objection affect Mr. Locke?

Again, "what if Armando should deny the Fact,
av having really lost all Consciouness of it? Is he
not still the same Person that flew his Neigh-
bour?" — According to Mr. Locke's Idea of the
same Person, he certainly is not. And why will

* B. II. C. 17. § 9. † P. 299, 300. R

Gentlemen
Gentlemen dispute against Mr. Locke, without attending to the Meaning of his Words.

However, "Does not the Witness of Mar-""tys and Criton declare him to be the same Per-""son?"" — But if he be not the same Person, in Mr. Locke's Sense, will all the Declarations in the World make him the same? And as to his being the same Person in any other Sense, what has Mr. Locke, in the least, to do with it?

But still, "they know his Body to be the" same, and according to the Laws of Nature, "they justly infer his Soul must be the same also," "whatsoever Armando's Distraction might dif-
"fer concerning himself*.

Whatever they might justly infer as to the Sameness of Armando's Soul and Body; they could not surely infer with any Reason or Justice, that the distracted Armando ought now to be punished for what the sober Armando formerly did.

The Doctor afterwards quotes several Passages from Mr. Locke's 9th and 10th Section †, where we are told, that "in Consciousness alone consists Personal Identity. And that it is not con-
"idered in this Case, whether the Self be con-
"tinued in the same, or divers Substances." "And that the same Consciousness unites distant "Actions into the same Person, whatever Sub-
"stances contributed to their Production." —

The Doctor having mentioned thefe, and more to the same Purpose, he is pleased to make the following Remark, — "any Man that reads "this, and knows that the Author is in doubt, "whether Matter may not think," would be "ready to suspeéct that he is fo very follicious

* P. 299, 300. † B.H. C. 27. ‡ See the Vindication of Mr. Locke, p. 2—7.

"to make the same Substance unnecessary to Per-
"sonal Identity, that he may maintain his sup-
"posed Possibility of Matter being made ca-
"pable of Thinking, &c. *"

With Submission to the Doctor, I believe that any Man, at least most unprejudiced Men, who know that Mr. Locke maintains that Matter is of itself incapable of so much as Motion †; who know he believed that his Sentiments could not be the Action of bare, insensible Matter, nor ever could be, without an immaterial thinking Being ‡, and who likewise know, that his Doctrine of Personal Identity would hold equally true (at least in his Opinion) whether the Soul was allowed to be immaterial or not §§; I say most unprejudiced Men who know these Things, would, I believe, be inclined to think, that the Doctor's Suspicions are neither very kind, nor well-grounded. But besides, does not the Doctor's own Hypothesis, full as much as Mr. Locke's, require that the same Substance should be unnecessary to Personal Identity? I really think it does; since Body is one Part of the Doctor's Idea of Person ††.

However, I suppose, the Doctor's Hypothesis may innocently require that, which renders poor Mr. Locke's highly suspicious. Such a Misfortune it is to be a suspected Man!

"But to indulge, says the Doctor no further "Suspicions.", — In my humble Opinion, he has rather indulged too many already. And I should hope, when the ingenious Author comes to review them, he will heartily wish they had not been indulged."
Towards the Conclusion of his last Essay, he thus expresses himself, —— "To do Mr. Locke
" Justice, he acknowledges * that the more probable Opinion is that this Consciouifsness (in which
" he supposes Personal Identity to consist) is annexed to one individual immaterial Substance†." Well then, since Mr. Locke acknowledges this, and still maintains that Personal Identity consists in Identity of Consiousness; this evidently shews, what has been just observed, that he thought the Immateriality of the Soul and his Doctrine of Identity were very consistent with each other.

But farther, Mr. Locke does not only acknowledge, "the more probable Opinion to be, that
" this Consciouifsness is annexed to one individual immaterial Substance;" but that it "is annexed to, [and the Affection of,] one individual immaterial Substance." Thereby plainly making it, not a mere superadded Property, as some might possibly suspect him; but a Power belonging to the very Nature of an immaterial Substance.

And therefore the Doctor should not have curtail'd this short Paragraph, when perhaps the whole was no more than necessarly to take off those bad Impressions, which his Representations of Mr. Locke might have made upon the Reader.

This might indeed proceed only from Hasle, or Inattention, or the Doctor might think that the greatest Part of the Proposition was sufficient; I would not so much as intimated it arose from any worse Principle. But the Doctor has still more Objections to Mr. Locke's Notion of Personal Identity.

* B. II. C. 27. § 25. † P. 311. ‡ B. II. C. 27. § 25.
" Mr. Locke says that Gentleman, seems to allow, that according to his Description of Personal Identity, two different Men may be one and the same Person; for in his 13th and 14th Sections, as well as in other Parts of this Chapter*, he grants that a different Spirit created long after, may possibly have the Consciouifsness of Actions done by a Spirit existent many Ages before, impressed upon it; by this Means the Mayor of Queenborough might suppose his Soul had been the Soul of Socrates, as Section 19, and then this latter Soul or Spirit, or this Man, becomes the same Person with the former, and thus Socrates and the Mayor of Queenborough become one Person.

"But I deny, continues the Doctor, this to be proper conscious Remembrance: 'Tis only a delusive Impression on the Mind or Fancy imitating the Act of Memory: 'tis a strong Belief of what is false. And can such a Frenzy be sufficient to turn two Men into one Person?"

The Doctor having tack'd what is said in the 13th Section, concerning the Possibility of a false Representation, with what Mr. Locke mentions in the 19th; to wit, that if Socrates and the Mayor of Queenborough agree in the Identity of Conscioufsness, they are the same Person; he maintains that what is here call'd Conscioufsness is only Phrenzy and Delusion. But how could this Gentleman get Leave of himself to imagine that Mr. Locke would call Madness by the Name of Conscioufsness? Has Mr. Locke any where so much as intimated that Phrenzy and Conscioufsness are identical Terms? Or that Madness is

* Ibid. † P. 304.
essential to Personal Identity? He affirms indeed, that Socrates and the Mayor of Queenborough would be the same Person in case they agreed in the same Consciences. But in answer to this, the Doctor first takes it for granted, that the poor Mayor is actually in a Prenzy, and then demands, whether such a Prenzy (which I presume is the same with Consciences) be sufficient to turn two Men into one Person? Mr. Locke surely knew full well, that mad Men were capable of imagining anything whatever. But in his whole Discourse upon Personal Identity, which he makes to confit in Identity of Consciences, I believe it will be found upon a careful Examination, that he means only such a real Consciences as renders Men justly liable either to Rewards or Punishments for their past or present Behaviour. This is the Consciences upon which, according to him, Personality depends; and as far as this extends, so far reaches the Identity of every Person.

"As far, says Mr. Locke, as any intelligent Being can repeat the Idea of any Past Action with the same Consciences it had of it at first, and with the same Consciences it has of any present Action; so far it is the same personal Self."

Can the Meaning of this be—so far as any distracted Being, can thro' his Prenzy, appropriate any Action to himself, of which he was never truly conscious, so far he is the same Person: Or in other Words, so far he is justly entitled either to Reward or Punishment. But the Doctor thus proceeds,——

"Must Domitian be really the same Person with Romulus, if his Pride cou'd so far imprefs

* B. II. C. 27. § 18.

his Imagination, and impose upon his Memo-
ry, as to persuade him that he built Rome?
"Is not this contrary to all the Senes and Rea-
son, as well as the Language of Mankind?
"And might not Domitian by the same Mad-
ness become Ninus and Darius and Plato, and
"twenty Persons as well as two?"

One would think Mr. Locke had paid enough in that 14th Section which the Doctor quotes, to have discouraged him from asking all these Questions, and others to the same Purpose.

Mr. Locke there mentions a learned and considerabe Man, who was persuaded that his Soul had been the Soul of Socrates: But yet Mr. Locke will not allow him to be the same Person with Socrates, because not conscious of any of that Philosopher's Thoughts or Actions.

Can we now suppose that Mr. Locke would own Domitian for Plato, because Domitian through Pride and Madness would be taken for him? Or that Domitian's Soldier (who is afterwards mention'd) was Domitian himself, because by a Disorder of his Brain, he imagin'd himself Emperor. On the contrary, so far would Mr. Locke be from acknowledging the mad Domitian to be the same Person with Plato, or the mad Soldier to be the same Person with the Emperor; that he cou'd not, I presume, allow either Domitian or the Soldier, to be any Person at all: I mean in that strict Sense, in which Mr. Locke uses the Word. For what is it that he understands by Person? Is it not "a thinking, intelligent Being, that has Reason and Reflection?" Is not Person, according to him, a "forensic Term appropriating Actions and their Merit.

* P. 304, 305. † B. II. C. 27. § 14. ‡ P. 305.
|| B. II. C. 27. § 9.

"and
"and so belongs only to intelligent Agents, capable of a Law, and Happines and Mery.*"

But does any mad Man whatever come within this Description? Can they properly be said to be intelligent Agents capable of a Law; or their Actions to have either Merit or Demerit belonging to them?

Again, the Doctor having mention'd Mr. Locke's Distinction betwixt the fame Man and the same Person, he thus remarks, ""So I may be the same Man that performed a hundred former Actions of Life, tho' I have entirely forgot them all; but I am not the same Person that performed Millions of those Actions, since I have entirely forgotten a far larger Number of my Thoughts than I can recollect. Now, I would only enquire whether such a Distinction between Man and Person, is either correspondent with the Nature and Reason of Things, or with the common Language of all Men, or the accurate Expressions of true Philosophy?"

But now, if the same Man should sometimes differ as much from himself, as the fable Man does from the mad Man; can it really be thought any Violation either of Grammar or Philosophy, or the Nature or Reason of Things, to adopt a particular Name to the one State, which should not belong to the other; even notwithstanding such a particular Expression may not altogether agree with the common Language of all Men?

But, perhaps it may be enquired, how far the Doctor has acquitted himself in this Affair, in order to approach nearer to the Nature and

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*P. 305, 306.  † P. 305, 306.

Reason of Things, to common Language, and the accurate Expressions of true Philosophy? Why, this Gentleman defines Personal Identity in the following Manner, --- ""the same Person, in a complete Sense, is the same Spirit united to the same Body, that is, in short, the same Man.""

This, according to the Doctor, is ""considering Personality rather in its philosophical Signification, [but] which yet is by no Means fo very different from the more usual Meaning of it in common Life, as Mr. Locke's Account of it is.""

And moreover, whilst Mr. Locke's is a strange and novel Opinion, [this] is much plainer in itself, and much more agreeable to the common Sense of Mankind.†"" And thus, I suppose, the Doctor has avoided those ""many Inconveniences that may arise from [Mr. Locke's] Notion of Personal Senseness, even in the common Affairs of human Life, as well as in Philosophical Science."

The Inconveniences the Doctor not only apprehends to be such, ""as may utterly discourage our Assent to this Notion;"" but he 'fears this Opinion, if universally received, ""would bring in endless Confusions, whereof the Word Person was introduced."" Some Inconveniences of these Confusions and Inconveniences the Doctor gives us, and therefore it may be proper to consider them.

According to [Mr. Locke's] Doctrine of Personal Identity, many Men, says this Author, may successively or simultaneously be one Person; and thus every private Soldier in the Army of Lewis XIV. may become the

* P. 309. † Ibid. ‡ P. 313. § P. 307, 308. ‡Ibid. ""fame
"fame Person as Alexander the Great, if a general Frenzy should seize them, &c. And so any one Man may become many Persons. For if Mr. N. Lee the Tragedian hath a strong Impression on his Fancy, that he caught "Plato Philosophy, then he is the fame Person with Socrates; or that he pleaded in the Roman Senate against Mark Antony, then he is Cicero; or that he subdued Gaul, and made himself Master of Rome, then he is Julius Cæsar; that he wrote the Æneid, then he is Virgil; that he began the Reformation from Popery, then he is Martin Luther; and that he reign'd in England at the latter End of the sixteenth Century, and then he is the fame Person with Queen Elizabeth.

"On the other hand, this Doctrine seems to allow us to believe, that if St. Paul should irrevocably forget all the Labours and Sufferings that he underwent for the Sake of the Gospel, he would not be the fame Person that fulfill'd his Apostleship so gloriously: And if Judas should never think again through all his future Existence, that he betray'd the Saviour of the World, he would not be the Person that committed that heinous Wickedness.

But now, after the Doctor has set forth the dreadful Tendency of Mr. Locke's Notion, in so tragic a Manner, he immediately acquaints us, that "the Way Mr. Locke comes off from any terrible Consequences of these Possibilities in his 26th Section, is by applying the Word Person to Man only in a forensic Sense, as he is the Subject of Happiness or Misery, and is an Object of Rewards or Punishments: And in Section 13, he supposes the Goodness and


Justice of God will not suffer such extravagant Possibilities to come to pass, which may affect the Rewards or Punishments of Men; but his Equity and Truth will discover themselves in attributing proper Recompences to Men or Spirits, consider'd only as Persons, or in their Personal Identity, i.e. as conscious of their own former Actions of Vice or Virtue."

I don't at all wonder, that a fair Writer should give us Mr. Locke's Answer to these extraordinary Objections; but I really wonder, that an ingenious Writer can get Leave of himself to suffer such Objections to stand, when he has already such an Answer to them.

However the Doctor next proceeds to mention certain Inconveniences that may attend Mr. Locke's Notion, with respect to the common Affairs of Human Life.

"The Word Person, says this Gentleman, is often used, if not most frequently, without any forensic Sense: We say, there were five Persons present in the Room at such a Time, or I had but one Person with me, &c. And how can we tell how many Persons were, or were not present, if the supposed Consciousness of five other Persons should place them there at that Time, and render them the same Persons? Or if the supposed Forgetfulness of the Persons really present should take away their Personal Identity?"

It must indeed be acknowledged, that the introducing a Distinction betwixt Man and Person, either at Balls or Drawing-Rooms, or many other Places of public Resort, might be often attended with some Disorder and Confusion: but as it

* Ibid.  † P. 308.
does not appear that Mr. Locke had any such Design, or that he was for altering the common Language of Mankind in the common Affairs of Human Life, perhaps these last Objections might as well have been spared.

The Doctor concludes his Essays with this Remark, — "Personality and Sameness of Persons, "either in this World or the other, must not "stand upon such a shifting and changeable "Principle, as may allow either one Man to "be two Persons, or two Men to be one Person, "or any one Man or Person to become another, "or to be really any thing but himself".

If this Gentleman only means, that Personality and Sameness of Persons cannot stand upon the Principles laid down by Mr. Locke, this is what every one must judge of for himself. But if he means, that Naï. Lee, notwithstanding his Distraction, is neither Caesar, nor Cicero, nor Luther, nor Queen Elizabeth, the Doctor is entirely in the right; but then the Point to be consider'd, is, whether he be not altogether mistaken, when he supposes Mr. Locke to be his Antagonist?

I shall give the learned Reader no farther Trouble, than just leaving the two following Queries to his Reflections.

First, Whether it be not highly reasonable that Gentlemen should understand Mr. Locke, before they undertake to censure or confute him?

And, in the next Place, If they had always done this, whether the Number of his Opponents might not have been considerably lessen'd?

* P. 313.

FINIS.